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Foreword
Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself? was conceived on the idea that 
Europe – which at the time was thoroughly bogged down with 
the migrant crisis, economic crisis and a counter-terror crisis 
– was also experiencing a new type of crisis. One less visible, 
but with the potential to become just as important. In the 
declining level of political engagement and trust, the   
growth of populist parties and anti-immigrant sentiment, 
we saw a common thread of fear weaving its way through   
European societies, with the potential to foster a divisive new   
political culture, to destabilise democratic governance, and 
to challenge the ‘liberal consensus’ of modern times. Even so, 
18 months ago we could not have imagined we would ever 
arrive where we are now.
This project has sought to capture a snapshot of the 
common and unique manifestations of fear and insecurity 
across Europe in a moment that feels particularly important. 
There is a sense that we are standing on the edge of a new   
era, one where the core tenets of the past half-century – of 
representative democracy as an inherent good, of unfettered 
globalisation, of greater mixing of people, goods and ideas 
across the world – are being held to trial, challenged and 
potentially turned away from all together. Just as the changes 
our European societies have experienced in absorbing this   
age of free trade, movement and ideas have fostered fears and 
insecurities, so too does the next phase ahead feel uncertain 
and unchartered – particularly for those who felt safe in 
what we had before.
It is clear that the era we are leaving has caused some 
parts of our societies to feel disenfranchised and disconnected. 
Too many political leaders, from both the left and the right, 
have viewed success in primarily economic terms, and have 
missed simmering social and cultural crises that can feel more 
important to ordinary people’s day-to-day lives. The sense of 
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being displaced or ignored, the demoralising impact of 
precarious work, the loss of culture and community, the 
feeling of no longer belonging where you once felt at home. 
Even now, as this research shows, these concerns are often 
dismissed as intangible, or ‘emotional’ in nature – as if not 
being able to be measured empirically, or addressed through 
the traditional prisms of public policy, somehow impeaches 
their significance. 
The political upheavals we have witnessed throughout 
the course of the project – and the ones that are perhaps yet 
to come – should underscore to any politicians or institutions 
the risks that are posed to stability, openness and cohesion   
by allowing citizens’ fears to bud and flourish. Let us be   
clear: this is not the time to turn our backs on the many 
achievements that have also been made over recent decades 
– not least of all in social liberalism, and improved equality 
of opportunity across gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation, 
education, international cooperation, conservation, 
technology, health and innovation. These gains need to be 
defended, and further advanced, even in the face of growing 
authoritarian and nationalist attitudes. What is evident from 
this research project is that this will only be possible if we 
recognise and address the insecurities plaguing so many 
citizens’ lives, because – as humans – we are at our most 
altruistic, generous, inclusive and community-minded 
when we feel safe.
I would like first to thank the Open Societies 
Foundation, and in particular Christal Morehouse, Goran 
Buldiowski and Heather Grabbe, for their unfailing support   
for this project. I would also like to thank the scores of 
immensely bright, perceptive and enthusiastic people who 
have contributed to this project across Europe, including 
journalists, think tankers, non-governmental organisations, 
politicians, academics, policy-makers and civil society 
organisations. The issues addressed in this project are bigger 
than all of us, and the generous spirit of collaboration from 
a broad consortium of stakeholders is tremendously 
encouraging. I am grateful to our partner organisations 
– d|part in Germany, the Jacques Delors Institute in France, 
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FORES in Sweden, the Institute of Public Affairs in   
Poland and the Elcano Institute in Spain, who have   
produced such high-quality research, and worked so closely 
with us throughout this project. At Demos, I recognise the 
outstanding contribution of our chief executive Claudia 
Wood, as well as research colleagues Peter Harrison-Evans 
and Sacha Hilhorst, and Alex Porter. Ralph Scott and Charlie 
Cadywould, who have since moved on to other organisations, 
were also integral to this project and key authors on the UK 
case study. 
As always, any errors or omissions in this report 
as a whole remain those of the authors.
Sophie Gaston, Demos 
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Introduction
Introduction
There is a spectre haunting Europe: a culture of fear that 
is finding its form and asserting its growing influence in 
myriad ways. 
This is a fear of the unknown: a fear of the other, a fear 
of the future. Its political consequences have been shown most 
starkly in the UK’s vote to leave the EU, and the electoral 
success of authoritarian governments in central Europe. 
However, fear is also taking hold of the politics of other 
European nations, marked by the growing success of other 
‘populist’ right-wing and Eurosceptic parties, including the 
Front National, Alternative für Deutschland, and the Swedish 
Democrats, as well as the rise of street movements such as the 
anti-Islamic Pegida. This new populist politics is having 
tangible effects on national public policy, through tighter 
border controls, the erosion of liberal freedoms and so-called 
‘welfare chauvinism’, where social security eligibility is made 
ever-stricter. Its social impact can be seen in the increasingly 
nativist and ‘othering’ discourse in the public realm, the 
disintegration of civil society and declining social trust, and 
the resurgence of exclusive national and regional identities.
The drivers of this are as multifarious and indeterminate 
as their effects. If ‘fear’ does not quite do it justice, then 
perhaps we are talking about what sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman calls Unsicherheit – ‘that complex combination 
of uncertainty, insecurity, and lack of safety’, which results 
from the economic, social and cultural consequences of 
globalisation, and their entanglement with national, 
regional and local contexts. 
Some drivers and symptoms of the politics of fear   
are, therefore, specific to particular regions or countries, 
however many exhibit some level of commonality across EU 
member states. It seems clear, then, that this is not an isolated 
phenomenon with causes to be unpicked, but is part of a wider 
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rising tide that cuts across traditional geographic, political 
and analytical boundaries. This fear threatens not only the 
transnational solidarity underpinning the European project, 
but the stability of free and open societies across Europe.
This project led by the think tank Demos, working in 
partnership with think tanks and academic researchers in five 
other European countries, has set out to explore this culture 
of fear, understand its influence on social and political 
attitudes and behaviour, and develop ideas to tackle it. 
Through cross-national, as well as country-specific, polling, 
supplemented by qualitative research, this study maps the 
current political landscape and provides a detailed analysis 
of public attitudes across France, Germany, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. By drawing together this analysis we 
assess the way forward for political leaders to restore a more 
positive and inclusive political culture within individual 
nation states and across the EU. 
Our approach
The starting premise for our research contends that the 
politics and culture of fear cannot be treated as a discrete 
phenomenon to be studied in isolation but must instead be 
observed through the analysis of other social and political 
trends. With this in mind we identified five key themes to 
frame our subsequent investigation: 
 · party politics: the rise of populist parties and ‘anti-politics’, 
with declining trust and participation in electoral politics
 · public policy: restrictions on citizenship and access to public 
services and welfare, rising state authoritarianism, and an 
increased reliance on directly democratic decision-making
 · social cohesion: declining social cohesion, particularly between 
different ethnic and religious groups, and real and perceived 
problems of social integration
 · political narratives and rhetoric: changes in public discourse – 
whether media framing, the rhetoric employed by politicians 
or through social media – with an increase in ‘othering’ 
language and framing
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 · citizens: including perceptions of identity, rising exclusive 
nationalist sentiments, and feelings of pessimism  
and insecurity
We selected six EU member states – France, Germany, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK – to act as a barometer through 
which to analyse and explore these five core themes. These   
six countries were chosen, in part, to represent a breadth of 
experiences and outcomes across the EU – for example, when 
looking at party politics our case studies reflect a range of 
circumstances from the electoral victory of an authoritarian 
populist party in Poland to a relative absence of right-wing 
populists in Spain. However, we also selected countries which 
help to highlight emerging and common trends across Europe 
– on narrative, for example, we have seen a turn towards   
more nationalistic political discourse in many of our chosen 
countries – from a greater emphasis on ‘Swedish values’ 
by populist and mainstream politicians in Sweden, to the 
nationalistic, and at times xenophobic, campaigning around 
the EU referendum in the UK. 
Our overarching method has been to establish common 
research questions and approaches across the countries, while 
also conducting more detailed country-specific analysis, 
employing a range of different research methodologies. 
As well as working with our research partners, we have also 
sought input from a wider group of academic, policy and civil 
society leaders and experts through a series of workshops, 
which have helped frame the research, explore emerging 
findings and develop possible solutions. The study’s 
methodology can, therefore, be broken down into three 
constituent parts:
 · Cross-national polling: Demos commissioned YouGov to 
conduct an online survey of adults (aged 18 and over) across 
our six countries (UK polling did not survey adults in 
Northern Ireland, therefore when referring to polling we use 
the term Great Britain). The polling asked common questions 
across all six countries, with a focus on public attitudes 
to the EU, globalisation, societal changes (eg increasing 
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diversity), and political leadership and trust. Samples across 
the six countries were weighted to ensure the findings were 
representative of national populations.1
 · National case study research: Demos commissioned case 
studies produced by independent think tanks in five of the 
six countries, with Demos conducting the case study research 
for the UK. The case studies used additional country-specific 
polling (with additional questions added to the cross-national 
survey conducted by YouGov), combined with a range of 
different methodologies, including qualitative interviews 
with politicians (Germany), regression modelling (UK), and 
discourse and textual analysis (Sweden and Poland). 
 · Expert workshops: Demos convened workshops in Brussels 
with academic, policy and civil society leaders and experts 
from the six case study countries, together with delegates 
with Europe-wide expertise, including EU policy leaders and 
journalists. The first workshop involved facilitated discussion 
around the five key themes, to provide expert input to frame 
and guide the subsequent polling and case study research. 
The second workshop was conducted over two days, during 
the first of which delegates debated emergent findings of the 
research, while the second focused on gaining insights about 
potential policy and civil society responses. 
In the following sections of this chapter we set out the current 
political context behind this research, discuss the findings of 
the cross-national polling, and give an introduction to the six 
country case studies. 
Context and background
Context and background
The current era is one of rapid, and at times bewildering, 
political and social change, in which there have been 
significant shifts in public opinion over a short space of   
time, together with seismic events that have confounded 
expert predictions. It increasingly feels as if crisis after crisis 
rattle through the political and media landscape, leaving 
pre-existing institutions with little time to adapt. Fear is   
often both a product of and a response to this pace of change, 
contributing to a growing sense of precariousness and anxiety 
among European publics, at times exploited by insurgent or 
even mainstream political figures. 
There is, therefore, a growing sense of urgency in the 
need to understand the drivers and symptoms of rapidly 
shifting tides across our five thematic areas – party politics, 
policy, society, narrative and individual identity – and build 
coalitions across disciplinary and political divides to develop 
effective responses. Below we review the current picture across 
the five themes, as the first step to getting to grips with the 
current situation. 
Party politics
While 2016 has been widely viewed as the year in which 
authoritarian populist politics broke through to the 
‘mainstream’, the steady rise of populist parties across Europe 
can be traced back to at least the European elections of 2009, 
when the likes of the British National Party, Hungary’s 
Jobbik, the Austrian Freedom Party and the True Finns made 
significant electoral inroads. By the 2014 European elections 
the gains made by populist parities were brought into far 
sharper relief. In France, Marine Le Pen’s Front National 
topped the polls, while anti-EU UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) won the most votes in the UK. There were similar 
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trends in Austria, where the Freedom Party increased its 
vote share, Germany, where the new party Alternative für 
Deutschland won its first seats, Italy, with initial success for 
Grillo’s Five Star Movement, and many other countries.2 
In the years since 2014 successes in European elections 
have increasingly been replicated in populist gains in national 
and regional elections. This has been most starkly shown 
through the victory of the Law and Justice party in the 2015 
Polish parliamentary elections. However, there have also been 
significant gains for other populist parties, across Europe. 
In Germany, for example the anti-European Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) received double-digit shares of the vote in 
all the regional elections in March 2016, before surging to 21 
per cent in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in September 2016, 
finishing above the Christian Democratic Union in Angela 
Merkel’s home state. In Austria, the 2016 presidential election 
between the Green Party’s Alexander Van der Bellen and the 
far-right Freedom Party’s Norbert Hofer was notable. First, it 
was the first time since the Second World War that an Austrian 
president had not been backed by either of the two 
establishment parties. Second, while there was widespread 
international relief that Van der Bellen claimed victory in the 
re-run of the election in December, this still left 46 per cent of 
the vote going to the far-right candidate. In the UK, while 
UKIP was restricted to just one seat in the 2015 general 
election thanks to the first-past-the-post electoral system, the 
party managed to gain nearly 13 per cent of the popular vote. 
It is worth noting that despite often being referred 
to as ‘far right’, many of these groups are not easily placed 
according to traditional political categories, often combining 
elements of left-wing and right-wing philosophy, mixed with 
populist language and rhetoric. For example, under Marine 
Le Pen, the Front National has campaigned from a strongly 
left-wing position on welfare, while taking a far-right position 
on immigration. In some ways, this leaves these parties with 
a greater capacity to capitalise on the changing contours of 
national political debates. Recent referendums have produced 
voting patterns which cut across traditional party lines, and 
this highlights the waning of the left–right paradigm as the 
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major dividing line in politics, with others schisms – such   
as young vs old, educated vs uneducated, open vs closed   
(or in Le Pen’s words, ‘globalists’ vs ‘patriots’) – becoming 
increasingly significant. 
That said, there have also been major gains for   
anti-establishment, populist parties from a more resolutely 
left-wing position, including Podemos in Spain, and   
most notably Syriza in Greece. ‘Populist’ is therefore an 
all-embracing term that brings together very different political 
entities. However, while the term ‘populism’ is not without its 
conceptual problems, populist parties at the very broadest 
level tend to have a similar worldview, one defined by 
prominent political scientist Cas Mudde as: 
an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus 
‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.3
For left-wing populist parties, this concept of ‘the people’ 
may be framed particularly to exclude financial elites, using 
language such as the ‘99 per cent’. For right-wing populist 
parties, ‘the people’ is typically bound to the idea of the 
nation, which may exclude non-elite groups such as welfare 
recipients, immigrants and ethnic and religious minorities 
(albeit often constructed as receiving underserved support 
from elites).4 In both cases, however, growing populist 
support reflects a deep distrust in, or a rejection of, the current 
political system, which represents a substantial challenge to 
mainstream parties. 
Public policy
Anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic rhetoric is exerting an 
influence on policy across Europe. In some cases this is the 
result of populist parties in government. For example, once 
in power the Law and Justice party reversed the previous 
government’s pledge to accept 7,000 refugees, citing concerns 
around terrorism and disease; Jaroslaw Kaczynski accused 
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refugees of ‘bringing in all kinds of parasites’.5 In June 2016, 
Poland also passed new anti-terrorism laws introducing 
measures such as the wiretapping of foreign citizens without 
a court order. Critics argue that these laws are inconsistent 
with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Some commentators have argued that this combination 
of anti-immigrant and authoritarian policy change seen in 
Poland reflects the Law and Justice party ‘learning from the 
Hungarians’ in their approach.6 Since regaining the 
premiership in 2010, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
has been criticised for cracking down on media freedom and 
political accountability, as well as exploiting terrorist attacks 
in Europe to spread fear and promote Islamophobia and 
a narrow, ethnic nationalism. The policy agendas of both 
governments have brought them into open conflict with the 
EU – Hungary for its treatment of migrants, and Poland for 
changes to the country’s constitutional court and state media 
– which have led to threats to sanction these countries under 
Article 7 for violating fundamental EU rights. 
Even where populist parties have not formed 
governments, the politics of fear has asserted its influence 
on policy through restrictions on welfare and social security 
provision, driven in part by financial constraints, but also 
a more politicised weakening of social bonds and solidarity. 
A number of states have recently attempted to tighten 
eligibility rules for immigrants. This was at the forefront of 
David Cameron’s EU renegotiation (a now largely academic 
exercise), which included an ‘emergency brake’ on in-work 
benefits for EU migrants. Welfare chauvinism towards 
migrants is part of a wider and much longer-running trend 
towards tightening eligibility and reduced generosity in 
many countries’ welfare regimes, however. 
Austerity policies, largely implemented by establishment 
parties in the wake of the financial crisis, have led to 
significant falls in welfare spending in many countries. 
According to the OECD’s social expenditure index, spending 
to gross domestic product (GDP) ratios declined between 
2009 and 2014 by 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points in Germany, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland and the UK.7 In Greece, the impact 
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of austerity measures imposed by the troika of the  
European Central Bank, the European Commission,   
and the International Monetary Fund led to a sharp fall in   
spending-to-GDP of 2 percentage points in just two years.   
In 2016 alone, Greece slashed public spending by €5.7 billion.8 
More fundamentally there’s also been a restructuring 
of the social contract in many countries, and a re-imagining 
of what constitutes a deserving or undeserving welfare 
recipient. This is linked to longer-running trends towards   
the activating welfare state, which places greater emphasis   
on active labour market policies and benefit conditionality. 
German academics Peter Bleses and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser 
have described the ‘dual transformation’ of the German 
welfare state, which has experienced a significant expansion 
of family policy (to support female labour market 
participation), combined with a far-reaching retrenchment 
in unemployment protection.9 
The policy direction of governments is both shaping 
and being shaped by public opinion, which in many cases 
has hardened on welfare. According to the most recent British 
Social Attitudes Survey, 45 per cent of people said that 
spending on unemployment benefit should be reduced and 
60 per cent said unemployment benefit receipt should be 
time limited.10 The recent British Social Attitudes Survey also 
found that 61 per cent of people agreed that a working-age 
couple without children who are struggling to make ends meet 
should ‘look after themselves’, rather than getting government 
support to boost their wages. While Britain may be somewhat 
of an outlier on welfare solidarity, academics Paul de Beer and 
Ferry Koster have argued that there is, at least, a broader shift 
across Europe from one-sided solidarity (assisting someone else 
without expecting anything in return) to two-sided solidarity, 
playing into narratives of a ‘something for something’ culture.11 
Levels of social trust have been shown to be a key ingredient 
of public support for the welfare state – therefore the divisive 
political rhetoric that typifies the politics of fear represents 
a substantial threat to the social contract across Europe.12 
Against a backdrop of an ever-present threat of 
terrorism, it is not surprisingly that many leaders are 
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themselves embodying the fear of their citizens in hardening 
security and migration practices. Border checks and controls 
have been re-imposed in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Norway and Sweden.13 However, the response to the migration 
crisis also reflects fears more related to a sense of erosion of 
cultural and social identity. Some governments, with the 
notable exception of Germany, have refused to take large 
numbers of refugees, in part due to the fear of losing support 
to populist parties. 
The current political landscape in Denmark, with a 
right-wing minority government, dependent on support from 
the anti-immigrant Danish People’s Party, has encouraged 
a hardline position on refugees, out of step with the country’s 
reputation as a bastion of social democratic generosity. 
Denmark’s response to the refugee crisis has become defined 
by a series of controversial measures, including the slashing of 
refugee benefits, placing advertising in Lebanese newspapers 
urging refugees not to come, and most notably the passing of 
a law which enables the authorities to seize refugees’ cash and 
valuables. Most recently, the Danish government has 
indefinitely suspended a programme to receive around 
500 refugees per year through the UN Refugee Agency.14 
Populist rhetoric has exerted an influence on the broader 
policy agendas of mainstream governments and political 
parties, which have often taken what Matthew Goodwin terms 
an ‘adoptive’ strategy to responding to populist insurgencies.15 
In France, for example, measures have been put in place to 
reduce access to citizenship, so that now the children of 
immigrants no longer gain citizenship at birth, but at the 
age of 18, and only once they show themselves to be ‘well 
assimilated to customs and manners’. The national 
government in France has been unable to challenge 
successfully the highly controversial ban on burkinis on public 
beaches, which was introduced in over 30 municipalities.
Finally, it is also important to recognise recent changes 
to the policy process itself that are influenced by this culture 
and politics of fear. Declining trust in politicians generally 
and an increased emphasis on a ‘purer’ (more direct) form 
of democracy has led governments across Europe to respond 
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positively to calls for more referendums.16 In the 1970s,   
Europe averaged just three referendums a year – The Economist 
estimates that figure to now stand at eight. In 2016 alone, there 
were major referendums in the Netherlands (on the Ukraine–
EU Association Agreement), the UK (on EU membership), 
Italy (on its constitution) and Hungary (on migrant quotas). 
The growth in the number of referendums can be seen to 
reflect politicians promoting a more inclusive form of politics, 
but they have been proven in many cases to encourage divisive 
public discourse built around binary narratives, and are 
largely considered unsuitable as a mechanism for most 
complex or constitutional matters – particularly if there is 
little chance that citizens can be sufficiently educated in the 
subjects at hand.17 
While encouraging political participation, referendums 
have the power to destabilise and disempower more 
deliberative and representative forms of democracy   
on which most European societies are founded. 
Social cohesion
Freedom of movement within Europe, immigration from 
outside the EU and the ongoing migrant crisis have raised 
questions about how new arrivals should best be integrated 
into existing societies. Numerous populist politicians have 
argued that the pace of change has been too quick, that new 
arrivals have tended to separate themselves off from the rest 
of society, and that indigenous cultures are under threat. In 
December 2016, 45 per cent of respondents to a Eurobarometer 
survey named immigration as one of their most important 
concerns at EU level, with 20 per cent naming terrorism, 
the second most common response.18
Whether this apparent lack of integration leads to 
cultural and social conflict is a matter of fierce debate – and 
nowhere is the fear of cultural threat felt and exploited more 
than with Islam. Jeffrey Alexander claims that a backlash 
against the ‘multiculturalist’ approach to integration began   
in the mid-1990s, and sped up following 9/11. In 2008 David 
Cameron called multiculturalism a ‘dangerous’ and 
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‘wrong-headed doctrine’, and in recent years French 
commentators have spoken of ‘Balkanisation’, while the 
German discussion has used the term ‘parallel societies’.19 
Alexander argues: ‘One European nation after another   
has shifted… from entertaining a more multicultural to 
demanding a more assimilative mode of incorporation.’20
The Cologne assaults in early January 2016 and incidents 
of home-grown terrorism have raised the profile of problems 
of social integration, and linked immigration directly to 
feelings of physical insecurity. This has been seen in a 
hardening of attitudes to migrants, particularly in Germany; 
while only one-third of the population thought that their 
‘country already has a large number of foreign nationals or 
people of foreign origin and it is not possible to host 
additional immigrants’ in September 2015, that proportion 
had increased to half by March 2016.
EU citizens are far less likely to feel comfortable 
working alongside a Muslim (71 per cent) than a Christian 
(94 per cent), atheist (87 per cent), Jew (84 per cent) or 
Buddhist (81 per cent). The figure for Muslims is far lower 
in some countries, such as Czech Republic (just 27 per cent 
comfortable) and Slovakia (37 per cent comfortable). Similarly, 
just 50 per cent would feel comfortable with their son or 
daughter being in a relationship with a Muslim person, with 
30 per cent saying they would be uncomfortable. In many 
countries the numbers are much lower: just 12 per cent of 
Czech respondents would be comfortable with their son or 
daughter being in a relationship with a Muslim, with less than 
half agreeing in many EU-15 countries too: Italy (41 per cent), 
Germany (43 per cent), Austria (44 per cent) and Belgium 
(47 per cent). 
The most recent Eurobarometer survey on discrimination 
in the EU gives us some insight into the scale of the problems 
experienced by minorities: 30 per cent of participants 
belonging to an ethnic minority group said they had 
experienced discrimination or harassment related to their 
ethnicity in the previous 12 months; 22 per cent of those from 
a religious minority said they had experienced discrimination 
or harassment on the grounds of their religion or beliefs.21 
Context and background
While often primarily considered in terms of race 
relations, social cohesion has also been eroding in European 
countries across other spheres of interaction and relationships. 
The elections held in 2016, and the campaigns under way   
in 2017, have exposed a multitude of social and attitudinal 
schisms across European societies. The traditional binary 
division in politics based largely on class (blue-collar–white-
collar collar; left–right) has been supplemented, or even 
superseded, by emerging divisions – between age groups, 
ethnic groups, graduates and non-graduates, and urban and 
rural communities – which are increasingly defined by their 
social values and economic status. There is a sense that social 
fragmentation is both increasing and hardening, with citizens 
increasingly unlikely to mix with their counterparts across the 
new dividing lines. 
Education has been shown to be at the centre of many 
of these emergent social schisms. The Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation in the UK found that educational opportunity 
was ‘the biggest driver’ of the Brexit vote, with 75 per cent of 
voters with postgraduate qualifications in favour of Remain, 
and 73 per cent of those without qualifications voting Leave.22 
While educational divides can be lazily caricatured as the 
informed vs the uniformed, British sociologist David 
Runciman has written convincingly about the impact of 
higher education – not in correcting for political or economic 
ignorance, but instead acting as a socialising force promoting 
liberal and cosmopolitan values.23
While the new dividing lines cut across European 
countries, where particular social groups stand on key issues 
can vary markedly between member states. Age, for example, 
is becoming an increasingly important predictor of attitudes 
and voting intentions. In Western and Northern Europe 
younger people tend to have more liberal and internationalist 
views. However, the reverse is true in parts of central Europe 
where younger people have been far more receptive to far-right 
nationalist rhetoric than older generations. The proportion of 
young people voting for Jobbik in Hungary, Law and Justice 
in Poland, and the far-right Kotleba party in Slovakia in 
recent elections has outstripped that of the wider population.24 
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While the Central European case is perhaps more alarming, 
growing inter-generational divides on either side of the 
political spectrum threaten social cohesion, particularly in 
the context of an ageing population reliant on social security 
transfers from young to old. 
Social fragmentation of values and demographics is in 
some cases set within more tangible geographic fragmentation 
driven by secessionist movements, most notably in Scotland 
and Catalonia. Although these campaigns have so far been 
defeated or constrained, the Brexit vote has heightened the 
chances of a second Scottish independence vote, and Carles 
Puigdemont, the head of the Catalonian government, has 
insisted that a referendum on independence will take place 
in September 2017 (in defiance of the Spanish government’s 
position). European and national political leaders clearly fear 
that success in either of these elections could spark a further 
disintegration of European political space. 
Political narratives and rhetoric
Changing political narratives and language have in part been 
driven by the rise of populist parties, whose rhetoric has 
gained increased prominence as a result of electoral success. 
Populist discourse preys on a sense of precariousness 
in social and cultural identities through appealing to binary 
distinctions, encouraging gang-like mentalities that drive 
cleavages between different groups. These may take the form 
of hyper-patriotic nationalism against cosmopolitanism; of the 
‘deserving’ recipients of state welfare and users of public 
services against undeserving interlopers and charlatans; or the 
authentic, salt-of-the-earth ‘people’ against the bloated, 
out-of-touch establishment and ruling elites.
These divisions are powerful in their ability to shape 
social relations, set a framework for acceptable public debate, 
and become normalised through mainstream political parties 
and the media. In their study of political speeches and 
rhetoric, Ruth Wodak and Salomi Boukala examine speeches 
given by Geert Wilders and David Cameron in detail. 
They argue:
Context and background
Debates about European identities – especially since the financial 
crisis of 2008 – have increasingly been accompanied by debates 
about both more traditional racialised cultural concerns and more 
recently about economic security, leading to new distinctions 
between ‘Us’, the ‘real Europeans’, and ‘Them’, the ‘Others’.25 
The most prominent example of the influence of divisive 
populist rhetoric has been the mainstreaming of strongly 
negative depictions of immigrants. Analysis of national 
newspapers in the UK by the Oxford Migration Observatory 
showed that the most common descriptor for the word 
‘immigrants’ was ‘illegal’. Other consistent terms found 
nearby in newspaper copy included those around legality   
and security (‘terrorist’, ‘suspected’, ‘sham’), and those using 
water-based imagery (‘flood’, ‘influx’, ‘wave’).26 Similarly, 
Alexander Caviedes’ study of centre-right national newspapers 
in Britain, France and Italy found that 39 per cent of articles 
related to immigration had a focus on security between 2008 
and 2012. Most of these related to border controls, although 
in the UK and Italy around 1 in 5 related to physical threats, 
including terrorism and disease.27
Research has also shown that the prevalence of these 
narratives is not highly dependent on local realities. Donatella 
Bonansinga’s research into attitudes towards Islam in the 
Czech Republic found that Islamophobic sentiments are 
gathering momentum and rising quickly, although the 
country’s Muslim population is ‘tantamount to zero’. 
Bonansinga hypothesises that media representations   
and political rhetoric are to blame for such trends:
The construction of otherness as referred to the Muslim culture 
is channelling fears about an allegedly inevitable clash of 
civilisations. In addition, problems concerning immigration to 
Europe have given birth to dramatic fears of an invasion, as these 
constant flows of people on the move are perceived as a challenge 
and threat to both national identities and security.28
Anti-immigrant rhetoric may be the clearest example of the 
populist influence on contemporary political discourse in 
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Europe, but the politics of fear, and the policies of fear, are 
driving wedges between many different societal and cultural 
groups. In particular, the divisions of nationalism and 
authoritarianism against liberal values are being fought in 
the public debates around patriotism and the ‘legitimacy’ of 
different voices and opinions. In this context, the ‘you’re either 
with us or against us’ narrative is threatening to stifle free 
debate, and side-lining the important contributions of 
‘experts’ – now considered enemies of the state for their lack 
of blind national optimism. Nowhere has this become more 
evident than in the aftermath of the European Referendum, 
where even fundamental institutions, such as the Bank of 
England and the Supreme Court, have been politicised to the 
extent that major daily newspapers have ‘named and shamed’ 
individual judges and called for marches on the court.29 
Any caution or concern expressed about the UK’s vote to 
leave the EU is now branded as an act of ‘remoaning’ by some 
of the nation’s most influential news outlets, and views of 
dissent outside the framework of acceptable commentary are 
labelled treacherous. This dangerous new narrative – perhaps 
the most explicit form of ‘othering’, with implied consequences 
for citizenship – is a clear obstacle to maintaining a unified 
society, and threatens to obscure the urgency of addressing 
many of the other divisions and conflicts already at play, and 
the inequalities of power and agency between those asserting 
and subscribing to the narrative itself.
Citizens
Finally, how much of this culture of fear is reflected in 
changing individual identities? Are we seeing new, exclusive 
nationalisms at the expense of more inclusive identities and 
transnational solidarity? 
As early as 2004, academics such as Mary Kaldor were 
arguing that a ‘new’ nationalism was on the rise as a direct 
response to globalisation.30 Today many commentators believe 
that the rise of right-wing populist parties is linked to global 
economic trends, with the core support for these parties 
coming from blue-collar workers whose career prospects have 
Context and background
been damaged by competition from emerging markets, 
migrant labour and in some cases the austerity policies 
imposed by governments and EU institutions.31 Hanspeter 
Kriesi and Takis Pappas argue in their 2015 book European 
Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession:
The lack of responsiveness of established parties to the plight of the 
‘globalisation losers’ provided a chance for their mobilisation by the 
new populist right… the success of the new challengers was mainly 
due to their appeal to the cultural anxieties of the ‘losers’, which, 
given the ‘losers’’ heterogeneous economic interests, provided the 
lowest common denominator for their mobilisation.32
This is influenced by and feeds into pessimism and a lack of 
social trust. Research by Demos into the attitudes of online 
supporters of populist movements across Europe found that 
these groups had very low levels of optimism about their 
country’s future: only 10 per cent felt their country was ‘on 
the right track’.33 However, this pessimism was also evident 
– albeit to a lesser extent – in the wider population with only 
28 per cent thinking the same across the European population 
as a whole. Similarly, when asked a standard question of social 
trust – whether ‘most people can be trusted’ – our online 
study of populist supporters found that they tended to be 
more fearful or sceptical of others, with 33 per cent saying  
yes compared with a European average of 40 per cent. 
Trends in national identity and attitudes often coincide 
with negative sentiments towards supranational identity   
and institutions: Carey, for example, found a negative 
relationship between national pride and attitudes towards EU 
integration.34 In the UK, there has been a clear trend towards 
a more exclusive sense of English national identity: in 1992, 
31 per cent felt English and 62 per cent British, while in 2014, 
43 per cent felt exclusively English and the same proportion 
British. This Englishness is related to attitudes towards the 
EU, with 52 per cent of those identifying as English 
supporting Leave against 32 per cent of those who felt British.
Although the UK is to some extent an outlier in this 
regard – regularly coming bottom of Eurobarometer surveys 
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of European identity – attachment to the EU as an institution 
is low across Europe. Just 11 per cent of EU citizens feel ‘very 
attached’ to the EU, compared with 56 per cent who feel 
attached to their country and 52 per cent who feel attached to 
their city, town or village.35 This lack of attachment, combined 
with a rising politics of fear and its populist manifestations, 
could have severe consequences for the future of the EU.
Cross-national surveys
Cross-national surveys
In 2016, we conducted cross-national surveys of citizens   
in France, Germany, Great Britain,36 Poland, Spain and 
Sweden, which revealed a widespread sense of precariousness, 
uncertainty and pessimism, which was most clearly   
evidenced in public opinion on political trust and the EU,   
and respondents’ expectations for the future. In particular  
the polling found: 
 · low levels of trust in both EU and national-level governments 
and political institutions
 · greater proportions of citizens in each country (with the 
exception of Spain) expecting things to get worse rather than 
better for their country and for Europe as a whole
 · majorities (Britain, France, Sweden) or significant minorities 
(Germany, Poland, Spain) wanting to reduce the EU’s powers 
or leave it all together
Opinions were more mixed when it came to questions on 
the impact of recent societal changes – with majorities in most 
countries holding favourable views on female participation in 
the labour market and same-sex relationships. By contrast a 
greater proportion of citizens in France, Germany and Poland 
thought that greater ethnic diversity had made their countries 
worse rather than better off, while the reverse was true in 
Britain, Spain and Sweden. 
Perhaps surprisingly, our polling found significant 
majorities holding positive views about the impact of 
globalisation on Europe, their country, their local area and 
their own lives. The only exception here came from the French 
polling where half of people felt that globalisation had had 
a negative impact on France. 
We review the findings from our cross-national polling 
in greater detail below. 
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Euroscepticism
In every country, there is either a majority or a substantial 
minority in favour of reducing the EU’s powers or leaving it 
altogether. Unsurprisingly, Great Britain is the most 
Eurosceptic, with 45 per cent (51 per cent excluding don’t 
knows) wanting to leave the EU. Germany is the most  
pro-European with half (48 per cent) wanting either to leave 
things as they are or increase the EU’s powers, although 
16 per cent expressed a desire to leave the EU (fi gure 1).
Figure 1   Preferences of respondents in each country, on their 
country’s long-term policy on the EU 
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Attitudes to globalisation
We also asked our survey respondents about globalisation. 
This is a difficult subject to poll because it is so multi-faceted, 
and means different things to different people. Rather than 
using the term explicitly, we described the current situation 
as one where:
Over recent decades the world has become more interconnected. 
There is greater free trade between countries and easier 
communication across the globe. Money, people, cultures, 
jobs and industries all move more easily between countries.
We asked respondents whether they thought this trend had 
had a positive or negative effect at four levels: Europe as 
a whole, their country, their local area, and their own lives. 
Overwhelmingly, and somewhat surprisingly, respondents 
were generally positive about globalisation across the four 
measures. Poland was the most positive about the effect of 
globalisation on Europe, with 79 per cent of respondents 
believing the impact had been positive. French respondents 
were the most sceptical, with 46 per cent saying it had been 
positive for Europe, 41 per cent negative, with the remaining 
13 per cent answering ‘don’t know’ (figure 2). 
Most participants across all countries agreed that 
globalisation had had a positive impact on their local area 
and their own lives, again with Poland the most positive 
and France again the more balanced, with just 42 per cent 
answering ‘fairly’ (35 per cent) or ‘very’ (7 per cent) positive, 
and 41 per cent answering ‘fairly’ (27 per cent) or ‘very’ 
(14 per cent) negative. While significant majorities in Britain, 
Germany, Poland, Spain and Sweden agreed that globalisation 
had had a positive impact on their country, French 
respondents disagreed, with only 39 per cent believing 
it had been positive and 50 per cent negative (figure 3).
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Figure 2  Views of respondents in each country who believe 
globalisation has been positive or negative for Europe 
as a whole
Figure 3  Percentage of respondents in each country who 
believe globalisation has been positive or negative 
for their country
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
0
20
40
60
80
Positive Negative
BritainSweden FranceGermanySpainPoland
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
0
20
40
60
80
Positive Negative
Poland FranceBritainSwedenGermanySpain
Cross-national surveys
Pessimism
On the other hand, we found that respondents in all 
countries – with the consistent exception of Spain – were 
overwhelmingly pessimistic about prospects for the next 12 
months. Large minorities or even majorities in Britain, France, 
Germany and Sweden thought things would get worse for 
Europe as a whole in the next year, while citizens in Poland 
and Spain felt things would get neither better nor worse. Th e 
same trend was seen when we asked about prospects for the 
respondent’s country: pluralities in Britain, France, Germany 
and Sweden believe things will get worse, while those in 
Poland and Spain are more evenly split (fi gure 4).
Figure 4  Percentage of respondents in each country who think 
things will get better or worse for their country over the 
next 12 months
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Political trust
We also asked our survey respondents about their levels of 
trust in national and European political institutions. We found 
strikingly low levels of trust across all measures, and in all 
countries. On a scale from 0 to 10, we found that more than 
half of respondents in Britain, France, Germany and Spain 
have low levels of trust (0–4) in the European Commission. 
Particularly surprising is that French respondents had less 
trust (56 per cent 0–4) in the Commission than British 
respondents (51 per cent) (figure 5).
Figure 5  Percentage of respondents reporting low levels of trust 
(0–4 on a 10-point scale) in the European Commission
Conversely, while levels of trust in British political 
institutions were not as low (45 per cent polling 0–4 for 
British government, 43 per cent for parliament), French 
respondents had even lower trust in national institutions 
than in EU bodies: 71 per cent of French respondents reported 
low levels of trust in their government, and 65 per cent for 
the parliament (figure 6).
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Figure 6  Percentage of respondents reporting low levels of trust 
(0–4 on a 10-point scale) in their national government
Societal changes
Our polling on societal changes found Spain and Sweden 
to be the most socially liberal countries, particularly in their 
support for more women going to work (80 per cent and 74 per 
cent) and sexual equality (74 per cent and 67 per cent). 
However, we also found broad support for female 
participation in the labour market and same-sex relationships 
across the other four countries (with the exception of Poland 
on same-sex relationships). 
That said, small but not insignificant minorities of 
around 10 per cent in each member state think that women’s 
economic participation has changed society for the worse, 
although twice as many people in Poland (13 per cent), 
Germany (12 per cent) and Great Britain (12 per cent) believe 
this than in Sweden (6 per cent). The Polish (35 per cent) and 
British (17 per cent) are most likely to regard the acceptance 
of same-sex marriage as having been a negative development.
However, it is clear that increased religious and ethnic 
diversity is a much more divisive issue, which gains 
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signifi cantly less support in the countries we polled. Spain 
(50 per cent), Sweden (41 per cent) and – perhaps surprisingly 
– Britain (41 per cent) are the most supportive of diversity, and 
they are twice as likely to see a positive societal impact than 
in France, Germany and Poland. In these countries a higher 
proportion of people say that ethnic diversity has changed 
society for the worse than the better (eg, in France 46 per cent 
of people say it has changed society for the worse, compared 
with 21 per cent saying the reverse) (fi gure 7).
Figure 7  Percentage of respondents who think that  
changes in relation to women in the labour market, 
same-sex relationships, and ethnicity and diversity  
have ‘improved society for the better’
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European case studies
Our six country case studies provide a deeper understanding 
of the drivers and symptoms of the politics of fear through 
a detailed analysis of national specificities. Each provides 
a different analytical perspective and takes a different 
methodological approach, taking account of national 
contexts and trends. 
In France, we find a toxic political atmosphere, 
dominated by negative voting intentions, and a population 
divided between a majority that continues to view the Front 
National in strongly negative terms, set against a sizeable 
minority that see its leader Marine Le Pen, as ‘strong’ and 
a ‘realist’. This political context is underpinned by a more 
widespread sense of anxiety and crisis, linked to recent 
attacks, and economic uncertainty. 
In Germany, by contrast, citizens’ concerns are shown 
to be more closely tied to specific issues around the EU’s 
impact in key areas of policy, including social security and 
EU payments. The findings here reveal there is a significant 
gap between the views of the public and those of German 
politicians, who tend not to recognise these concrete concerns 
and instead speak of a generalised sense of fear among 
their citizens.
In Poland, while socioeconomic grievances have played 
a role in the electoral success of the Law and Justice party, 
their rise to power also reflects a clear backlash against liberal 
and European values. The Polish case study argues that the 
dissemination of systematic political lies and conspiracy 
theory through social and alternative media has been a key 
component of the populist right’s success. 
In the UK, we find similar social and cultural 
underpinnings to the Brexit vote, although these are shown 
to be heavily intertwined with economic and educational 
inequalities. Social networks are also found to be significant 
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– internationally and intranationally – with those people 
who have recently socialised with someone from either 
a different country or a different UK city more likely to 
have voted Remain.
Even in the home of social democratic liberalism, 
Sweden, our findings show a similar (if slighter) turn towards 
ethnically defined conceptions of national identity in Swedish 
political discourse. That said, the public polling also reflects 
the continued strength of civic understandings of identity in 
Sweden, albeit with Sweden Democrats voters more likely to 
hold a mixture of civic and ethnic conceptions. 
Spain stands as an outlier, with no significant right-wing 
populist gains despite seemingly fertile conditions – having 
been particularly impacted by the economic crisis and with 
high levels of immigration. The Spanish research – ‘the 
Spanish exception’ – suggests that this unique situation is 
linked to Spain’s political past, its current electoral system, 
and the failure of its far-right parties to modernise. However, 
polling findings from Spain on support for reduced 
immigration present a warning against complacency 
even in this country. 
The following chapters explore these case studies in 
detail, and the findings of surveys and interviews conducted 
in each country with both citizens and elites during the second 
half of 2016.
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1   What we already 
know about Brexit 
The UK’s decision to leave the European Union on 23 June 
2016 was a seismic political event with significant implications 
for the future of the UK. It also divided Britons into two 
political camps, which were profoundly different from the 
election-orientated, party political battle lines that generally 
define how political scientists, commentators and politicians 
analyse the country. Since then the characteristics, attitudes, 
situations and motivations of voters on both sides of the issue 
– and especially those in the Leave camp – have been the 
subject of a tremendous amount of analysis.
The Brexit vote also appears to signify a larger change 
in attitudes to globalisation. Many have read the outcome of 
the referendum as a verdict on a fast-paced, globalised world 
where networks matter more than place.1 Trade-offs between 
sovereignty, democracy and (economic) globalisation – what 
political economist Dani Rodrik called ‘the political trilemma 
of the world economy’2 – are understandably less appealing to 
those who feel a networked, globalised world has little to offer 
people like them. Crucial themes of the Leave campaign such 
as self-determination and border control fit well with such an 
understanding. Insofar as the outcome of the referendum is 
indicative of a larger cultural–political shift, it holds lessons 
not just for the UK, but for democratic politics in Europe 
and beyond. This case study provides a thematic summary 
of the robust, data-driven analysis of the factors behind the 
UK’s decision to leave, examining which factors motivated 
and mobilised Leave voters, ultimately underpinning the 
UK’s departure from the European Union (EU). As voter 
theorists have long argued, voting is more than calculating 
benefits or maximising utility. Rather, it is intimately tied up 
with who we are and how we see our place in the world.
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Part 1 is divided into four sections, starting from the 
objective characteristics of voters, such as age, education and 
other demographic factors, and their geographical contexts. 
Next, it discusses subjective attitudes and value orientations 
that might have informed the vote, and finally the influence 
of media representations and the campaigns themselves. 
In doing so, this chapter both challenges some of the existing 
narratives around why the UK voted to leave and highlights 
potentially important factors which remain underexplored. 
These factors are analysed through new analysis and original 
polling in part 2. 
Demographics and identity
As soon as the results were in, commentators sought to explain 
the demographic make-up of the Leave and Remain camps. 
Since the Brexit vote was difficult to map onto the usual party 
political divides, there were few go-to explanations. The 
electoral cleavages diagnosed in subsequent reports are almost 
too many to count. Younger people generally voted to stay in 
the EU, as did higher-educated people, while pensioners and 
people with fewer educational qualifications opted to leave. 
There were geographic splits: it was the Remainers of London 
versus the Brexiteering regions and a pro-EU Scotland versus 
a Eurosceptic England and Wales.3 There were differences by 
ethnicity, by income, by class. Of the most prominent axes 
of identity, interestingly, only gender does not appear to have 
played a significant role, with men and women voting Leave 
in almost exactly the same numbers.4 Brexit Britain, some 
have argued, is a society divided by ‘class, generation 
and geography’.5
Age
One of the most prominent divides lay between younger and 
older voters. Early on, it became apparent that the youngest 
segment of voters was far more likely to support staying in the 
EU than was the oldest. According to British Election Study 
data, only 28 per cent of 18–25-year-olds voted to Leave, 
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compared with 59 per cent of those over 65.6 Correspondingly, 
it was older constituencies that voted to Leave, with 19 of the 
20 constituencies with most pensioners voting to leave the EU, 
while 16 of the 20 youngest ones votes to remain.7 
There was considerable debate over the turnout 
numbers of young people. Early reports suggested the vast 
majority of young people had not voted in the referendum, 
but later analyses found these claims were likely overstated. 
About 64 per cent of registered young voters went to the polls, 
according to researchers at the London School of Economics, 
compared with a 72 per cent average turnout. This leaves 
a worrisome double-digit gap in turnout between the oldest 
and the youngest voters, but it is a world away from the initial 
figure of 36 per cent turnout among 18–25-year-olds.8
Some of the most prominent themes of the campaign, 
such as sovereignty and controls on immigration, appear to 
have resonated much less with younger voters. While older 
groups felt strongly about ‘Britain’s right to act 
independently’, only 20 per cent of young people said this 
mattered to them and significantly influenced how they would 
vote. Instead, young people were more likely to be concerned 
about economic opportunities, which they saw as imperilled 
by a potential Brexit.9
Education
The effect of age is not always easy to distinguish from the 
effect of education, as levels of education vary by generation. 
Nonetheless, education levels appear to have been the single 
biggest driver of the decision to either Leave or Remain. 
According to the British Election Study, the difference in 
likelihood to vote Leave between people with postgraduate 
degrees and people with no formal educational qualifications 
was almost 50 per cent.10 In their research for the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, Matthew Goodwin and Oliver Heath 
found that, controlling for other factors such as income, the 
gap between those with a university degree and those with 
GCSE qualifications or below still stood at 30 per cent.11 
The effects of other important factors such as age and 
income pale in comparison. 
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These effects were also visible on an aggregate level, 
with constituencies with many graduates far more likely 
to opt to remain. University towns in particular were often 
Remain outposts within vast Leave territories – Brighton, 
Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Exeter, Newcastle, Norwich, 
Nottingham, Oxford, Reading, Warwick and York all had 
majorities voting to stay in the EU.12
The large effects of educational qualifications trigger 
an important question: did higher education nudge people 
towards a Remain vote because of the material advantages 
it confers, because of the (presumably liberal) worldview it 
instills, or a combination of both? These effects can be difficult 
to disentangle, although they will be examined through our 
original analysis. Taking income into account can help us 
control for some of the labour market benefits associated with 
a degree, but income per se likely captures only part of the 
opportunities afforded by (higher) education. A second 
well-documented phenomenon is the effect of education on 
one’s social and political beliefs, which a large body of work 
has commented on. These effects will be discussed at length 
in the section below on values and attitudes, ‘Social attitudes 
and political predispositions’. 
Income and class
Although not as strong a predictor as education, most research 
found that income was nonetheless an important and 
statistically significant correlate of a Remain vote. Those in the 
poorest households in the UK tended to support leaving the 
EU, with 58 per cent of people in households making less than 
£20,000 annually voting to leave. Of those in the higher 
income brackets – households making at least £60,000 per 
year – only 35 per cent chose the same. On an individual level, 
unemployment was also correlated with support for Brexit: 
59 per cent of those out of work voted to leave. That compared 
with 45 per cent among those in full employment. Finally, 
a Joseph Rowntree Foundation report also finds that the type 
of work matters: 71 per cent of those in more manual, more 
low-skilled work cast their ballots in favour of leaving the EU 
– 30 per cent more than among those in other types of work.13 
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This leads the authors to conclude that Brexit was about 
‘poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities’.14
This is in line with the data from the British Election 
Study about subjective class. Self-defined middle-class people 
were much more likely to vote to stay in the EU – a clear 
majority at 59 per cent. Of self-defined working-class people, 
on the other hand, 55 per cent were in favour of leaving.15 
Objective measures of class by occupational grade also seem 
to have been influential, with Lord Ashcroft’s research 
reporting that those in professional and managerial jobs   
were more likely to be Remainers and those in routine or 
semi-routine work more likely to be Brexiteers.16
National identity 
A further difference is visible between the various parts of 
the UK. In Northern Ireland and Scotland, the Leave vote 
accounted for a clear minority – 44.2 per cent and 38 per cent 
of the total votes cast respectively. In Wales, the Leave vote 
accounted for 52.5 per cent of the votes, and in England 
53.4 per cent – 55.5 per cent discounting the capital.17 Clearly, 
national divisions within the UK played a role. 
These national differences were largely mediated by 
national identification: 79 per cent of those who defined 
themselves as ‘English not British’ and 66 per cent of those 
who defined themselves as ‘more English than British’ voted 
to leave. Conversely, 63 per cent of those who saw themselves 
as ‘more British than English’ and 60 per cent of those who 
defined themselves as ‘British not English’ voted to remain.18 
While feelings of Britishness were generally correlated with 
a Remain vote, in Scotland they were correlated with a 
predisposition towards voting Leave: 55 per cent of Remain 
voters reported feeling ‘Scottish not British’ or ‘more Scottish 
than British’, while only 46 per cent of Leavers reported 
feeling predominantly or entirely Scottish,19 suggesting that 
a strong identification with national identity per se is not the 
explanatory factor behind the Leave vote. 
It might be argued that a greater level of identification 
with England or Scotland rather than Britain suggests a 
greater level of identification with the predominant political 
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cultures of those countries, rather than purely a reduced 
interest in or sympathy with internationalism. Here, more 
subjective questions of national identity come into play. 
One could argue that Scottish political identity, for example, 
is currently more associated with internationalism and 
progressive politics, whereas English political identity 
is more associated with exclusive nationalist sentiment. 
Certainly, unpicking the question of how national and 
British identities and political cultures, predisposition towards 
internationalism and Euroscepticism interact requires further 
investigation – it is not simply the case that those who define 
their identity in geographically narrower terms are more 
likely to be Eurosceptic. 
European identity 
Although the effects of national and British identifications 
differ, the effects of European identity are fairly 
straightforward. Out of the citizens of the 28 member states, 
Britons are the least likely to regard themselves as European 
in any sense, with nearly two-thirds of Britons identifying only 
with their nation, while less than 40 per cent of French citizens 
and 30 per cent of Germans feel the same way.20 This lack of 
identification is matched by a similar lack of trust in the EU 
– only Greeks and Cypriots are less likely to ‘tend to trust’ in 
the EU than Britons, likely a reflection of the EU’s economic 
interventions in those countries.21 According to Pew Global 
research conducted in spring 2016, of the ten major European 
countries surveyed, only respondents from Greece were more 
likely to favour the return of powers to national 
governments.22 The role of trust in the EU and global 
governance in general will be further explored in the sections 
on social and political attitudes. 
Of course, the relationship between the EU as an 
institution and Europe as a cultural entity is complex. Not 
all European states are part of the EU, and attitudes towards 
Europe are not the same as attitudes towards the institutions 
of the EU. Despite the UK’s unique, well-documented lack of 
European identity, Britons do not dislike Europeans: 84 per 
cent of Britons across both the Remain and Leave camps 
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think it is vital to let European nationals living in Britain 
know that they are welcome to stay.23 
Nonetheless, identification with Europe or absence 
thereof closely related to people’s voting intention in the 
referendum. The British Social Attitudes Survey from before 
the campaigns started found that of those who describe 
themselves first and foremost as European rather than British 
(15 per cent of Britons), 92 per cent wanted to stay in the EU, 
whereas only 51 per cent of those who did not describe 
themselves as European first and foremost wanted to stay 
within the EU.24 The demographic factors discussed earlier 
played a role here, too, with graduates and professionals being 
much more likely to identify as European in the first place. 
The politics of place 
A second important aspect of the referendum vote, besides 
demographics and identity, is geographical. Although the 
Brexit vote cannot be condensed into a single narrative, the 
individual-level demographic data thus far appear to support 
at least in part the thesis that Leave voters were those who had 
been ‘left behind’ – by globalisation, as a result of neglect by 
government or politicians, or as a result of geographic 
inequalities in wealth and opportunity across the UK. This 
observation is contextualised by Eurostat research, which in 
mid-2015 found that regional inequality in the UK is worse 
than any other country in Western Europe, significantly 
ahead of the next most regionally unequal country, Italy.25
Overall, it appears that data on the geographical 
locations of Leave voters (and their own perceptions of  
these places) both bolster and refine the narrative of the  
‘left behind’. However, in drawing conclusions regarding 
geography and the vote share of the two referendum 
campaigns, it is further worth noting that in every region  
and nation in the UK there was variation – in 62 per cent of 
the UK’s 395 electoral districts, the range of votes fell between 
40 per cent and 60 per cent, evidence that the UK is not as 
wildly divided as has been suggested by some commentators.26
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Economic factors
A straightforward analysis of the referendum result and its 
socioeconomic context suggests that poorer areas were more 
likely to vote Leave, and richer areas to vote Remain. The day 
after the referendum, the Resolution Foundation published an 
analysis of the result, which suggested that while short-term 
regional economic changes had not had a profound impact 
on the vote shares of either campaign, longer-term economic 
inequality had. This analysis suggested that by local authority, 
the vote share enjoyed by the Leave vote was positively 
correlated with lower average hourly earnings.27 
In the aftermath of the referendum result, the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation conducted a poll which reinforced the 
idea of ‘left behind’ groups as being a core constituent of the 
Leave vote, and suggested that for many Leave voters 
perceptions of economic and political neglect were common. 
It found that Leave voters were twice as likely to feel that their 
local area did not get a fair share of Britain’s economic success 
(23 per cent against 11 per cent of Remain voters).28 More than 
a quarter (27 per cent) of Leave voters felt their local areas had 
been neglected by politicians against 13 per cent of Remain 
voters, while 40 per cent of Leave voters felt that the national 
government did not listen to their concerns, only 23 per cent 
of Remain feeling the same way.29
Further analysis, however, suggests that if the Leave vote 
was defined or reinforced by those who were ‘left behind’, it 
was not simply on the basis of high unemployment. Analysis by 
political scientist Zsolt Darvas shows that the unemployment 
rate of a given area was a statistically insignificant factor.30 
However, ‘the estimated parameter of the Gini-coefficient of 
income inequality is [a] positive and statistically significant’ 
correlate of referendum voter choice. Darvas found that a 
1 percentage point higher level of income inequality boosted 
the share of Leave votes in an area by around 0.9 percentage 
points. Poverty rate was also a robust and significant indicator 
of Leave vote share, with a 1 percentage point higher level of 
poverty boosting the share of Leave votes by 1 per cent.31
Another area-level study, by a research team at the 
University of Warwick, found a significant correlation 
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between areas hit hardest by austerity and a vote to leave 
the EU. They go so far as to say that the outcome of the 
referendum could have been swayed had the fiscal cuts been 
slightly less severe.32 Especially where the quality of service 
provision of the NHS suffered, people tended to vote Leave in 
higher numbers. However, this is caveated by the researchers 
who argue it may simply reflect the fact that poorer areas were 
more likely to vote Leave: ‘Given the nexus between fiscal cuts 
and local deprivation, we think that this pattern largely 
reflects pre-existing deprivation.’33 
There is some evidence that struggling cities in the 
UK were more likely to vote Leave, and thriving cities were 
more likely to vote Remain. Of the 20 cities that the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation has listed as the most struggling in the 
UK, and within that of the 16 for which data are available, 
only 3 voted to Remain – Dundee, Glasgow and Liverpool.34 
While these are notable exceptions to the observation that 
struggling cities incline towards a Leave majority – and it 
is further notable that that two of the three are situated in 
Scotland – they are nevertheless exceptions. While there is 
clearly some correlation between a city performing poorly 
economically and a majority Leave vote within, the correlation 
between the best-faring cities and majority Remain votes 
is weaker – of the 20 cities listed by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation as best-faring, 7 voted in the majority to leave, 
and 13 to remain.35
Immigration
Another important local factor is experience of migration, 
given the significance of it in the Leave campaign. Numbers 
of foreign-born people were in themselves correlated 
(in aggregate) with a Remain, rather than a Leave vote.36 
Rapid rates of change were, however, significant: while areas 
with high numbers of immigrants were more likely to vote 
Remain, in 94 per cent of cases where the foreign-born 
population of a local authority area grew by more than 
200 per cent between 2001 and 2014, the majority in that 
local authority voted Leave.37 This suggests that the pace 
of migration in recent years was a significant determinant 
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of Leave vote at certain (high) levels. This analysis is 
supported by analysis presented by Matthew Goodwin and 
Oliver Heath, which found that while places with many EU 
migrants were less likely to vote Leave, places where in the 
last ten years there had been a sudden influx of EU migrants 
tended to be more pro-Leave.38 Academics at the University 
of Warwick found that an influx of Eastern European 
migrants, too, was statistically significant at the aggregate 
level.39 A case in point is Boston, the constituency with the 
highest Brexit vote recorded. In a decade, the town went from 
having virtually no Eastern European immigrants to having 
more than any other place in Britain. It seems highly likely 
that this was a factor in its 75 per cent Leave majority.40 
Further analysis by British Future suggests that the 
ability of a local area to absorb migrants successfully has 
a potentially significant impact on their attitudes towards 
migrants and therefore their predisposition towards a Leave 
vote. They found that areas that are broadly similar 
demographically and socioeconomically could often have 
significantly different numbers of Leave voters. Sandra 
Wallman’s concept of place-based capability suggests that 
‘open’ or resilient communities, characterised by good 
transport links, mixed economy and housing types, social 
networks that span dissimilar groups and powerful, inclusive 
local narratives about group identity, are more capable of 
absorbing migrants successfully.41 By contrast, ‘closed’ areas, 
which do not have these characteristics, are less able to do so. 
Applying this theory to a typology of local areas, British 
Future found evidence that place-based resilience might have 
influenced the extent to which a local area voted Leave.42 
Review: changing places
These socioeconomically focused analyses present a complex 
picture. While older, less wealthy areas containing citizens 
with a lower average level of education were more likely to 
vote Leave, these alone are not satisfactory explanatory 
factors. Regional poverty rates and wealth inequality played 
a stronger and more consistent role in predicting Leave vote, 
but wealthier areas also frequently voted Leave – plenty of 
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wealthy towns in the south of England (outside London and 
the university towns) had sound Leave majorities. Moreover, 
the extant analysis suggests that migration matters, but not 
straightforwardly so. As Oxford professor Sarah Harper put 
it: ‘The UK did not vote leave on anti-immigrant grounds per 
se – many voted because they believe in the local over the 
global, because they see their future grounded in local 
economic and social concerns.’43
The lesson from these data is not that the referendum 
vote was a simple economic calculation on the part of citizens, 
but rather that there is a significant group in Britain who feel 
they have seen their local areas change culturally and stagnate 
economically. Observations of socioeconomic inequality, 
poverty and marginalisation should not be analysed in 
isolation from the values of ‘left behind’ groups, as if Leave 
voters were solely economic actors. As Matthew Goodwin 
and Oliver Heath put it, the Brexit vote was ‘anchored 
predominantly, albeit not exclusively, in areas of the  
country that are filled with pensioners, low-skilled and less  
well-educated blue-collar workers and citizens who have  
been pushed to the margins not only by the economic 
transformation of the country, but by the values that have 
come to dominate a more socially liberal media and political 
class’.44 The strength of the correlation between levels of 
regional poverty, inequality and referendum vote choice 
should be considered in the light of the strength of the 
correlation between social values and referendum vote choice.
Social attitudes and political predispositions
Although the EU referendum and its results were in many 
ways unprecedented, there is a field of academic literature 
devoted to explaining the values underlying different types 
of politics. In an academic article titled ‘Trump, Brexit and 
populism’, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris use the World 
Values Survey dataset to analyse the worldviews that motivate 
various types of anti-establishment politics across time and 
place. They hypothesise that Brexit might be motivated by the 
same four value orientations that predict votes for populist 
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parties in Europe: identifying as right of centre, espousing 
authoritarian values, having little trust in national and global 
governance, and being anti-immigration.45
Self-placement on the left—right spectrum
While, in the UK, attitudes towards the EU are significantly 
correlated with self-placement on a left–right spectrum, the 
decision to vote either Leave or Remain in the referendum was 
far less party political than might be assumed. Officially, both 
the Conservative party and the Labour party campaigned for 
a Remain vote, though the Conservative party leadership was 
more divided than the Labour party on the issue of whether 
to stay in or leave the EU. Individual Labour supporters were 
more likely than individual Conservatives to be Remainers, 
as per Inglehart and Norris’s suggestion that the majority of 
Leavers would identify as right of centre rather than left 
of centre.46
On the level of constituencies, however, these patterns 
disappear almost entirely. Analysis by Chris Hanretty of the 
University of East Anglia found that 77 per cent of 
Conservative-held constituencies voted to Leave, while 70 per 
cent of Labour-held constituencies voted to Leave.47 Many 
areas considered Labour heartlands, such as Stoke-on-Trent, 
voted decisively for Brexit. The referendum divide, while 
associated with positioning on the political spectrum, was 
not strongly associated by areas of party political influence. 
Authoritarianism
As the left–right spectrum loses (some of) its dominance as 
the organising principle of politics, other value orientations 
become more noticeable. Prime among these is the 
libertarian–authoritarian divide. Based on his analysis of the 
2015 British Election Study, Birkbeck politics professor Eric 
Kaufmann has argued that social grade only accounts for 
1–2 per cent of the variation in voting intention among 
individuals, while factors like region, age and education 
level were slightly more effective predictors.
A more valuable predictive factor than these factors was 
the level of support an individual had for the death penalty. 
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Similarly strong predictive power is associated with the extent 
to which people think it is important to discipline children.48 
Kaufmann has suggested that this highlights an important 
attitudinal divide, between those who prioritise ‘order’, and 
those who prioritise ‘openness’ or novelty, defined partially by 
a like or a dislike of difference.49 Further analysis by Pat Dade 
of Cultural Dynamics suggested that Euroscepticism 
correlates with things like general scepticism, a prioritisation 
of national security and social order, and positive attitudes 
towards the idea of whipping sex criminals.50
This divide is reinforced by more traditional differences 
between social progressives and social conservatives. Analysis 
of a survey of 12,369 people on the day of the referendum 
itself, conducted by Lord Ashcroft Polls, for example found 
that 81 per cent of those who think that multiculturalism is a 
force for ill rather than a force for good voted Leave. Similarly, 
80 per cent of those who thought social liberalism was a 
predominantly bad thing, 74 per cent of those who thought 
feminism was a bad thing and 78 per cent of those who 
thought the green movement was a bad thing voted Leave.51
Authoritarian value orientations are not entirely distinct 
from other political cleavages; they are known to be strongly 
related to a set of demographic, psychological and social 
factors. Inglehart and Norris demonstrate that there are 
significant interaction effects between self-professed economic 
insecurity and authoritarian values.52 And though Kaufmann 
shows authoritarian values to be only weakly related to income 
per se, they are known to be strongly related to education.53 
In fact, it is possible that the predictive strength of education 
on the Remain vote is high precisely because higher education 
tends to socialise students to adopt a liberal, anti-authoritarian 
and open worldview, as we will investigate. This also expresses 
itself as a comfort with global forces and global changes: those 
who have enjoyed a university education are vastly more likely 
to see economic globalisation as a force for good, a Harvard 
study found, even if they have observably not benefited from 
it.54 As David Runciman has suggested: ‘Education does not 
simply divide us on the grounds of what is in our interests. 
It sorts us according to where we feel we belong.’55
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Trust in national and global governance
Political trust also appears to have a significant influence. 
Representative polling of 5,000 British citizens by YouGov 
found that lack of trust in government (and David Cameron 
in particular) was one of the most prominent arguments 
mentioned by Leave voters.56 In general, Remain voters   
were almost three times more likely to trust UK politicians’ 
judgment about the referendum ‘a lot’ or ‘a fair amount’ 
(at 22 per cent versus 8 per cent), while Leave voters were 
twice as likely to indicate they did not trust UK politicians at 
all.57 Another way this scepticism is demonstrated is through 
conspiracy theories: 28 per cent of Leave supporters, 
compared with 16 per cent of Remain voters, believed that 
MI5 was conspiring with the government to prevent a Brexit 
vote. Moreover, three-quarters of Leave voters suspected that 
‘there are plans for further EU integration and enlargement 
that the EU are deliberately not announcing till after the 
referendum’, with only a quarter of Remain voters believing 
the same. Most shocking of all, approximately half of Leave 
voters agreed with the statement that the referendum might 
be rigged, compared with only 11 per cent of Remainers.58 
This distrust impacted on consumption of news and 
information in the lead up to the vote: trust in and approval 
of the EU influenced citizens’ readiness to believe positive or 
negative news stories about the EU. A 2016 YouGov study 
conducted before the referendum asked supporters of the 
Remain and the Leave campaign whether they believed a 
series of statements about how the EU had changed UK law, 
some of which were true (such as ‘banning vacuum cleaners 
of a certain wattage’) and some of which were false (such as 
‘introducing a maximum size for coffins’). The study found 
that most frequently, Leave voters were more likely to believe 
either true or false statements about the influence of the EU 
on UK laws as long as they were unpopular changes, and 
less likely to believe true or false claims concerning popular 
changes. Similarly, Remain voters were more likely to believe 
either true or false statements about the influence of the EU on 
UK laws as long as they were popular changes, and less likely 
to believe true or false claims concerning unpopular changes.59
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Anti-immigrant sentiment 
In addition to the relation between experience of immigration 
in one’s local area and propensity to vote Leave, there is   
also the influence of individual attitudes to immigration. 
Immigration and controls on UK borders featured strongly 
in the campaign.60 A British Election Study survey conducted 
in the run-up to the referendum found that in an open-
response question, the most significant factor determining 
how Leave voters would choose to vote was ‘sovereignty’, 
closely followed by ‘immigration’.61 However, these two 
factors were frequently connected in what voters had to 
say, as described by the British Election Study researchers: 
‘In fact reading responses shows that many respondents 
mention both sovereignty and immigration together, 
showing that these two issues were closely linked in 
the minds of British voters.’62 
As discussed earlier, the salience of immigration as 
a political issue has a complex relationship with experience 
of immigrants in one’s local area – with the pace of migration 
in recent years appearing to be the significant factor in 
influencing a vote to leave, rather than overall proportion of 
non-UK-born in the population.63 However, in turn there is 
not a clear relationship between concern about migration and 
local experience of it: concern about national levels of 
immigration is consistently 50 per cent higher than concern 
about local levels of immigration.64
Since anti-immigrant sentiment is not necessarily 
explained by these factors, some have looked to personality 
as an explanatory factor. Particularly interesting in this regard 
is locus of control, which is the extent to which a person feels 
in control over their life. Previous research has found that 
people who score low on locus of control scales tend to score 
high on indicators of authoritarianism65 and anti-immigrant 
sentiment.66 The British Election Study asked participants to 
respond to statements such as ‘Many times I feel that I have 
little influence over the things that happen to me’, or its 
inverse, ‘When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can 
make them work’. The British Election Study found that those 
with an external locus of control also were much more likely 
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to vote Leave.67 In this light, the ‘take back control’ slogan 
of the Leave campaign takes on a whole new significance.
Optimism
To the vast polling data to come out of the referendum, 
we might add one more predictive factor to Inglehart and 
Norris’s list of value orientations predicting a vote for populist 
parties in Europe (identifying as right of centre, espousing 
authoritarian values, having little trust in national and global 
governance, and being anti-immigration). Ashcroft polling 
and British Election Study data suggest that in addition to 
social attitudes being a strong determinant of referendum 
voter choice, there is some evidence that a voter’s level of 
optimism and pessimism regarding the past and the future 
of the UK is strongly correlated with their referendum vote 
choice. Leave and Remain voters were presented with pairs 
of opposing statements indicating pessimism or optimism in 
a variety of circumstances, and asked which statement they 
most strongly agreed with. Among Leave voters, there was 
a 22 per cent net agreement that ‘for most children growing 
up in Britain today, life will be worse than it was for their 
parents’, while among Remain voters there was a 4 per cent 
net agreement with the opposing statement, ‘for most 
children growing up today, life will be better than it 
was for their parents’.68 
As well as being less optimistic about the future, Leave 
voters were more positive about the past than Remain voters. 
In Ashcroft’s polling, 73 per cent of Remain voters felt that 
‘overall, life in Britain today is better than it was 30 years ago’; 
58 per cent of Leave voters, by contrast, felt that ‘overall, life 
in Britain today is worse than it was 30 years ago’. Both sides 
thought that economic and social changes would bring more 
threats than opportunities, but to differing degrees: 42 per cent 
of Leave voters but only 20 per cent of Remain voters agreed.69 
The British Election Study asked similar questions, with similar 
results. They found, for instance, that among those who 
strongly disagreed with the statement that things used to be 
better in Britain in the past, only 15 per cent voted Leave.70 
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External and campaign factors 
The predictive value of the demographic, geographic and 
attitudinal variables discussed thus far suggests that some 
were always more likely to vote Leave, and some always more 
likely to vote Remain. Still, like all human behaviour, voting 
behaviour is complex and changeable: our decisions in the 
voting booth are not predetermined by structural factors, 
nor do values and attitudes automatically yield a political 
preference. To fully capture how people voted on 23 June, 
any analysis must also consider the influences on people in 
the run-up to the referendum: the media representations, the 
campaign leaders and the friends and family they spoke to. 
Media representations 
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the media 
influenced voters in the referendum for the same reason that 
it is difficult to ascertain how the media affect voters in any 
election or popular vote; media representations are just one 
of many factors that contribute to a voter’s eventual choice and 
many claimed to have always known how they were going to 
vote.71 This being said, some studies have provided evidence 
that media framing of public discourse around specific EU 
policies can affect the extent to which those policies are seen 
positively or negatively.72
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that among 
national newspapers in the UK, the Leave campaign 
enjoyed a number of advantages. A study by Loughborough 
University’s Centre for Research in Communication and 
Culture released two weeks before the vote found that, based 
on analysis of media articles from the ten largest newspapers 
in the UK, favourability of reporting towards either the Leave 
or the Remain camps was largely balanced within the sample 
of 1,127. However, when circulation and thus number of 
probable article ‘views’ was taken into account, only 18 per 
cent of the sample were pro-Remain, while 82 per cent were 
pro-Leave (discounting neutral articles).73 Similar research 
undertaken by the Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism, published one month before the referendum vote, 
which covered two sample days of coverage a week for the first 
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two months of the official referendum campaign, found that 
of the 928 articles examined from the nine largest newspapers, 
45 per cent were in favour of leaving, 27 per cent in favour of 
remaining in the EU, and the rest were neutral. Additionally, 
of spokespeople quoted in these articles, 36 per cent were UK 
politicians, of whom 69 per cent were Conservatives and only 
14 per cent were Labour.74
The media advantage enjoyed by the Leave campaign 
should be further understood within the context of a  
longer-term, predominant Euroscepticism in reporting and 
comment related to the EU. The general Euroscepticism of  
the British mainstream press has been observed in numerous 
studies, and while the effect of predominantly negative 
reporting on the EU over a number of years on the eventual 
outcome of the referendum is impossible to quantify, this 
longer-term negativity within the British media is likely to 
have had an effect.75
Campaign leaders
During the campaign, prominent politicians on both sides 
travelled around the country (and its television studios) to 
make their case. Several studies have attempted to measure 
the effects of these key figures on the eventual outcome, 
especially the effect of Boris Johnson, the unofficial leader 
of the Leave campaign. When he announced his support for 
the Leave campaign, just four months before polling day, he 
was relatively popular, scoring 4.5 on a 0–10 likability scale. 
Though this may not seem like an enthusiastic endorsement 
from the public, it is high compared to Jeremy Corbyn’s 4.2, 
David Cameron’s 3.5 and Nigel Farage’s 3.2 ratings.76 Indeed, 
a study by the Electoral Reform Society found that most 
campaign figureheads were so disliked that their effects may 
have been the opposite of what they intended, with more than 
half of Leave supporters suggesting that David Cameron, who 
campaigned to Remain, had made them more likely to vote 
Leave. The only personalities to influence voters in the 
intended direction on aggregate, it appears, were Boris 
Johnson, Nigel Farage and, indeed, Donald Trump.77 
It is worth noting that all of these advocated Brexit. 
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One caveat of this research is that voters might not be 
able to gauge accurately who influenced them in their vote. 
Perhaps a more reliable measure of the effect of various 
politicians’ involvement on the outcome of the referendum 
is the correlation between support for certain politicians and 
likelihood to vote as they advised – as investigated by Clarke, 
Goodwin and Whiteley, who also model the effect various 
politicians may have had on voters’ assessment of the risks 
associated with a decision to leave the EU.78 Of those who 
gave Boris Johnson a full 10 out of 10 for likability, 93 per cent 
voted to leave, while those who were at least lukewarm 
(scoring Boris at 5 out of 10 or more) were also 
disproportionately likely to vote Leave.79
Network and neighbourhood effects
Perhaps still more important than politicians were people’s 
neighbours, friends, families and colleagues. When Remain 
campaigners were approaching voters in the weeks leading up 
to the vote, they reported that voters’ response was often the 
same: ‘I don’t know anyone who is voting in.’80 This is likely to 
be an important factor in people’s voting decision, according 
to political scientists. Earlier British Election Study research 
found that friends and family were crucial in sustaining or 
changing party preferences.81
Indeed, some of the effects of geography discussed 
earlier may be mediated by social networks. As Ron Johnston 
and Charles Pattie wrote in ‘Social networks, geography and 
neighbourhood effects’, 
People talk to their neighbours and the outcome of their 
conversations may be changes in what they know and think 
about a subject – such as the candidates standing at a forthcoming 
election… [The result is] a spatial polarisation of opinions 
as more people respond to the information reaching them 
through their neighbours and thus, in this case, a polarisation 
of voting patterns.82 
Since casual discussions about politics have the potential 
to change or fortify views, the size, spread and heterogeneity 
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of networks matters. These effects were visible to some extent 
in the support for Donald Trump in the USA: people who had 
never moved away from their home town were among the 
strongest Trump supporters.83
One indicator that networks mattered in the referendum 
is the fact that graduates in low-skilled areas were much more 
likely to vote Leave than their peers in high-skilled areas. 
People who had A-level qualifications, too, were very sensitive 
to the area they were in: in high-skilled areas, they often voted 
Remain, while in low-skilled areas they were more frequently 
Leavers. Some of these effects can of course be explained by 
structural differences in economic opportunity and quality 
of life in various areas of the country, which predispose people 
towards an anti-establishment vote. But social networks, too, 
are spatially organised, making the effects of the two difficult 
to disentangle.84 It is not just who you know: how many 
people you know also matters. Remain supporters generally 
had larger and more varied social circles. This may have made 
them more resilient to changes in their communities, the 
British Election Study suggests, since they could draw on 
a larger group of people for support. Their levels of social 
trust were also much higher; for example, they tended to 
respond positively to statements such as ‘people are 
generally trustworthy’.85 
But if Remainers knew more people, Leavers were more 
vocal about their preference, at least online. A comprehensive 
Twitter analysis found that the volume of tweets with the 
hashtag #voteleave was a full seven times larger than the 
volume of tweets arguing Britain was #strongerin.86 Moreover, 
the top three referendum-related hashtags, #Brexit, #Beleave 
and #VoteLeave, were all Leave hashtags. Vyacheslav Polonski, 
a network scientist at the University of Oxford, writes: ‘Using 
the Internet, the Leave camp was able to create the perception 
of wide-ranging public support for their cause that acted like 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, attracting many more voters to 
back Brexit.’87
These findings suggest that local and digital social 
networks may have been important drivers of the Brexit vote. 
Nonetheless, the effect of networks and mobility on the Brexit 
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vote (and indeed on populism in general) remains 
underexplored – which is something we seek to address 
in part 2 of this study.
Conclusion
The next chapter will analyse original polling of the British 
public to further explore the relation between various political 
variables on the one hand (including the referendum vote, 
attitudes to globalisation and social and political trust) and 
various demographic and geographic factors on the other 
(including mobility, social networks and deprivation). 
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2  Original analysis on 
the drivers of Brexit
Introduction
As part 1 demonstrates, there is already a significant 
amount of evidence available on the demographic, economic, 
geographical and attitudinal breakdown of the Brexit vote.
Our original analysis has two aims. First, we wanted to refine 
the existing evidence by combining individual demographic 
information with a place-based analysis. Existing analysis 
shows the kinds of areas more likely to vote to leave the EU: 
rural areas and smaller towns, more deprived areas, and areas 
that have experienced a rapid increase in immigration. We 
wanted to see whether there is an environmental effect of living 
in these areas separate to individual demographic trends. 
Second, we wanted to explore key social and political 
attitudes through the lens of a new political divide that has 
been termed ‘open versus closed’ outlooks. There is much 
evidence to suggest the Brexit vote and other recent 
international political events have in part been driven by 
a reaction to globalisation, trade, immigration and a perceived 
lack of ‘control’ over voters’ lives and communities.
If this is the case, we hypothesise that demographic 
and place-based factors are an important predictor of voters’ 
attitudes and political behaviour, and their everyday 
experiences and interactions with the wider world outside 
their immediate geographic community inform their views, 
and ultimately their political preferences. This is tangentially 
related to the ‘contact hypothesis’, which states that – under 
certain conditions – contact between members of different 
groups can reduce prejudice and inter-group conflict.88 
However, we wanted to test whether broader social circles 
in a geographic sense alone were sufficient to change social 
and political attitudes.
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As part of this project, we commissioned YouGov 
to conduct surveys of voters in six European countries, and 
analysis presented in this chapter uses the results of the British 
survey.89 These included questions about attitudes to the EU, 
ethnic and religious diversity, globalisation, international 
cooperation, and political and social trust. With the aim 
of testing the above hypothesis, we asked an additional 
set of survey questions, to measure: 
 · the geographical extent of respondents’ social networks – 
whether they regularly socialise with people who live  
outside their local area, in different parts of Britain, or in  
other countries
 · respondents’ long-term geographic mobility – whether  
they have they lived in the same town their whole life,  
in different parts of Britain or even different countries
 · respondents’ short-term geographic mobility – whether  
they have they travelled abroad in the last 12 months
Method
Geographic mobility and social networks are likely to be 
partially correlated with socioeconomic factors. Similarly, 
we wanted to be able to disentangle individual demographics 
and place-based factors: residents in more deprived areas or 
those who have experienced more immigration might be more 
or less likely to support globalisation or the EU, but is this 
because of where they live, or simply because these places are 
inhabited by a higher proportion of people with individual 
traits (eg education or income) that are associated with certain 
attitudes or behaviours? 
To disentangle these overlapping factors, we employ 
logistic regression analysis. This involves building a model  
of all the factors we reasonably believe to affect a given 
outcome such as an individual voting to leave in the EU 
referendum, or saying they think globalisation has had  
a negative effect on their life. We are then able to pick out  
a single factor, or explanatory variable, and measure its  
‘average marginal effect’ on the outcome of interest. 
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Regression models were built in steps, with demographic 
factors added in first, followed by place-based statistics, and 
finally measures of social networks and geographic mobility. 
Results are reported as significant if they pass the 95 per cent 
confidence threshold. A full description of the model-building 
method, calculation of average marginal effects and data 
tables are available in the technical appendix.
Results
Table 1 presents the predicted probabilities of the 
demographic and local area variables found to be significant 
within the model.
The figures in table 1 reinforce much of the previous 
analysis described in part 1 – for example finding a strong 
effect by both age and education. Figure 1 illustrates the 
strong trend by age – the older the respondent, the more 
likely they were to have voted to leave the EU, even 
controlling for other factors.
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Table 1   Predicted probability of respondents voting Leave, 
by demographic and local area variables
Variable Predicted 
prob-
ability 
of voting 
Leave
Standard 
error
z P>z 95% confidence 
interval
Age 18–24 22% 0.071 3.12 0.002 0.081 0.358
25–34 45% 0.046 9.7 0 0.36 0.541
35–44 52% 0.047 10.87 0 0.423 0.609
45–54 55% 0.045 12.18 0 0.461 0.638
55–64 57% 0.036 15.74 0 0.5 0.643
65+ 56% 0.04 13.74 0 0.478 0.637
Education No 
qualifications
82% 0.05 16.49 0 0.724 0.92
GCSEs 64% 0.04 16.05 0 0.563 0.719
A levels 56% 0.037 14.93 0 0.482 0.628
degree 38% 0.029 13.14 0 0.32 0.432
Ethnicity Non-white 30% 0.094 3.2 0.001 0.116 0.484
White 52% 0.018 28.33 0 0.484 0.556
Religion
No religion 47% 0.024 20.14 0 0.427 0.519
Christian 56% 0.030 18.62 0 0.501 0.619
Other 
religion 56% 0.090 6.16 0 0.381 0.737
Urban–
rural (local 
authority)
Urban 48% 0.020 23.46 0 0.440 0.520
Rural 61% 0.032 18.52 0 0.544 0.672
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Figure 1   The relationship between respondents’ age and 
predicted probability of voting Leave in EU referendum
The analysis also finds significant effects for ethnicity, 
religiosity and the type of area one lives in, with white people, 
the religious and those in rural areas being more likely to have 
voted to leave the EU. Holding other variables constant, the 
predicted probability of an individual voting to leave the EU 
is 22 percentage points lower among non-white respondents 
than white respondents. Similarly, identifying with a religion 
is associated with a 9 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of voting to leave.
We also tested the impact of various place-based 
statistics on the likelihood of an individual voting Leave. 
Previous geographical analyses of the referendum results 
showed that areas with higher percentages of foreign-born 
residents were more likely to vote to remain, but areas where 
the number of foreign-born residents has risen sharply 
in recent years were more likely to vote to leave.89 However, 
when controlling for individual factors, we do not find any 
significant effect of the speed or scale of immigration at 
either a local authority or neighbourhood level. Similarly, 
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neighbourhood levels of deprivation were not found 
to be a signifi cant factor, once controlling for individual 
circumstances. It is important to note with this analysis that 
we cannot be sure that there is no eff ect, merely that we cannot 
say with 95 per cent confi dence that these place-based factors 
do have an impact when controlling for other factors. On 
the other hand, we do see a divide among urban and rural 
respondents: those living in local authorities classed as urban 
were 13 percentage points more likely to vote to remain in the 
EU than those in local authorities classed as rural, holding 
other factors constant. 
Our analysis goes further to show that the education 
eff ect is not confounded by other correlates of a good 
education, such as income or age (as a higher proportion of 
Generations X and Y have a degree than the pre-war or baby 
boomer cohorts). On the other hand, although overall higher 
earners were more likely to vote to remain than those at the 
bottom of the income spectrum, income is not a signifi cant 
predictor of an individual’s referendum vote once we control 
for other factors.90
Figure 2  The relationship between respondents’ level of income 
and level of education and predicted probability of 
voting Leave in EU referendum 
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Figure 2 shows the impact of various levels of education on 
the probability that an individual respondent voted to leave 
the EU. We also show this trend at diff erent levels of income 
to show how education is a much stronger predictor. A full list 
of all the variables included in each model can be found in 
the technical appendix.
On the other hand, there was a signifi cant ‘interaction 
eff ect’ between gender and income. Holding other factors 
constant, women with a household income of between £1,520 
and £3,160 per month are more likely to have voted Leave than 
those on lower incomes, with those on higher incomes the 
least likely (fi gure 3).
Figure 3  The relationship between respondents’ income and 
gender and predicted probability of voting Leave in 
EU referendum 
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Social networks
Most important for our analysis is the strong effect of 
measures of social networks. Table 2 lays out the predicted 
probabilities for each of our social network variables.
Table 2   Predicted probability of respondents voting Leave, 
by social network variables
Variable Predicted 
probability 
of voting 
Leave
Standard 
error
z P>z 95% confidence 
interval
Socialised 
with someone 
from another 
country
No 57% 0.025 23.04 0 0.524 0.622
Yes 43% 0.025 16.84 0 0.378 0.478
Socialised 
with someone 
from another 
part of Britain
No 58% 0.033 17.47 0 0.511 0.641
Yes 48% 0.021 22.98 0 0.436 0.517
Socialised 
with someone 
from another 
town or city
No 57% 0.04 14.44 0 0.496 0.652
Yes 48% 0.019 24.71 0 0.441 0.518
Our analysis finds that those who had socialised with someone 
who lives in a different town or city in the last six months were 
9 percentage points less likely to vote Leave than those who 
had not. Similarly, those who had socialised with someone 
from a different part of Britain in the last six months were 10 
percentage points less likely to vote to leave than those who 
had not. Those who had socialised with someone who lives in 
a different country in the last six months were 15 percentage 
points less likely to vote to leave than those who had not. 
Crucially, this is the case controlling for all of our 
demographic and local area variables – including income, 
age, whether rural or urban, and local deprivation.
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Figure 4  The relationship between whether respondents had 
socialised with someone living in a diff erent country in 
the last six months and predicted probability of voting 
Leave in EU referendum
Interestingly, there is an interaction eff ect here between social 
networks and income: while those on lower or middle incomes 
are less likely to have voted Leave if they have wider social 
networks, the opposite is true for those on higher incomes 
(fi gure 4).
Attitudinal predictors of Brexit
We also explored the link between our attitudinal variables 
of interest and a vote to leave the EU (table 3). 
Attitudes towards various recent societal trends are a 
particularly important predictor. Controlling for other factors, 
those who believe that increased acceptance of same-sex 
relationships has had a positive impact on society are 
15 percentage points less likely to have voted to leave the 
EU than those who felt it had a negative impact or neither 
a negative nor positive impact. 
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Table 3   Predicted probability of respondents voting Leave, 
by their attitude towards various societal trends
Societal trends Predicted 
prob-
ability 
of voting 
Leave
Standard 
error
z P>z 95% 
confidence 
interval
View on 
same-sex 
relationships
Worse or 
neither
61% 0.033 18.760 0 0.551
Better 46% 0.023 20.090 0 0.416
View on 
women in 
work
Worse or 
neither
65% 0.034 18.830 0 0.580
Better 46% 0.021 22.180 0 0.423
View on 
ethnic and 
religious 
diversity
Worse or 
neither
65% 0.027 23.960 0 0.598
Better 36% 0.029 12.500 0 0.303
Level of 
social trust
0–3 75% 0.084 8.880 0 0.581
4–7 53% 0.027 19.940 0 0.479
8–10 47% 0.025 19.110 0 0.425
View of 
globalisation 
(Europe)
Positive 40% 0.021 18.900 0 0.358
Negative 83% 0.032 25.860 0 0.769
View of 
globalisation 
(Britain)
Positive 44% 0.021 21.160 0 0.395
Negative 74% 0.035 21.220 0 0.673
View of 
globalisation 
(local area)
Positive 42% 0.022 19.210 0 0.379
Negative 70% 0.036 19.320 0 0.630
View of 
globalisation 
(own life)
Positive 42% 0.022 19.150 0 0.380
Negative 69% 0.042 16.690 0 0.612
Preferred 
leadership 
style
Strong or 
neither
57% 0.030 19.310 0 0.514
Consensual 47% 0.023 20.850 0 0.427
View on 
international 
cooperation
Put Britain 
first or 
neither
78% 0.024 32.380 0 0.730
Cooperate 26% 0.027 9.710 0 0.206
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Those who think that more women entering the workplace has 
been positive for society are 18 percentage points less likely to 
have voted to leave the EU. Most strikingly, those who believe 
that increased ethnic and religious diversity has been good for 
society are 29 percentage points less likely to have voted 
Leave. Similarly, those with high levels of social trust were 
27 percentage points less likely to have voted to leave than 
those with low levels of social trust.
Figure 5  The relationship between respondents’ levels of social 
trust (0–10 scale) and predicted probability of voting 
Leave in EU referendum
Attitudes towards globalisation were also found to be 
particularly important predictors of a vote to leave. Given 
that ‘globalisation’ is a contested term and there is no 
consensus about its meaning among members of the public 
or in academic circles, we chose not to use the term explicitly 
in our survey question, instead asking:
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Over recent decades the world has become more interconnected. 
There is greater free trade between countries and easier 
communication across the globe. Money, people, cultures,   
jobs and industries all move more easily between countries.
Generally speaking, do you think this has had a positive 
or negative effect?
We asked whether the effect had been positive or negative 
at four levels: for Europe as a whole, for Britain as a whole, 
in the respondent’s local area, and in their own life.
Those who felt globalisation had been bad for Europe 
were 43 percentage points more likely to have voted to leave 
in the referendum. Those who felt it had been bad for Britain 
were 31 percentage points more likely, those who felt it had 
been bad for their local area were 28 percentage points more 
likely, and those who felt it had been bad for their own lives 
were 27 percentage points more likely to have voted Leave.
We also found that respondents who expressed a 
preference for ‘strong’, principled political leaders compared 
with more consensual, conciliatory leaders were 10 percentage 
points more likely to have voted to leave. The single biggest 
indicator was responses to the question about international 
cooperation – whether respondents felt that Britain did best 
when it compromised and worked in partnership with other 
countries, or when it put Britain’s interests first without 
worrying what other countries think. Those in favour of 
compromise and cooperation were a full 52 percentage points 
more likely to have voted Remain than those in favour of 
putting Britain’s interests first (or in favour of neither). 
Conclusion
Since the conclusion of the referendum campaign, numerous 
commentators, civil society organisations and think tanks 
have sought to explain the result. Much of this analysis has 
focused on a single trend or theme, if not a single cause. This 
chapter has highlighted just some of the most prominent 
interrelated and complex factors that contributed towards 
1 Great Britain
the eventual outcome. Some have argued that structural 
economic factors are the most important, with next to no role 
for campaigning and other such factors,91 while others dismiss 
the relevance of economic concerns altogether in favour of a 
more value-focused approach.92 The evidence presented here 
suggests instead that the motivation behind the referendum 
vote is complex – and interrelated demographic, geographic, 
economic and attitudinal aspects worked together. Insofar 
as it is useful to speak of the ‘left behind’ or the ‘losers of 
globalisation’, these terms must be interpreted as a response 
not just to an economic reality, but also to a perceived 
cultural consensus. 
While there was significant demographic variety on 
both sides of the referendum debate, Leave voters tended to be 
older, had fewer educational qualifications, and were less well 
off. They were more likely to be English or Welsh, and less 
likely to be Scottish or Northern Irish than their compatriots 
in the Remain camp. While a number of more well-off cities 
voted for Leave and a number of less well-off cities voted for 
Remain, those from more deprived urban areas were more 
likely to vote Leave than those from more prosperous cities. 
Those involved in manual labour and those most at risk of 
poverty were among the most reliable Leave supporters. 
Brexit supporters also tended to score high on five value 
orientations that have previously been identified as important 
in populist voting: being right of centre, suspicious about 
national and global governance, interested in order over 
openness, and worried about immigration. There is strong 
evidence to suggest that those with a greater disposition 
towards social order, and pessimism regarding the future 
of the UK, commonly voted to leave, while those with a 
disposition towards diversity and optimism regarding the 
future of the UK voted to stay. While caution should be 
exercised when drawing conclusions from this division 
between the optimistic and pessimistic – those voting for 
change are clearly less inclined towards the status quo in any 
situation – the wider division by social values is significant. 
Our original analysis reinforced a number of these 
findings at the level of the individual voter, particularly the 
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significance of demographic variables such as age, ethnicity 
and levels of education. Interestingly, when accounting for 
individual characteristics, local immigration (whether speed 
or overall scale) did not appear to matter for a voter’s 
propensity to support Leave – although rural areas were 
overall more likely to support Brexit. Our analysis also 
revealed that those who were less positive about globalisation, 
considered international cooperation to be a zero-sum game, 
and held socially conservative attitudes on ethnic and 
religious diversity were more likely to vote Leave. But even 
controlling for demographic and place-based factors, we found 
a significant role for social capital in referendum voting: both 
the geographical spread of social networks and the degree 
of social trust were significant factors in explaining a vote 
to leave.
After the referendum, numerous commentators argued 
that it was time to listen to the people and to take their 
concerns seriously. Few would disagree. Yet Leave supporters 
were a diverse coalition with diverse concerns, and did not 
speak with a single voice. Moreover, leaving the EU will not 
bridge the deep divides that found their expression in the 
referendum – the divides between those who prioritise 
openness and those who prioritise order, between those who 
feel they have benefited from globalisation and those who feel 
threatened by it. 
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Technical appendix
Survey details
We commissioned YouGov to survey members of the British 
public on attitudes towards the EU, globalisation, political 
and social trust, and a number of other social and political 
indicators. The survey was conducted online from YouGov’s 
panel of 185,000 people who had agreed to take part in 
surveys. Response rates to YouGov’s surveys are typically 
35–50 per cent.
The total sample size for this survey was 1,661 adults, 
with fieldwork taking place between 23 and 24 August 2016. 
YouGov provided weights to the dataset to provide a sample 
representative of the British public according to key 
demographic indicators. Alongside our survey questions, 
the dataset includes respondent demographic information 
such as gender, age, ethnicity, religion, education 
qualifications and income. To this, nine new variables were 
added using respondent location data provided by YouGov:
 · percentage of the population in the respondent’s 
neighbourhood (lower super output area; LSOA) who 
were born outside the UK (2011 census data)
 · percentage change in the foreign-born population in the 
respondent’s neighbourhood (LSOA) between 2001 and 
2011 (census data)
 · percentage of the population in the respondent’s local 
authority area who were born outside the UK (ONS 2015 
mid-year estimate)
 · percentage change in the foreign-born population in the 
respondent’s local authority area between 2001 and 2015 
(Office for National Statistics mid-year estimates)
 · relative overall deprivation in respondent’s neighbourhood 
(LSOA), measured in deciles using the Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation (IMD)
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 · relative employment deprivation in respondent’s 
neighbourhood (LSOA), measured in deciles using the IMD
 · relative income deprivation in respondent’s neighbourhood 
(LSOA), measured in deciles using the IMD
 · rural–urban classification of the respondent’s neighbourhood 
(LSOA), provided by the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
 · rural–urban classification of the respondent’s local authority 
area, provided by DEFRA
Model building
Our analysis uses logistic regression analysis to measure the 
effect of discrete changes in explanatory variables of interest 
in a total of nine response variables. Logistic regression is 
used where the response variable is dichotomous. In all 
models, the weights provided by YouGov were applied.
The full list of variables included in our analysis is set 
out in table 4. Two additional points should be made here. 
In some models: 
 · continuous or ordinal variables are included as a series of 
dummy variables in order to account for non-linear effects
 · certain attitudinal variables coded as dichotomous are 
changed to include ‘neither’ responses on one side of the 
divide; these changes are clearly indicated in the results tables
Table 4   Variables used in logistic regression analysis
Variable Scale Explan-
atory or 
response
Variable Scale Explan-
atory or 
response
Age Continuous E Domestic 
political trust
Continuous 
(0–10 scale)
E+R
Gender Dichotomous E EU referendum 
vote
Dichotomous 
(Leave–Remain)
R
Ethnicity Dichotomous 
(non-white–
white)
E Highest 
educational 
qualification
Ordinal E
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Variable Scale Explan-
atory or 
response
Variable Scale Explan-
atory or 
response
Religion Categorical 
(no religion, 
Christian, 
other)
E Geographic 
mobility: lives 
in same part of 
Britain as when 
a small child
Dichotomous 
(yes/no)
E
Income Ordinal 
(income 
brackets)
E Geographic 
mobility: lives 
in same part of 
Britain as at age 
of 10
Dichotomous 
(yes/no)
E
Overall 
deprivation 
decile
Ordinal E Geographic 
mobility: lives 
in same part of 
Britain as 5 years 
ago
Dichotomous 
(yes/no)
E
Employment 
deprivation 
decile
Ordinal E Geographic 
mobility: 
travelled abroad 
at least once in 
last year
Dichotomous 
(yes/no)
E
Income 
deprivation 
decile
Ordinal E Social network: 
has socialised 
with someone 
living in a 
different town 
or city in last six 
months
Dichotomous 
(yes/no)
E
Foreign-
born 
population 
(LSOA) (%)
Continuous E Social network: 
has socialised 
with someone 
living in a 
different part of 
Britain in last six 
months
Dichotomous 
(yes/no)
E
Foreign-
born 
population 
(local 
authority) 
(%)
Continuous E Social network: 
has socialised 
with someone 
living in a 
different country 
in last six months
Dichotomous 
(yes/no)
E
Foreign-
born 
population 
change 
(LSOA) (%)
Continuous E Perceived 
impact on 
society: 
acceptance 
of same-sex 
relationships
Dichotomous 
(positive/
negative)
E
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Variable Scale Explan-
atory or 
response
Variable Scale Explan-
atory or 
response
Foreign-
born 
population 
change 
(local 
authority) 
(%)
Continuous E Perceived 
impact on 
society: more 
women in work
Dichotomous 
(positive–
negative)
E
Urban–rural 
classification 
(LSOA)
Dichotomous E Perceived 
impact on 
society: more 
ethnic and 
religious 
diversity
Dichotomous 
(positive–
negative)
E+R
Urban–rural 
classification 
(local 
authority)
Dichotomous E Perceived 
impact of 
globalisation on 
Europe
Dichotomous 
(positive–
negative)
E
Preferred 
leadership 
style
Dichotomous 
(conviction–
consensual)
E+R Perceived 
impact of 
globalisation on 
Britain
Dichotomous 
(positive–
negative)
E+R
International 
cooperation
Dichotomous 
(cooperate 
or put Britain 
first)
E+R Perceived 
impact of 
globalisation on 
local area
Dichotomous 
(positive–
negative)
E+R
Social trust Continuous 
(0–10 scale)
E+R Perceived 
impact of 
globalisation on 
own life
Dichotomous 
(positive–
negative)
E+R
The approach to building regression models has several stages. 
First, a simple model that includes the response variable and 
individual demographic explanatory variables is assembled. 
These statistics (on education, ethnicity, gender, religion and 
income) remain in the model regardless of their significance 
or contribution to the explanatory power of the model. Next, 
place-based statistics are added to the model one by one, 
in each case removing the previous addition so that only 
one place-based statistic is included at any one time. Once all 
place-based statistics have been tested, the variable that gives 
a test statistic with the lowest p-value is retained in the model.
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With this new baseline, we repeat the exercise, adding 
in all additional place-based statistics one by one. Of any 
additional variables that are significant, the test statistic with 
the lowest p-value is once again added to a baseline. This is 
repeated until no additional variables are significant. This 
approach is used as an alternative to the likelihood-ratio test, 
which cannot be used when probability weights are applied 
to a model. To complete the model, the same approach is then 
used for a new set of variables: social networks and geographic 
mobility. Significant interaction terms are then added, and 
various post-estimation checks are run, including the   
Box-Tidwell test for non-linearity. 
In some cases, more than one final model is reported for 
a response variable. There are two reasons for this. First, where 
there are two significant explanatory variables that display 
substantial multicollinearity but are both of theoretical 
interest, they are reported separately. This is the case with the 
three social network variables, for example. Second, where 
attitudinal variables are of interest as explanatory variables 
(for example where referendum vote is the response variable), 
they are reported as separate models.
This is because we consider non-attitudinal and 
attitudinal variables to be of a different order – our hypothesis 
is that certain demographic, place-based and behavioural 
variables influence attitudes rather than the other way around, 
while different sets of attitudes might tend to be associated 
with one another or influence political behaviour (such as 
voting). Therefore, the impact of the breadth of an individual’s 
social networks on the likelihood of holding a particular 
political view or voting in a certain way is interesting on its 
own even if it is mediated through another social attitude. 
Including all attitudinal variables within a model when 
seeking to quantify the explanatory power of a demographic 
trait or a life experience would risk muddying or watering 
down the true scale of predictive power as a result of strong 
associations between attitudes.
Similarly, when we do put attitudinal variables into 
the model, they are included one by one (with the rest of 
the model), as these associations are of theoretical interest 
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regardless of the possible importance of other attitudinal 
variables. For example, it is interesting if respondents’ 
attitudes to same-sex relationships are strongly associated 
with a vote to leave the EU regardless of whether attitudes 
to ethnic and religious diversity are also important.
Reporting
Effects are reported as significant at a 95 per cent confidence 
level. In some cases confidence intervals are relatively large 
because of small sub-samples or missing data, but all reported 
margins and coefficients have a p-value less than or equal 
to 0.05.
In the logistic regression models, there are broadly 
three methods to report marginal effects: marginal effects 
at the means, marginal effects at other values decided by the 
researcher (such as modes or medians), and ‘average marginal 
effects’. In this analysis, we report average marginal effects.93
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Table 5   The main Brexit predictive model
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.355448 0.5479525 2.47 0.013 0.2814807 2.429415
35–44 1.689128 0.5534602 3.05 0.002 0.604366 2.77389
45–54 1.858809 0.5597221 3.32 0.001 0.7617743 2.955845
55–64 1.971858 0.5339147 3.69 0 0.9254048 3.018312
65+ 1.898366 0.537191 3.53 0 0.8454905 2.951241
education2
GCSEs -1.136426 0.440053 -2.58 0.01 -1.998914 -0.2739378
A-Levels or higher, 
below degree
-1.569419 0.4337769 -3.62 0 -2.419606 -0.7192321
degree -2.439014 0.4197594 -5.81 0 -3.261727 -1.616301
1.white 1.232452 0.5959748 2.07 0.039 0.0643633 2.400541
1.ruralla 0.6894382 0.2101209 3.28 0.001 0.2776088 1.101268
socdifcountry
yes -1.059817 0.2872928 -3.69 0 -1.622901 -0.4967339
religion1
Christian 0.4651931 0.2087088 2.23 0.026 0.0561314 0.8472547
other religion 0.4590905 0.5128065 0.9 0.371 -0.5459918 1.464173
male
male -0.7481792 0.2929094 -2.55 0.011 -1.322271 -0.1740874
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.7418954 0.3609421 -2.06 0.04 -1.449329 -0.0344618
over £3,160 -2.485991 0.5644772 -4.4 0 -3.592346 -1.379636
male#incomenom1
male#under £1,520pm 0.794986 0.4061168 1.96 0.05 -0.0009884 1.59096
male#over £3,160 1.519846 0.5728461 2.65 0.008 0.3970879 2.642603
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes 0.0776491 0.4102226 0.19 0.85 -0.7263723 0.8816706
over £3,160#yes 1.56205 0.5760419 2.71 0.007 0.4330285 2.691071
_cons -0.2417419 0.8851385 -0.27 0.785 -1.976581 1.493098
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 715
 Wald chi2(20) = 171.54
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -362.22919 Pseudo R2 = 0.2114
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Table 6   Brexit model with socdifbrit (social network – different part 
of Britain)
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.310609 0.6073538 216 0.031 0.1202175 2.429415
35–44 1.747973 0.6042527 2.89 0.004 0.5636598 2.77389
45–54 1.950882 0.611457 3.19 0.001 0.7524482 2.955845
55–64 2.053577 0.5939692 3.46 0.001 0.8894186 3.018312
65+ 1.943229 0.5899863 3.29 0.001 0.786877 2.951241
education2
GCSEs -1.117543 0.4450537 -2.51 0.012 -1.989832 -0.2452536
A-Levels or higher, 
below degree
-1.495116 0.4389677 -3.41 0.001 -2.355477 -0.6347548
degree -2.423104 0.4243214 -5.71 0 -3.254759 -1.59145
1.white 1.220537 0.602015 2.03 0.043 0.0406097 2.400465
1.ruralla 0.6480308 0.2080497 3.11 0.002 0.2402608 1.055801
socdifcountry
yes -0.9483851 0.3416816 -2.78 0.006 -1.618069 -0.2787014
religion1
Christian 0.4625524 0.2019088 2.11 0.035 0.0308183 0.8222864
other religion 0.324939 0.487735 0.67 0.505 -0.6310031 1.280883
male
male -0.6896035 0.2929094 -2.36 0.018 -1.263258 -0.1159493
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.651011 0.4727202 -1.38 0.168 -1.577526 0.2755036
over £3,160 -3.639948 0.838833 -4.34 0 -5.284031 -1.995866
male#incomenom1
male#under £1,520pm 0.6573993 0.4029989 1.63 0.103 -0.132464 1.447263
male#over £3,160 1.613362 0.5803072 2.78 0.005 0.4759805 2.750743
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes 0.0962631 0.480585 0.2 0.841 -0.8456731 1.038199
over £3,160#yes 2.452025 0.79726 3.08 0.002 0.8894237 4.014626
_cons -0.1503411 0.9217084 -0.16 0.87 -1.956856 1.656174
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 721
 Wald chi2(20) = 141.44
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -368.60842 Pseudo R2 = 0.2013
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Table 7   Brexit model with socdiftown (social network – different 
town or city)
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.322133 0.6058235 2.18 0.029 0.1347413 2.509526
35–44 1.763448 0.6020656 2.93 0.003 0.5834216 2.943475
45–54 1.988278 0.6112011 3.25 0.001 0.7903457 3.18621
55–64 1.950939 0.5880067 3.32 0.001 0.7984673 3.103411
65+ 1.885311 0.5850678 3.22 0.001 0.7385991 3.032023
education2
GCSEs -1.210558 0.45319 -2.67 0.008 -2.098794 -0.3223217
A-Levels or higher, below 
degree
-1.575364 0.4486518 -3.51 0 -2.454706 -0.6960232
degree -2.501104 0.4345606 -5.76 0 -3.352827 -1.649381
1.white 1.286912 0.6090524 2.11 0.035 0.0931912 2.480633
1.ruralla 0.6705575 0.2060934 3.25 0.001 0.2666219 1.074493
socdifcountry
yes -0.6611432 0.3869411 -1.71 0.088 -1.419534 0.0972474
religion1
Christian 0.4869297 0.197652 2.46 0.014 0.0995389 0.8743206
other religion 0.3584251 0.4815733 0.74 0.457 -0.5854412 1.302291
male
male -0.581899 0.2843425 -2.05 0.041 -1.1392 -0.024598
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.1261168 0.5478195 -0.23 0.818 -1.199823 0.9475896
over £3,160 -3.424705 1.102689 -3.11 0.002 -5.585937 -1.263474
male#incomenom1
male#under £1,520pm 0.5583373 0.3956099 1.41 0.158 -0.2170438 1.333719
male#over £3,160 1.356807 0.583554 2.33 0.02 0.2130626 2.500552
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes -0.4316664 0.5367725 -0.8 0.421 -1.483721 0.6203884
over £3,160#yes 2.124158 1.036838 2.05 0.04 0.0919936 4.156323
_cons -0.03869513 0.9625025 -0.4 0.688 -2.273421 1.499519
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 721
 Wald chi2(20) = 141.44
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -368.60842 Pseudo R2 = 0.2013
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Table 8   Brexit model with attitudes to same-sex relationships
leave Coef. Robust Std. 
Err.
z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.271662 0.5488237 2.32 0.021 0.195987 2.347336
35–44 1.536489 0.5598816 2.74 0.006 0.4391411 2.633837
45–54 1.684395 0.557221 3.02 0.003 0.5922618 2.776528
55–64 1.712349 0.5335943 3.21 0.001 0.6665231 2.758175
65+ 1.478559 0.545666 2.71 0.007 0.4092684 2.54785
education1 -0.5251782 0.078313 -6.71 0 -0.6786688 -0.3716877
1.white 1.516283 0.6348928 2.39 0.017
religion1
Christian 0.537462 0.2234242 2.03 0.042 0.0158429 0.8916495
other religion 0.4015126 0.5139388 0.78 0.435 -0.605789 1.408814
1.ruralla 0.5814139 0.2161413 2.69 0.007 0.1577847 1.005043
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.6281017 0.3706145 -1.69 0.09 -1.354493 0.0982894
over £3,160 -2.503735 0.5647177 -4.43 0 -3.610562 -1.396909
male
male -0.8004649 0.3064866 -2.61 0.009 -1.401168 -0.1997622
socdifcountry
yes -1.02904 0.293292 -3.44 0.001 -1.615714 -0.4423656
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes 0.008873 0.4285642 0.02 0.983 -0.8310973 0.8488433
over £3,160#yes 1.699351 0.580728 2.93 0.003 0.5611456 2.837557
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 0.7484264 0.423635 1.77 0.077 -0.0813509 1.578204
over £3,160#male 1.531427 0.6029756 2.54 0.011 0.3496165 2.713238
samsex1
better -0.8372346 0.2212489 -3.78 0 -1.270874 -0.4035948
_cons -0.1982647 0.825019 -0.24 0.81 -1.815272 1.418743
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 690
 Wald chi2(20) = 175.37
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -336.63582 Pseudo R2 = 0.2415
1 Great Britain
Table 9   Brexit model with attitudes to women in work
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.474622 0.5638878 2.62 0.009 0.3694224 2.579822
35–44 1.649226 0.5662371 2.91 0.004 0.5394219 2.759031
45–54 1.833732 0.5643447 3.25 0.001 0.7276364 2.939827
55–64 1.830715 0.5387474 3.4 0.001 0.7747893 2.737435
65+ 1.663679 0.5478446 3.04 0.002 0.5899236 2.737435
education1 -0.5391039 0.0767285 -7.03 0 -0.6894891 -0.3887187
1.white 1.191468 0.5900896 2.02 0.043 0.0349137 2.348022
religion1
Christian 0.5323742 0.2253474 2.36 0.018 0.0907015 0.9740469
other religion 0.3832696 0.5345351 0.72 0.473 -0.6643999 1.430939
1.ruralla 0.6702096 0.2142258 3.13 0.002 0.2503348 1.090084
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.6311579 0.378092 -1.67 0.095 -1.372205 0.1098887
over £3,160 -2.354791 0.5772421 -4.08 0 -3.486164 -1.223417
male
male -0.7205906 0.2978646 -2.42 0.016 -1.304394 -0.1367868
socdifcountry
yes -1.076872 0.2892838 -3.72 0 -1.643857 -0.5098858
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes 0.0157121 0.4302462 0.04 0.971 -0.8275549 0.8589791
over £3,160#yes 1.685102 0.5934232 2.84 0.005 0.5220142 2.84819
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 0.7785664 0.4263135 1.83 0.068 -0.0569928 1.614126
over £3,160#male 1.475785 0.6018073 2.45 0.014 0.2962639 2.655305
womenwork1
better -1.014215 0.2285272 -4.44 0 -1.46212 -0.5663098
_cons 0.1007031 0.8255299 0.12 0.903 -1.517306 1.718712
Logistic Regression  Number of obs = 692
  Wald chi2(20) = 171.23
  Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -334.82753  Pseudo R2 = 0.2465
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Table 10  Brexit model with attitudes to ethnic and religious diversity
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.282488 0.5413378 2.37 0.018 0.2214852 2.34349
35–44 1.502042 0.5649804 2.66 0.008 0.3947006 2.609383
45–54 1.700371 0.5595347 3.04 0.002 0.6037027 2.797038
55–64 1.584298 0.5214252 3.04 0.002 0.5623238 2.606273
65+ 1.414513 0.5403797 2.62 0.009 0.3553881 2.473638
education1 -0.4796191 0.0847807 -5.66 0 -0.6457862 -0.313452
1.white 0.7109843 0.6266295 1.13 0.257 -0.517187 1.939156
religion1
Christian 0.4856132 0.2373345 2.05 0.041 0.0204461 0.9507804
other religion 0.602837 0.4746672 1.27 0.204 -0.3274935 1.533168
1.ruralla 0.5678419 0.2191492 2.59 0.01 0.1383174 0.9973665
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.6655545 0.3890372 -1.71 0.087 -1.428053 0.0969445
over £3,160 -2.291817 0.5929367 -3.87 0 -3.453952 -1.129683
male
male -0.6653625 0.3144853 -2.12 0.034 -1.281742 -0.0489826
socdifcountry
yes -1.145391 0.3136778 -3.65 0 -1.760188 -0.530594
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes 0.1526358 0.4513572 0.34 0.735 -0.732008 1.03728
over £3,160#yes 1.738443 0.623701 2.79 0.005 0.516011 2.960874
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 0.8504372 0.4508759 1.89 0.059 -0.0332634 1.734138
over £3,160#male 1.174471 0.6182012 1.9 0.057 -0.0371814 2.386123
multicultural1
better -1.555394 0.2198987 -7.07 0 -1.986387 -1.1244
_cons 0.6147333 0.8670532 0.71 0.478 -1.08466 2.314126
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 679
 Wald chi2(20) = 191.23
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -310.2622 Pseudo R2 = 0.2864
1 Great Britain
Table 11   Brexit model with levels of social trust
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.793987 0.6310889 2.84 0.004 0.5570757 3.030899
35–44 2.026917 0.6391752 3.17 0.002 0.7741571 3.279678
45–54 2.178513 0.6320035 3.45 0.001 0.9398089 3.417217
55–64 2.299213 0.6071426 3.79 0 1.109236 3.489191
65+ 2.265572 0.6064029 3.74 0 1.077044 3.4541
education1 -0.5582819 0.0784971 -7.11 0 -0.7121334 -0.4044304
1.white 1.275547 0.6544262 1.95 0.051 -0.0071048 2.558199
religion1
Christian 0.4488639 0.2127661 2.11 0.035 0.03185 0.8658779
other religion 0.420326 0.5303171 0.79 0.428 -0.6190765 1.459728
1.ruralla 0.6761046 0.2100748 3.22 0.001 0.2643655 1.087844
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.7535278 0.370463 -2.03 0.042 -1.1479622 -0.0274336
over £3,160 -2.317528 0.5806413 -3.99 0 -3.455564 -1.179491
male
male -0.8038296 0.2982439 -2.7 0.007 -1.388366 -0.2192822
socdifcountry
yes -0.953439 0.2968335 -3.21 0.001 -1.535222 -0.3716559
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes 0.1284486 0.4281261 0.3 0.764 -0.7106632 0.9675604
over £3,160#yes 1.509081 0.5913802 2.55 0.011 0.3499967 2.668165
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 0.7859251 0.4263775 1.84 0.065 -0.0497595 1.62161
over £3,160#male 1.55748 0.5885303 2.65 0.008 0.4039815 2.710978
soctrust1
04-Jul -1.289572 0.6063319 -2.13 0.033 -2.477961 -0.1011836
08-Oct -1.611063 0.5970109 -2.7 0.007 -2.781183 -0.4409435
_cons 0.3368493 1.085019 0.31 0.756 -1.789748 2.463447
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 693
 Wald chi2(20) = 168.71
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -341.63936 Pseudo R2 = 0.2335
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Table 12   Brexit model with attitudes to globalisation (Europe)
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.27012 0.6090076 2.09 0.037 0.0764869 2.463753
35–44 1.184893 0.5940277 1.99 0.046 0.0206203 2.349166
45–54 1.457002 0.5939093 2.45 0.014 0.2929616 2.621043
55–64 1.381286 0.5693809 2.43 0.015 0.2653201 2.497252
65+ 1.292294 0.5640453 2.29 0.022 0.1867853 2.397802
education1 -0.5045843 0.0849808 -5.94 0 -0.6711436 -0.338025
1.white 1.596494 0.762329 2.09 0.036 0.1023567 3.090632
religion1
Christian 0.7917461 0.2545319 3.11 0.002 0.2928727 1.290619
other religion 0.1689743 0.5386787 0.31 0.754 -0.8868167 1.224765
1.ruralla 0.7952901 0.2353882 3.38 0.001 0.3339377 1.256642
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -1.139291 0.4307787 -2.64 0.008 -1.983602 -0.2949803
over £3,160 -2.92856 0.8113665 -3.61 0 -4.518809 -1.33831
male
male -1.016657 0.3335248 -3.05 0.002 -1.670354 -0.3629606
socdifcountry
yes -1.049536 0.3265969 -3.21 0.001 -1.689654 -0.4094178
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes -0.0456634 0.4848669 -0.09 0.925 -0.995985 0.9046582
over £3,160#yes 1.916262 0.7687773 2.49 0.013 0.4094858 3.423037
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 1.352823 0.4781883 2.83 0.005 0.4155908 2.290054
over £3,160#male 1.581352 0.6805341 2.32 0.02 0.2475294 2.915174
glob1b
negative 2.666646 0.3142108 8.49 0 2.050804 3.282488
_cons -1.178349 0.9584769 -1.23 0.219 -3.056929 0.7002316
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 657
 Wald chi2(20) = 175.29
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -277.56236 Pseudo R2 = 0.3436
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Table 13   Brexit model with attitudes to globalisation (Britain)
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.661903 0.51143 3.25 0.001 0.6595184 2.664287
35–44 1.665384 0.5049061 3.3 0.001 0.6757862 2.654982
45–54 2.095342 0.5018235 4.18 0 1.111786 3.078898
55–64 1.964873 0.4710256 4.17 0 1.04168 2.888067
65+ 1.871387 0.4737149 3.95 0 0.9429227 2.799851
education1 -0.5352892 0.0827533 -6.47 0 -0.6974826 -0.3730957
1.white 1.694507 0.7200055 2.35 0.019 0.2833219 3.105692
religion1
Christian 0.6015602 0.2411341 2.49 0.013 0.1289462 1.074174
other religion 0.3148585 0.5044619 0.62 0.533 -0.6738686 1.303586
1.ruralla 0.7274999 0.2212049 3.29 0.001 0.2939464 1.161053
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.8231745 0.397295 -2.07 0.038 -1.601858 -0.0444906
over £3,160 -2.557213 0.6779805 -3.77 0 -3.886031 -1.228396
male
male -0.7739486 0.3132832 -2.47 0.013 -1.387972 -0.1599247
socdifcountry
yes -1.0657 0.309236 -3.45 0.001 -1.671792 -0.459609
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes -0.0460725 0.4680971 -0.1 0.922 -0.9635261 0.871381
over £3,160#yes 1.74722 0.6707517 2.6 0.009 0.4325704 3.061869
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 1.120504 0.4644086 2.41 0.016 0.2102796 2.030728
over £3,160#male 1.520633 0.6365075 2.39 0.017 0.2731016 2.768165
glob2b
negative 1.813317 0.2779732 6.52 0 1.2685 2.358135
_cons -1.705457 0.8730996 -1.95 0.051 -3.416701 0.0057871
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 665
 Wald chi2(20) = 170.58
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -302.61027 Pseudo R2 = 0.2923
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Table 14  Brexit model with attitudes to globalisation (local area)
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.862248 0.552563 3.37 0.001 0.7792445 2.945252
35–44 1.788315 0.5571647 3.21 0.001 0.6962923 2.880338
45–54 2.279196 0.5478568 4.16 0 1.205416 3.352976
55–64 1.934603 0.5206578 3.72 0 0.914132 2.955073
65+ 2.073528 0.5286855 3.92 0 1.037324 3.109733
education1 -0.5593059 0.0848867 -6.59 0 -0.7256808 -0.392931
1.white 1.160219 0.6576709 1.76 0.078 -0.1287928 2.44923
religion1
Christian 0.4853065 0.2475239 1.96 0.05 0.0001685 0.9704445
other religion -0.059904 0.4711146 -0.13 0.899 -0.9832716 0.8634636
1.ruralla 0.7595397 0.2420101 3.14 0.002 0.2852086 1.233871
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.8617273 0.4282071 -2.01 0.044 -1.700998 -0.0224569
over £3,160 -2.562885 0.8082602 -3.17 0.002 -4.147046 -0.9787242
male
male -0.7238127 0.3346159 -2.16 0.031 -1.379648 -0.0679776
socdifcountry
yes -1.029289 0.3280562 -3.14 0.002 -1.672268 -0.3863111
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes 0.0042826 0.4833729 0.01 0.993 -0.943111 0.9516761
over £3,160#yes 1.789991 0.7603536 2.35 0.019 0.2997249 3.280256
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 1.073628 0.4780715 2.25 0.025 0.1366252 2.010631
over £3,160#male 1.574177 0.6885049 2.29 0.022 0.2247324 2.923622
glob3b
negative 1.600475 0.2648202 6.04 0 1.081437 2.119513
_cons -1.286814 0.8584077 -1.5 0.134 -2.969262 0.3956344
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 607
 Wald chi2(20) = 150.46
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -283.60905 Pseudo R2 = 0.2753
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Table 15   Brexit model with attitudes to globalisation (own life)
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 2.128536 0.5767968 3.69 0 0.9980351 3.259037
35–44 2.018186 0.5883192 3.43 0.001 0.8651012 3.17127
45–54 2.345339 0.5868823 4 0 1.195071 3.495607
55–64 2.311586 0.5555125 4.16 0 1.222801 3.40037
65+ 2.301402 0.5702286 4.04 0 1.183774 3.419029
education1 -0.5632384 0.0889705 -6.33 0 -0.7376174 -0.3888593
1.white 1.201348 0.7137202 1.68 0.092 -0.1975184 2.600213
religion1
Christian 0.6711543 0.2678068 2.51 0.012 0.1462627 1.196046
other religion 0.2015327 0.5221228 0.39 0.7 -0.8218092 1.224875
1.ruralla 0.6589097 0.2406382 2.74 0.006 0.1872674 1.130552
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.652963 0.4112525 -1.59 0.112 -1.459003 0.1530771
over £3,160 -2.494873 0.6863733 -3.63 0 -3.84014 -1.149607
male
male -0.5610426 0.319424 -1.76 0.079 -1.187102 0.065017
socdifcountry
yes -0.8858376 0.3168724 -2.8 0.005 -1.506896 -0.2647791
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes -0.0532684 0.4874833 -0.11 0.913 -1.008718 0.9021812
over £3,160#yes 1.590677 0.7126725 2.23 0.026 0.1938646 2.987489
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 0.7529648 0.4801523 1.57 0.117 -0.1881164 1.694046
over £3,160#male 1.575893 0.6796225 2.32 0.02 0.2438573 2.907929
glob4b
negative 1.55371 0.2882326 5.39 0 0.9887845 2.118636
_cons -1.742764 0.904825 -1.93 0.054 -3.516189 0.0306601
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 594
 Wald chi2(20) = 163.96
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -272.7166 Pseudo R2 = 0.2853
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Table 16  Brexit model with preferred political leadership style 
(consensual vs strong or neither)
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.440666 0.5378152 2.68 0.007 0.3865673 2.494764
35–44 1.744874 0.5352011 3.26 0.001 0.6958987 2.793849
45–54 1.927284 0.5422538 3.55 0 0.864486 2.990082
55–64 2.06618 0.5070442 4.07 0 1.072392 3.059968
65+ 1.966977 0.5108311 3.85 0 0.9657667 2.968188
education1 -0.5996438 0.0802994 -7.47 0 -0.7570277 -0.4422599
1.white 1.534104 0.6434662 2.38 0.017 0.2729333 2.795274
religion1
Christian 0.5349257 0.217184 2.46 0.014 0.1092528 0.9605986
other religion 0.6504472 0.5235499 1.24 0.214 -0.3756918 1.676586
1.ruralla 0.5542725 0.213787 2.59 0.01 0.1352577 0.9732874
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.9247793 0.3820564 -2.42 0.015 -1.673596 -0.1759626
over £3,160 -2.648528 0.5882963 -4.5 0 -3.801568 -1.495488
male
male -0.8261431 0.3028058 -2.73 0.006 -1.419631 -0.2326547
socdifcountry
yes -1.181874 0.3008092 -3.93 0 -1.771449 -0.5922985
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes 0.1423095 0.4357065 0.33 0.744 -0.7116595 0.9962786
over £3,160#yes 1.692764 0.6051272 2.8 0.005 0.5067365 2.878791
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 0.8872693 0.4263684 2.08 0.037 0.0516026 1.722936
over £3,160#male 1.698101 0.6106393 2.78 0.005 0.5012698 2.894932
consensual
consensual -0.5822296 0.2258108 -2.58 0.01 -1.024811 -0.1396486
_cons -0.4070814 0.8406769 -0.48 0.628 -2.054778 1.240615
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 668
 Wald chi2(20) = 168.33
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -323.04264 Pseudo R2 = 0.2427
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Table 17   Brexit model with attitudes to international cooperation 
(cooperate vs put Britain first or neither)
leave Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>¦ z ¦ (95% Conf. Interval)
age3
25–34 1.379287 0.6733361 2.05 0.041 0.0595726 2.699001
35–44 1.992022 0.6748388 2.95 0.003 0.6693624 3.314682
45–54 1.74318 0.6168398 2.83 0.005 0.5341962 2.952164
55–64 2.073719 0.6218387 3.33 0.001 0.8549376 3.292501
65+ 1.956028 0.6169567 3.17 0.002 0.7468149 3.165241
education1 -0.4762585 0.0957761 -4.97 0 -0.6639762 -0.2885408
1.white 1.333426 0.9042877 1.47 0.14 -0.4389456 3.105797
religion1
Christian 0.4710541 0.2645078 1.78 0.075 -0.0473717 0.9894799
other religion 0.4631358 0.561161 0.83 0.409 -0.6367195 1.562991
1.ruralla 0.529269 0.2837055 1.87 0.062 -0.0267835 1.085322
incomenom1
under £1,520pm -0.5186517 0.4428839 -1.17 0.242 -1.386688 0.3493847
over £3,160 -2.22161 0.7465685 -2.98 0.003 -3.684857 -0.7583628
male
male -0.3040613 0.3611871 -0.84 0.4 -1.011975 0.4038524
socdifcountry
yes -1.012278 0.3602688 -2.81 0.005 -1.718392 -0.3061645
incomenom1#socdifcountry
under £1,520pm#yes -0.4153401 0.5363815 -0.77 0.439 -1.466629 0.6359484
over £3,160#yes 2.057513 0.77995 2.64 0.008 0.5288393 3.586187
incomenom1#male
under £1,520pm#male 0.7906286 0.5381362 1.47 0.142 -0.264099 1.845356
over £3,160#male 1.188076 0.7048558 1.69 0.092 -0.193416 2.569568
intcoop
cooperate -3.048002 0.2589008 -11.77 0 -3.555439 -2.540566
_cons 0.2723731 1.082688 0.25 0.801 -1.849656 2.394402
Logistic Regression Number of obs = 669
 Wald chi2(20) = 215.41
 Prob > chi2 = 0
Log pseudolikelihood = -237.71372 Pseudo R2 = 0.4467
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Summary 
How do we live with fear? This question is being asked with ever 
greater intensity in French society. In recent years France has 
been particularly exposed to an economic, geopolitical and 
political environment marked by crises, instability, insecurity 
and emotional shocks. The feeling of fear seems to be 
nourished by the accumulation of concerns that are different 
but interconnected to a greater or lesser degree – fears about 
Islamist terrorism, economic and financial globalisation, 
declining social status and the rise of the extreme right; and 
ambivalent attitudes towards the European Union (EU).   
This convergence of diverse fears sustains a climate of 
collective pessimism that has already been identified in many 
opinion surveys.
In order to better understand the situation of French 
fears and their impact on political debate in the country, 
Demos asked the Institut Jacques Delors to analyse the results 
of an exclusive survey carried out by YouGov in six European 
countries (France, Germany, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the 
UK). The results of this YouGov survey provide illuminating 
comparative perspectives and strengthen the findings of 
previous studies. There are three distinctive elements that 
emerge in particular:
 · Fear is a structuring element of French public debate, 
in many forms.
 · The upcoming elections in 2017 are likely to be an outlet for 
a feeling of mistrust, and will determine whether the Front 
National is seen as a possible solution or a further threat.
 · The growing Euroscepticism among French people should 
not be seen as the expression of a Europhobic desire to leave 
the EU.
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Introduction
Fear exists in France as a force of its own
Alain Duhamel 
Already in 1993, in his main book devoted to the analysis 
of the increase of ‘fear’ in the French political discourse, the 
famous French journalist Alain Duhamel highlighted the main 
French paradox of the last 25 years. This paradox is rooted in 
the fact that France, despite being protected from major 
internal and external crises, is still struggling to find a 
reassured state of mind within the new globalised world. The 
result is that the country is sliding backward into a negative, 
fearful and sometimes overcritical mentality about the future 
of the country. In his view, this has been the norm since the 
end of the ‘trente glorieuses’ (‘glorious thirty years’, a period 
comprising the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s). 
This anxiety, specific to France, is the core feeling that 
is structuring the politics of fear in the country. One cannot 
be understood without the other. Frank Furedi, for instance, 
has pinpointed this subconscious and more profound origin 
that transcends particular periods of time.1 Fear can be 
generated by manipulating public opinion, but in France it 
also exists as ‘a force in its own right’: a ‘fatalistic sensibility 
coexists with anxieties concerning the future, which in turn 
disposes the public to feel uncomfortable about managing 
uncertainty’.2 In such a context fear has become synonymous 
with disagreement in modern political discourse, when in 
fact it should be analysed as a symptom of exhaustion, 
disengagement and, more importantly, uncertainty and 
insecurity about the future. 
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French déclinisme 
Anyone who has studied the French political temperament 
knows that the worst weakness in the country, the most 
common, and also the most damaging, is the declinist 
attitude. This could perhaps be analysed as the logical and 
natural consequence for countries with an emerging national 
consciousness, but in France this consciousness is part of 
history and the specific political narrative of the country. 
Voltaire’s account of the Siècle des Lumières3 already casts a 
light on the French political nature: France must rise, shine, 
and then immediately the fear of losing that leadership 
plunges the country into a declinist period. French political 
history is made of those ups and downs, of those incredible 
milestones followed by spectacular falls: the Revolution and 
the fall of the Empire in 1814; the victory in 1918 and the 
collaboration with the Nazis in 1940; the trente glorieuses and 
the challenge posed by decolonisation; the end of the Cold 
War and the emergence of the geopolitics of globalisation. 
In a new bestseller published in September 2016, with 
the self-explanatory title Pathologies Françaises, Alain Duhamel 
updates his thesis and explores the idea that it is precisely this 
notion of France, this dual historical framing theory, that 
seems to have encapsulated the whole country in its own past 
and memory: France as a country is being held a prisoner of 
its own narrative. ‘The nation of crusaders’ (Sieburg), ‘The 
oldest daughter of the church’ (Pope Paul VI), ‘The great 
nation and the second motherland of all men’ (Thomas 
Jefferson), ‘The pilot of the vessel of humanity’ (Michelet). 
There is a heavy political and historical burden for a country 
that is failing to find a way to reframe a new vision for its 
people.4 This case study argues that the politics of fear in 
France is a combination of insecurity regarding new 
sociological phenomena, the rise of a political discourse 
manipulating such insecurities, and the unresolved question 
about the French role in the world and as a driver of the 
European integration ideal. 
This chapter addresses some of the main psychological 
and social ‘fears’ that are crucial nowadays in France. The 
social psychology of fear is politically relevant for a number   
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of reasons. It affects how citizens associate with various social 
demographic groups that they perceive to be the same or 
different to them, the tendency to express or support socially 
exclusive or even violent tendencies towards such groups, and 
political activity and voting behaviour. France is not an 
exception in having increased fears associated with migration. 
In The Politics of Insecurity, one of the most cited books in that 
field, Huysmans analyses the impact and political significance 
of new political forces framing immigration and asylum as 
dangers to society which can ‘sustain security policies’, ‘be 
used in a competition between political parties’ and reinforce 
certain concepts about ‘what a political community’ consists 
of.5 Unsurprisingly, this thesis is synonymous with the type 
of narrative used increasingly – but not exclusively – by the 
Front National. 
The second factor behind the politics of fear in France 
is undeniably the rising use of fear as a political tool, both by 
a large part of the political spectrum in the country as well as 
by the media and main channels of information. This 
dimension is interesting because political and media discourse 
influences public opinion both by modulating as well as by 
directly shaping public opinion on matters where fear (of real 
or imagined threats) is relevant. Therefore, we can argue that 
fear is instrumentalised only after actors with high visibility in 
the public debate introduce layers of structured meaning that 
give sense and purpose to this fear – which thereupon 
becomes a political motivator and can be exploited by parties. 
This specific cycle – politicians get exposure, exposure 
creates salience, salience creates new political faces – was 
particularly rich between 2006 and 2013, as pointed out by 
Hobeika and Villeneuve in their study at Counterpoint on the 
topics of the Front National and the agenda of the French 
press.6 The two authors conducted a thorough enquiry 
analysing thousands of news stories related to the more salient 
topics for the extreme right in France. Interestingly, they 
found that that the articles containing the terms ‘Islam’ and 
‘Muslim’ show that journalists have a special interest in some 
topics on very specific occasions. Those occasions correspond 
basically to two types: when scandals related to Islam emerge 
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outside the political world (for example in the educational or 
the cultural world), and when politicians speak repeatedly 
about Islam. This conclusion is striking because it points out   
a well-known phenomenon of partial dependency between the 
topics covered in the media and the topics conveyed by 
politicians. The original finding of Hobeika and Villeneuve   
is that this dependency also applies to the extreme right in 
France, irrespective of the morality or acceptability of the 
purposes held by this political faction. 
More interestingly for the French case study, the same 
study also confirmed that the topics of the extreme right have 
a particular ‘ranking’ among the press. What are the topics 
that have the greatest influence on the political agenda when 
covered repeatedly by newspapers and news channels? 
Significantly, at the top of the list we found security and 
immigration, two of the main topics that have climbed to the 
top of the political agenda since 2013 – and which constitute 
the two pillars of the discourse of the Front National.7 
Undeniably, the Front National is using this ‘fear 
agenda’ for political means, with the objective of creating 
and capitalising on social insecurities. This strategy has been 
studied in depth by the literature on fear politics, on the 
discursive side as well as on the political style. 
In the discursive analysis of how populism is evolving 
in France, there is a clear pattern of re-enacting the divide 
between the ‘people’ – as a disenfranchised political entity 
– and the elite – allegedly corrupt and disconnected. This 
divide has been the core theoretical matrix since the 1970s, 
after the Essex School of Discourse Analysis came up with 
the best definition of populist rhetoric: ‘an anti-status quo 
discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically 
dividing society between “the people” (as the “underdogs”) 
and its “other”’.8 Alongside such classical rhetoric, the rise 
of the Front National equally illustrates the political style 
of a populist force and its main characteristics. 
First, there is the appeal to ‘the people’ – the populists’ 
audience, and the subject they ‘render present’. Second, there 
is the evocation of a systemic crisis, a breakdown and a series 
of threats to the ‘French nation’, which fuels the populist 
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impetus that originates in the public perception of any or all 
of these factors. In other words, the ‘evocation of emergency’ 
that has been present in France for the last 12 years can be 
either a driver for positive and constructive change or, in the 
hands of populists, the best trigger for a simplified political 
discussion justifying a more conservative, protectionist and 
exclusionist agenda. 
Nevertheless, in the French scenario, the rise of ‘fear’ 
in the populist discourse is not necessarily framed as a 
single-issue debate (as could be seen in the UK in the   
last year). The current French populism is complex and 
sophisticated ‘as a number of previously disconnected 
grievances can find articulation under a new populist claim’.9 
This thesis is illustrated in particular by one of the main 
questions in the Demos and YouGov survey analysed in   
this chapter (see below).10 
When asked to choose the three things that would 
do most to reduce support for the Front National, French 
respondents focus on the economy, immigration, education 
and the political class. Regarding the economy, the most 
quoted remedy is as simple as ‘achieving more economic 
growth and job creation’ (40 per cent), followed by the option 
of getting a ‘reduction of immigration into France’ (36 per 
cent). The third most quoted solution is electing ‘more 
inspiring mainstream political leaders’ (28 per cent) and ‘more 
emphasis on French values and citizenship in schools’ (28 per 
cent), both quoted at similar rates. 
These data could be interpreted in different ways, but it 
is already useful to identify the challenges that play into hands 
of the Front National. In other words, it helps to measure what 
makes the Front National popular today and from that 
perspective we could say that the four key ‘weaknesses’ in   
the country currently consist of a mix of unemployment, 
decreasing multiculturalist values, a lack of citizenship 
education and distrusted political elites.
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Figure 1   Responses by survey respondents when asked 
which of three options would in their opinion reduce 
support for the Front National
* Total greater than 100%: more than one answer possible.
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2 France
Another illustration of French political malaise and fear 
can be found in the relationship established between French 
society and the construction of the EU. Why has France 
always struggled with the idea of sharing its sovereignty when 
the very idea of a European union was essentially a ‘French 
idea’? The European genesis cannot be understood without 
the work and writings of French decision-makers of the 1930s 
such as Briand, Herriot, Painlevé and Paul-Boncour, all of 
them followed, of course, by Jean Monnet and Robert 
Schuman, two of the main ‘founding fathers’. So why all this 
resistance to leading a more consolidated and even ‘federal’ 
EU?11 Duhamel asked the same question in the 1990s by 
defining the French political outlook as ‘a paradoxical and 
even irrational anxious state of mind in the oldest nation-state 
in Europe’.12
However, it is striking that in the French part of the 
survey led by Demos and YouGov, European integration does 
not seem to play a big role. When presented with the 
possibility of the European project moving forward or 
backward, neither of the two options are considered to be 
a potential way to reduce the rise of the Front National. This 
seems to confirm that the relationship of France with the EU 
is definitively not as critical a factor as it was in the case of the 
UK, the rise of UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the 
victory of the Brexit vote in June 2016.
Other French concerns resonate in other European 
countries but it is difficult to find a clear and identifiable 
common path. For example, the Brexit debate was greatly 
influenced by the immigration argument, and unemployment 
has been a common trait in Italy and Spain, but France is the 
only country with this particular mix of problems. That is 
probably how populism should be analysed in Europe. The 
classical metaphor of the ‘wave’ could be replaced by that of 
a ‘soup’, with a different mix of ingredients in each country. 
Built on the basis of the Demos and YouGov survey’s main 
findings and other complementary studies, this chapter mainly 
shows that, unfortunately, France seems to have found quite 
a balanced recipe. 
137
1   Fear, a structuring 
element of public 
debate in France
The YouGov survey shows that fear constitutes a structuring 
element of public debate in France, and that this fear arises 
from manifold threats: most recently Islamist terrorism, but 
also financial and economic globalisation that is considered 
to be frightening, and the fear of a collective deterioration 
in status.
The French people and the terrorist threat
The most common concern among the French population is 
the possibility of major terrorist attacks in the very short term 
(figure 2). Just over 8 in 10 French people think that another 
attack is ‘probable’, and a majority of these (46 per cent) deems 
it even ‘very probable’. This belief in the inevitability of a 
terrorist incident is one of the major changes in French society 
over the last two years. Today, the issue of terrorism has 
become one of the cornerstones of French politics and of 
political and media discourse, and is very likely to be one 
of the determining elements in the upcoming elections.
In Ifop-Atlantico’s survey carried out in July 2016 on the 
determining issues in the 2017 presidential election (‘Enjeux 
déterminants du vote à l’élection présidentielle de 2017’),   
the ‘fight against terrorism’ was mentioned by 90 per cent   
of French people as an issue that will count ‘a lot or quite  
a lot’ during the elections in 2017 – putting it at the same  
level as France’s economic recovery and the fight  
against unemployment.13 
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Figure 2  Responses by survey respondents when asked how likely 
they think it is that there will be another major attack in 
France in the next six months
Th e fear of terrorism voiced by French people is an immediate 
reaction to the attacks that scarred the collective consciousness 
during 2015 and 2016, and which provoked unrelenting 
feelings of extreme violence, unpredictability and repetition 
(Charlie Hebdo, Hyper Cacher, the Bataclan, the Stade de 
France, Magnanville, Nice, Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray). At the 
national level, this psychological shock expressed itself as 
mass civic mobilisation around the victims and republican 
values, while at the same time as support for exceptional legal 
measures, such as the corpus of new anti-terrorism laws14 and 
the state of emergency, which has been prolonged fi ve times 
over the last 12 months. Despite criticism from organisations 
including Amnesty International,15 this extension is widely 
supported by 76 per cent of the population, according to one 
of YouGov’s recent surveys.16 Th is exceptional context also 
explains why most French people today cite insecurity as their 
primary concern, ahead of jobs and unemployment.17
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
0
20
40
60
80
100
Very probable Quite probable Not at all probable
Not very probable I don't know
‘I don’t know’‘Not probable’‘Probable’
139
A more structural issue: French collective 
anxiety about globalisation 
Wh en asked about the fact that the world today is more 
interconnected, French opinions are positive or negative 
depending on proximity and geographical scale (region, 
country, Europe…) (fi gure 3). 
Figure 3  Responses by survey respondents to a question on 
whether globalisation has had a positive or negative 
impact on Europe, France, their region and their life 
(‘In recent decades, the world has become increasingly 
interconnected. There is more free trade between 
countries and it has become easier to communicate 
across the world. Money, people, cultures, jobs and 
industries are exchanged much more easily between 
countries. Generally speaking, do you think this has 
had a positive or negative impact on…’)
Table including subtotals (‘positive’: very positive + quite positive; ‘negative’: 
very negative + quite negative).
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Slightly more French people consider the impact of 
globalisation on their own lives to be generally positive (43 per 
cent compared with 40 per cent who have a negative opinion). 
At the regional level, there are still more positive opinions 
than negative ones, although there is just a single percentage 
point gap between them (42 per cent compared to 41 per cent). 
The same is true when asked to judge for Europe as a whole; 
there are more positive than negative opinions, and the gap 
between the two is widest (46 per cent compared with 41 per 
cent, a +5 point difference). 
Conversely, when asked about the impact of 
globalisation on France in general, responses are much more 
clear-cut (see figure 4). It is the only territorial level where 
respondents thought globalisation had a negative impact 
(50 per cent compared with 39 per cent of positive opinions). 
It is also the area where the gap between views on the impact 
of globalisation is widest (+11 points for negative opinions): 
1 in 5 French people (21 per cent) judges the impact of 
globalisation on France as ‘very negative’. 
On balance, the French perceive globalisation in 
a positive way for Europe, in a positive way – but less so 
– for themselves and for their own region, and in a distinctly 
negative way for France. This curious ‘ranking’ of the winners 
and losers of globalisation supports the hypothesis that there 
is a certain defeatism at national level and the fear of a 
collective decline in status. Is globalisation perceived as 
incompatible with the nation state in France? This reading 
can be further supported by other national studies such as 
‘Fractures Françaises’, carried out in May 2016 by Ipsos and 
Sopra_Steria.18 They found that nearly 6 in 10 French people 
believed that globalisation was a threat to the country, and 
nearly 57 per cent believed that France should ‘protect itself 
more from the world of today’.
These results are specific to France: of the six countries 
analysed by YouGov, it is the only country where negative 
opinions on globalisation outweigh positive ones (figure 5). 
No other country has a public opinion that is so evidently 
concerned about globalisation and its impact on the   
national community.
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Figure 4  Responses by survey respondents to a question on 
whether globalisation has had a positive or negative 
impact on France
Figure 5  Responses by survey respondents to a question on 
whether globalisation has had a positive or negative 
impact on six countries in the EU
Table including subtotals (‘positive’: very positive + quite positive; ‘negative’: very negative + 
quite negative).
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The situation in Poland, for example, provides a stark contrast 
to that in France, with 80 per cent of Poles judging that 
globalisation has had a positive overall impact on their 
country, compared with just 13 per cent who think the 
opposite. In the UK, public opinion is also much more 
optimistic, despite traditional Euroscepticism among the 
British people. Even in a country that was struck hard by the 
crisis, such as Spain, the population still sees the impact of 
globalisation on their country in a more positive way than the 
French population does (63 per cent of Spaniards believe that 
overall globalisation has had positive effects on Spain, 
compared with 28 per cent who think the opposite).
This fear of national decline is also accompanied by a 
fear of social and economic decline, particularly in the many 
households that have been unable to secure their long-term 
stability and professional future since the crisis that struck in 
2009. This is particularly true among those at the start and 
end of their careers, the two population groups that are   
most sensitive to economic fluctuations. According to figures 
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) – which are almost identical to those 
of the Institut national de la statistique et des études 
économiques (INSEE) – the unemployment rate among young 
people aged 15–24 in France has increased over the last five 
years, rising from 22.57 per cent in 2009 to 24.68 per cent in 
2015,19 almost 12 percentage points more than the OECD 
average. As for unemployment among the over-50s, this has 
risen from 5.3 per cent in 2009 to 6.9 per cent in 2014.20 So, 
whether this is just a perception or a perceptible reality, the 
fear of a drop in status remains constant in France.21
Another key element in French public debate: 
collective pessimism for the next 12 months
Despite seeing the start of an economic recovery in 2016, the 
French are generally concerned about the next 12 months and 
think that the situation will get worse in Europe and at local 
and national levels (figure 6). The most frequently cited source 
of concern is again the future of France as a whole. Thus, more 
143
than 1 in 2 (53 per cent) French people think that the situation 
will get worse for the country, while 47 per cent are concerned 
for the future of the whole of Europe. Although the gap is less 
wide, the French are also pessimistic about the next 12 months 
at local and individual levels, since 40 per cent think that the 
situation will deteriorate in their region, and 1 in 3 (33 per 
cent) say they are pessimistic about their personal situation 
and that of their family.
2 France
Figure 6  Responses by survey respondents to a question on their 
expectations for the next 12 months for Europe, France, 
their region, and themselves and their family (‘Generally 
speaking, do you think things will get better or worse 
over the next 12 months for…?’)
Table including subtotals (‘get better’: get much better + get slightly better; 
‘get worse’: get much worse + get slightly worse).
Th e French political climate is fed by fears that still loom 
over the post-crisis period. Indeed, the French do not seem 
convinced that France has done everything necessary to learn 
from the lessons of 2009 as regards the possibility of another 
major fi nancial crisis (fi gure 7). Th is results in a concern 
shared by 7 in 10 French people who think that such an event 
is ‘probable’ in the medium term. Th is concern is particularly 
signifi cant since the question asked about a relatively short 
and imminent period of time (the next two years), suggesting 
that for a signifi cant part of the population, the crisis that 
began in 2008/09 – considered to be historic and without 
parallel in decades – could happen again.
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Figure 7  Responses by survey respondents when asked if they 
think it is likely that there will be another major fi nancial 
crisis in the next two years
Th is perception among a majority of French people refl ects 
a certain rejection of all eff orts made by EU member states 
since 2009 – bank bailouts (in Spain) or rescue packages for 
national public fi nances (in Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal), the European Stability Mechanism, Banking 
Union, reform of the Stability Pact… Th ese data can be 
interpreted in many ways; in particular, they cast doubt on 
the level of public information or assimilation of all the 
mechanisms that have been established. Ultimately, however, 
the fear of a crisis, and thus the fear of encountering economic 
and social diffi  culties, is evidently still a current concern for 
most French people.
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Figure 8  Responses by survey respondents aged 18–34 to a 
statement on their expectations for the next 12 months 
for Europe, France, their region, and themselves and their 
family (‘Generally speaking, do you think things will get 
better or worse over the next 12 months for…?’)
Table including subtotals (‘get better’: get much better + get slightly better; 
‘get worse’: get much worse + get slightly worse).
Wh ile the French population as a whole thus seems mired in 
generalised pessimism, young people aged between 18 and 34 
constitute an exception. Th is is the only age bracket where 
there is a majority who think that things will get better in the 
next 12 months for them and their family (fi gure 8). Th ose in 
this age group are thus broadly pessimistic about the future of 
the country, but the diff erence is −31 per cent (compared with 
−40 per cent). 
Similarly, when asked about the future of their region, 
the young pessimists still outweigh the optimists with a 
diff erence of 9 points, but this gap is 26 points when looking 
at the whole population. Th is more nuanced pessimism among 
the younger age brackets is an interesting fi nding, since 
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paradoxically this is the age group that might have suff ered 
most from the eff ects of an underperforming job market. 
Figure 9 shows the responses by survey respondents 
to a statement on their optimism for the future.
Figure 9  Responses by survey respondents when asked to what 
extent they agree with the statements ‘I am optimistic 
when I think about my own future’ and ‘Do you think 
young people today will have more, the same, or fewer 
opportunities for success than their parents did in the 
French society of tomorrow?’
Source: Chanvril, ‘Baromètre de la confi ance politique CEVIPOF.22 
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2  Elections at a time of 
political distrust: is the 
extreme right a possible 
solution or a further 
threat?
The perspective of presidential and legislative elections in 
spring 2017 requires us not only to measure the impact of   
fear on French public debate to evaluate its possible influence 
on the results at the ballot box, but also to consider another 
emotion that is distinct from fear, and which is very present 
in France (and beyond): anger towards the political system   
as a whole, particularly since the French question its capacity   
to tackle the main challenges facing their country effectively. 
In this context, one of the determining factors in the 
upcoming presidential election is to know whether the 
extreme right could be considered a credible solution in the 
face of these challenges, or if it is seen more as a threat in the 
eyes of the French people. The data collected in the YouGov 
survey also provide confirmation and clarification of how 
French public opinion has evolved with regard to this issue. 
More a feeling of mistrust than fear: the French 
political and institutional crisis
Alongside a singular vision of their country’s destiny, the 
French also show a certain political disillusionment and   
an almost total lack of confidence in their institutions and 
principal representative bodies. 
Thus, 8 in 10 French people do not trust the government, 
the parliament, the European Parliament, or the European 
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Commission. Similarly, nearly 1 in 4 French people believe 
that the best leaders ‘have strong principles and apply them 
without worrying about what others think, even if that means 
losing support’, which can be interpreted as dissatisfaction 
with recent political leadership.
Mistrust for the main political institutions remains 
dominant in the survey organised by the Institut Jacques 
Delors and Demos, since 84 per cent and 80 per cent of 
respondents do not trust the government or the French 
parliament respectively (fi gure 10). Mistrust in the European 
Parliament and the European Commission is also very high, 
since, on a scale of 1 to 10 measuring trust, 82 per cent of the 
population gives a score below 5 to both of these institutions.
Figure 10  Responses by survey respondents to a question on trust 
in institutions (‘On a scale of 0 [no trust at all] to 10 [total 
trust], where appropriate, what degree of trust do you 
have in the following institutions?’)
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These results are particularly significant because they show 
the erosion of trust in the European institutions, which 
traditionally had a more positive image than national ones. 
The July 2016 Eurobarometer still shows the public trust the 
European Commission slightly more than their national 
parliaments: 33 per cent, compared with 26 per cent of citizens 
who trust their national parliaments. In comparison, before 
the crisis, 1 in 2 Europeans trusted the European Commission 
(50 per cent in 2008), while just 1 in 3 Europeans had the same 
trust in their national parliament (34 per cent).23 The EU 
institutions are thus no longer sheltered from the political 
crises striking individual member states.
This mistrust among French people in political actors, 
deemed incapable of providing reassuring and convincing 
answers to the challenges of the 21st century, echoes the 
findings of the seven waves of the Centre de recherches 
politiques de Sciences Po (CEVIPOF) barometer on political 
trust in France, which highlights a triple crisis in the system:
 · A crisis of confidence in traditional political party divisions: 
since 2009, France has witnessed a continued rise in the share 
of the population who lack confidence in the left or the right 
to govern the country (67 per cent in 2015, +5 points compared 
with 2009).24
 · A general decline in trust in figures like the president of the 
Republic, the prime minister and members of the European 
Parliament. There is an overall drop of between 4 and 9 points 
between 2009 and 2015.25
 · A crisis of confidence in the future and more precisely in the 
government’s capacity to govern interdependencies: the   
desire for protection from globalisation grows until 2013 
(47 per cent against 31 per cent in 2009, +16 points), before 
declining slightly.26
We see a lack of confidence in the French political system, 
while at the same time part of the French population finds that 
the third defining feature of Marine Le Pen is precisely that 
she is ‘strong’ (27 per cent), after 35 per cent who mention her 
‘authoritarian’ character and 28 per cent who judge her to be 
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‘racist’ (figure 15). With a public opinion that is generally 
disappointed by the political options on offer, it is logical that 
when asked about the upcoming presidential election nearly  
1 in 2 French people believes that voters will have to vote by 
default, ‘choosing the candidate that they think is best placed 
to prevent the election of a candidate who would be dangerous 
for France’. Altogether, these elements are not only strong 
warnings for the health of democracy in France and in 
Europe, but also betray a mindset that is vulnerable to   
binary and anti-elitist discourses such as those embodied   
by the Front National.
Should we therefore see this criticism of institutions as 
a deeper criticism of the system of representative democracy? 
No such claim can be made, since citizens continue to be 
attached to inclusive leadership models (see figure 11). The 
largest group of respondents (42 per cent) believe ‘the best 
leaders listen to others and try to gain the support of the 
greatest number, even if that means making some 
compromises’. In comparison, just 26 per cent of those 
questioned consider that political leadership should equate 
to ‘strength’ and ‘imposition’. This gap (−16 points) is not 
necessarily clear-cut, since 1 in 4 French people (24 per cent) 
are not satisfied by either of the two models. 
Other recent studies, such as the second wave of the 
Democracy Observatory (published by Revue Civique, 
Viavoice and the Fondation Jean Jaurès), also show that 
despite the tensions in France over the last two years, there 
is a recovery in confidence in the functioning of French 
democracy.27 According to the Observatory, 36 per cent of the 
population believe that democracy is functioning well, which 
is six points higher than in April 2014.28 As was emphasised by 
the Fondation Jean Jaurès when the results were published, the 
Observatory also found that it is not because citizens are 
critical that they are not at the same time ‘very vigilant and 
concerned: 72 per cent think that democracy could be called 
into question in the years to come, with the vision of a threat 
brought simultaneously by political extremism, religious 
fundamentalism, and a growing divide between citizens and 
their representatives’.29
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Figure 11  Responses by survey respondents when asked to assess 
statements on political leadership (‘Which statement 
best refl ects your own opinion?’)
The 2017 national elections, a choice by default?
For 1 in 2 French people, the 2017 presidential election will be 
mainly a choice by default. Nearly half (49 per cent) of those 
surveyed think that the vote will be principally a negative vote 
– choosing the candidate that voters think is best placed to 
prevent the election of a candidate who would be dangerous 
for France (fi gure 12). In comparison, just 1 in 4 French people 
(24 per cent) think that voters will cast their vote as part of a 
‘positive’ process, choosing the candidate who proposes the 
best policies for the country. Th ese results highlight a certain 
dissatisfaction with the politics on off er in the 2017 elections, 
since a majority of French people believe that the country will 
vote mainly in a ‘tactical’ way, and so ‘against’ candidates 
rather than ‘for’ particular individuals.
‘The best leaders 
have strong principles 
and they apply them 
without worrying about 
what others think, 
even if that means 
losing support’
‘The best leaders 
listen to others and 
try to gain the support 
of the greatest number,
even if it means making 
some compromises’
‘Neither’
‘I don’t know’
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Figure 12  Responses by survey respondents to a question on 
the 2017 election and the ‘tactical vote’ (‘As regards the 
upcoming presidential elections in 2017, do you think 
that the voters’ choice will be mainly…?’)
Figure 13  Responses by survey respondents to the question ‘In 
your opinion, how likely is it that the following things 
will occur in France? The coming to power of a fascist 
or extreme-right political party in the next ten years’
‘A positive choice – 
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that they think is best placed 
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a candidate who would be 
dangerous for France’
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One of the parties that is likely to mobilise voters around this 
idea of a ‘tactical vote’ is the Front National, considered by 
most French people as a party that is ‘dangerous’ for France. 
For example, the most recent wave of the annual barometer 
organised by TNS-Sofres for Le Monde, France Info and 
Canal+ shows that 56 per cent of the population believe   
the Front National ‘represents a danger for democracy in 
France’.30 This percentage has been rising since 2012, when it 
was 47 per cent, but it is still far from the 75 per cent of those 
surveyed in the 1990s, the time of Jean-Marie Le Pen, who 
thought that the party was dangerous for the country. 
However, more than 1 in 2 French people consider the 
possibility of the extreme right coming to power in France as 
‘likely’, and 1 in 5 consider this to be ‘very likely’ (figure 13). 
This result seems to confirm the normalisation of the Front 
National, particularly in the long term. Indeed, the question 
focuses on a long period of time – the next ten years – in order 
to minimise the boost related to the current political context 
and in particular the presidential election. In this respect, the 
percentage of those surveyed who believe that a fascist or 
extreme-right government is likely becomes all the more 
significant, and shows the degree to which concern or fear 
about the rise of extremism is the result of a deep structural 
change in French political life.
The image of the Front National, a crucial element 
in the 2017 presidential election
When asked about the image of the Front National, the 
French think that this party’s three distinctive features are 
‘racism’ (36 per cent), ‘Islamophobia’ (27 per cent) and 
‘authoritarianism’ (26 per cent). Paradoxically, the fourth 
most frequently cited feature is ‘realism’ (24 per cent), listed 
with the same frequency as ‘incompetence’ (23 per cent), 
reflecting the image promoted by a party that claims to 
be more ‘sincere’ and less ‘conformist’ (figure 14).
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Figure 14  Responses by survey respondents to the question 
‘As regards the Front National, which three or four 
adjectives from the following list best describe the 
party and its politics?’
*Total greater than 100%; more than one answer possible.
This image of the Front National is similar to that of Marine 
le Pen, but with several very significant differences. First of all, 
Marine Le Pen is considered to be ‘strong’ (figure 15). Thus, 
while just 14 per cent of French people describe the Front 
National as a ‘strong’ party, 27 per cent use this term to 
describe the personality of its leader. It is a character trait that 
is particularly important, since it is the third most cited trait 
when describing Marine Le Pen, behind her ‘authoritarian’ 
(35 per cent) and ‘racist’ (28 per cent) nature. Conversely, the 
number of French people who believe the Front National is 
‘realistic’ is higher than the number who credit Marine Le Pen 
with this characteristic (19 per cent, −4 points difference). 
Ultimately, Marine Le Pen’s image seems to be much 
more defined by authority and strength – values that could be 
seen as guarantees of conviction and firmness – while the party 
has a more ‘realistic’ side – which could be more associated with 
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2 France
the idea of ‘plain speaking’. Nonetheless, it has to be 
emphasised that the Front National and Marine Le Pen are   
still very widely associated with negative, extremist and 
discriminatory traits, particularly racism, Islamophobia, 
authoritarianism and incompetence. This begs the question   
of the paradox of a party that continues to win votes at each 
election, while still being described by the whole country   
as essentially an extremist party – far from being a  
‘normalised’ and majority party as claimed in Front  
National communications. 
Figure 15  Responses by survey respondents to the question 
‘As regards the Front National, which three or four 
adjectives from the following list best describe its 
leader, Marine Le Pen?’
*Total greater than 100%: more than one answer possible.
The French people believe that the two best ways to reduce 
support for the Front National are to improve the economy 
(40 per cent) and reduce immigration in France (36 per cent) 
(figure 16). 
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Figure 16  Responses by survey respondents to the question 
‘Among the following options available, which 
three could in your opinion reduce support for 
the Front National?’
Total greater than 100%: more than one answer possible.
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The fact that these two issues gain the most backing among 
the list of options to reduce support for the Front National 
reflects a certain propensity among French people to subscribe 
to the idea that the economy and migration are not dealt with 
as they should be by other political formations. It is therefore 
mainly the Front National that exploits these issues as the 
foundation of their political and electoral success, especially 
since suggestions such as ‘a more responsible press’ (23 per 
cent) or ‘more stimulating policies’ (28 per cent) are not 
considered as useful for hindering the rise of the extreme 
right. Significantly, the European question does not seem to 
play an essential role in the eyes of the French people, either  
in a pro-European way, or in the opposite sense. Thus having 
‘greater European integration’ is considered to be a good  
way to combat the rise of the party by only 8 per cent of 
respondents, while almost the same percentage (9 per cent) 
think that ‘weaker European integration’ could significantly 
change the situation.
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3  French citizens are 
increasingly Eurosceptic 
but not Europhobic
The European dimension of the YouGov survey allows us 
not only to appreciate the singularity of the French position 
compared with their British, German, Polish, Spanish and 
Swedish neighbours, but also to put the deterioration in their 
feelings for Europe into perspective. In a context of growing 
uncertainty and fears, the EU evokes contrasting emotions 
among French people, which are more akin to a growing 
Euroscepticism than a Europhobic desire to break ties with 
the EU.
The EU evokes contrasting emotions
The gap in France today between those in favour of ‘more 
Europe’ and those in favour of ‘less Europe’ is considerably 
wide (figure 17). More than 1 in 2 French people adopt negative 
positions about the European project, either by expressing 
a desire to reduce the EU’s powers (33 per cent) – the most 
widely chosen option – or, to a lesser degree, by supporting 
France’s exit from the EU (22 per cent).
These Eurosceptic (wanting to bring powers back to 
national level) and Europhobic (wanting to leave the EU) 
positions contrast with pro-European or federalist positions, 
which fewer respondents support. Thus, just 11 per cent of 
French people think that the long-term policy should be to 
stay in the EU while trying to expand its powers, and only 
14 per cent go even further and think that the priority should 
be to work on creating a single European government. In any 
case, neither group is satisfied by the status quo, since just 
6 per cent of those surveyed want to leave things as they are.
2 France
Figure 17  Responses by survey respondents to a question on the 
future of France in the EU (‘Do you think that France’s 
long-term policy should be above all to…’)
Figure 18  Responses by survey respondents to a question on 
their country’s long-term policy towards the EU (‘Do you 
think [your country’s] long-term policy should be above 
all to…’)
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In today’s European political context, particularly in light 
of the victory of the Brexit camp in the British referendum 
of June 2016, it is important to stress that the French remain 
nonetheless attached to their membership of the EU and 
do not call into question France’s role as a member state. 
Compared with the 22 per cent who clearly wish to leave, 
64 per cent support long-term projects that, despite their 
differences, still see France as a member of the EU. 
The level of Euroscepticism in France is not the highest 
among the European populations surveyed (the UK has by far 
the highest levels, followed by Sweden, where public opinion 
appears quite similar to that in France). Importantly, the UK 
is the only country where the option ‘leave the EU’ surpasses 
the option ‘stay in the EU but try to reduce its powers’. This 
only confirms once again the specificity of the British case in 
this regard (figure 18). Furthermore, while 33 per cent of 
French people do wish to stay in the EU while trying to limit 
its powers, this percentage is similar to that of Sweden (32 per 
cent), Poland (32 per cent) and even Spain (33 per cent) – one 
of the traditionally more pro-European countries.31
The relative weight of the European question is also 
shown by answers to the question on ‘the best ways to fight 
against the Front National’ (figure 16). Only 10 per cent of 
French people think that weaker European integration could 
reduce support for the Front National, while at the other end 
of the spectrum just 8 per cent think greater integration could 
make a difference. The two measures receive the least support 
of the options suggested, far below ‘improved economic growth 
and employment’ or ‘a decrease in immigration in France’. 
The findings from the YouGov study echo those from 
the study by Daniel Debomy entitled ‘Europe malgré tout?’ 
(‘Europe in spite of everything?’), published by the Institut 
Jacques Delors in June 2016. Indeed, the author emphasises,
Citizens’ perception of their country’s membership of the EU 
and the benefits it gains from membership has remained positive 
throughout the period [of the last ten years], and, in a significant 
proportion of Member States [including France], it is even more 
positive in 2015 than in 2005.32
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As in the YouGov survey, Daniel Debomy also mentions the 
most recent Eurobarometer surveys to explain how, on the 
other hand, the EU’s image and the degree of confi dence that 
its citizens feel towards it have declined signifi cantly between 
2005 and 2015 – by 10 points on average for the former and 
more than 10 points on average for the latter.
The dissonance between French priorities 
at national and European levels
Figure 19  Responses by survey respondents to the question 
‘What do you think are the two most important issues 
facing the EU at the moment? (%)’
Source: European Commission, ‘Public opinion in the European Union’.33
Analysis of the European question in French public opinion 
reveals a dissonance between the priorities at national and 
European levels. Figures 19 and 20, taken from the Standard 
Eurobarometer of spring 2016, show respondents have a range 
of views about the priorities facing the EU and those facing 
their country, which varies depending on the territorial level 
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in question. Th us, when asked about priorities for France, 
French people fi rst cite unemployment, terrorism and the 
economic situation (fi gure 20). But when asked about 
priorities for the EU, unemployment slides down to fourth 
place, and terrorism and immigration rise to the top of the 
list of the most urgent priorities (fi gure 19). 
Th is dissonance might hide a certain disillusionment 
among French people over the fi ght against unemployment, 
a matter which is seen more as a national priority than a 
European challenge. To reduce this dissonance, the EU could 
develop a more hard-hitting strategy for national public 
opinion, particularly in the case of France, with the aim of 
showing that the EU can address the main threats facing its 
citizens eff ectively, but above all that the protections given by 
the European project – and which today are ignored by an 
apathetic public – are directly threatened by and incompatible 
with the populist wave.34
Figure 20  Responses by survey respondents to the question 
‘What do you think are the two most important issues 
facing your country at the moment? (%)’
 Source: European Commission, ‘Public opinion in the European Union’.35
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Conclusion: the need to put 
an end to Franco-scepticism
The complete analysis of the results of the study by Demos 
and the Institut Jacques Delors lends further weight to the 
conclusion that there is a general malaise within French 
society, particularly over the future of France faced with 
phenomena such as globalisation. In general, three challenges 
seem particularly urgent: the negative perception of economic 
and financial globalisation, pessimism in the short term, and 
the feeling of insecurity in the face of multiple crises in the 
medium and long term. Considering such an overview in the 
run-up to the national elections in spring 2017, it must be 
stressed that the expression of manifold fears in French public 
debate is even more dangerous because it takes place in a 
context of great distrust in the ability of institutions to meet 
the challenges facing France effectively. The rise of the Front 
National therefore appears not only to be a reflection of fears 
felt by French people, but also the expression of their anger 
towards the political system. The rise of the Front National 
will be contained as long as a majority of French people 
considers the possibility of the Front National coming to 
power to be not a possible solution but another threat to the 
stability and destiny of their country.
Finally, the comparative analysis of French public 
opinion also highlights that this country is not characterised 
by growing British-style Europhobia. Rather, we see the 
relative growth of a Euroscepticism that echoes the current 
polymorphous crisis in the EU, but is also the expression of 
frustration arising from a dissonance between French 
priorities and European actions. From this perspective, anger 
and frustration seem to be two emotions that are distinct   
from fear, the latter being more directly connected to the 
development of the global economic and geopolitical context. 
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It would probably be possible to ease these feelings of anger 
and frustration in France more easily if the national authorities 
recovered the ability to deal effectively with the challenges 
facing French citizens, drawing them away from the   
Franco-scepticism that seems to have pervaded them  
for many years.
2 France
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Summary
Germany has long been viewed as a country of Europhiles, 
but recently the country has been displaying signs of growing 
Euroscepticism. When asked to think about Europe, a sizeable 
minority of Germans expresses concern over a loss of social 
security or jobs, a loss of national identity and culture, or 
Germany’s financial contributions to the European Union 
(EU). German political elites across the left–right spectrum 
have left these concerns largely unaddressed and continue to 
advocate for the European project. This raises questions about 
there being a potential gap between public and elite 
conceptions of EU fears.
Our comparison of survey data on German public 
opinion with insights from elite interviews with political 
leaders reveals that there is indeed a gap between public 
opinion and elite interpretations of the EU. Political  
decision-makers across the left–right spectrum perceive fears 
in Germany to be largely generalised, non-concrete and 
unrelated to evaluations of the EU. However, this is the case 
for a minority of Germans only. The majority show a pattern 
of concrete, distinguishable concerns, suggesting that we 
cannot speak about EU fears in the aggregate. Citizens’  
levels of anxiety are directly related to their evaluations of 
Germany’s future strategy in the EU: those who are more 
worried overall are more likely to want Germany to leave the 
EU or work towards reducing the EU’s powers. While we find 
citizens’ concerns to be dependent on both pragmatic 
economic evaluations and more emotive variables such as the 
degree of national and European identification, politicians 
focus on pragmatic economic evaluations. They underestimate 
the impact of emotional affiliations as expressed through 
identity on German public opinion. 
Given German political elites’ limited understanding 
of the public’s concerns, it is not surprising to find that 
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politicians have difficulties addressing them. Although 
politicians recognise the importance of representation for 
citizens’ evaluations of the legitimacy of the EU, the measures 
they suggest remain largely one-dimensional, centred on 
explaining the EU’s procedures and increasing identification 
with the EU. Politicians, it seems, struggle to think of 
measures to improve the EU’s problem-solving capacity.
In order to close the gap between public and elite 
conceptions about the EU in Germany, it is crucial to support 
politicians in their task of understanding and addressing 
citizens’ worries. This requires research and debate on EU-
related concerns, strategies for the transfer of knowledge 
about their underlying drivers and instruments to facilitate 
public–elite interaction about the EU as well as a broader 
range of policy options to address EU concerns across several 
levels of governance.
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Introduction
Germany has long been viewed as a country of Europhiles. 
A recent survey conducted for the purpose of this project 
concludes that of the six European countries in the study 
(France, Germany, Poland, Spain, Sweden, UK), Germany 
has the least Eurosceptic citizenry.1 However, while  
Germany is perhaps less Eurosceptic than other places in 
Europe, recurring crises in the EU have left their mark on 
German society and public opinion towards the EU. The  
German public has recently shown signs of increasingly 
Eurosceptic attitudes.
German public attitudes towards the EU seem 
paradoxical at first. On the one hand, more Germans than 
ever agree that membership in the EU is a good thing (71 per 
cent) and that overall their country has benefited from EU 
membership (62 per cent).2 At the same time, after a first low 
during the Eurozone crisis in 2010/11, the EU’s image in 
Germany is on the decline, and faster than before. In spring 
2016 only 29 per cent of Germans said the EU conjured up 
an overall positive image. These latest Eurobarometer 
measurements attest to one of the sharpest drops in public 
perception of the EU’s image (−16 percentage points from 
spring 2015 to spring 2016). Few countries have a more 
negative perception of the EU: it fares worse only in the 
Czech Republic, Cyprus and Greece.3
Many have expressed surprise at the EU’s negative 
image in Germany, which is deemed the most powerful  
and most trusted member state in the EU;4 concerns are 
perceived to be much less material than those of many other 
Eurosceptics around the continent. Economic indicators 
provide clear evidence of the German economy’s 
outstandingly fast recovery after the financial and Eurozone 
crisis.5 In contrast to many of its neighbours it is deemed an 
‘island of the fortunate’. Yet, the decline of the EU’s image 
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among the German public suggests that there may be a 
difference between pragmatic evaluations of Germany’s 
structural position within the EU and more ideological or 
emotional evaluations of the EU as an institution itself. Public 
opinion surveys point towards fear as one of the underlying 
drivers of the EU’s negative image in Germany: when asked 
to think about the EU, a sizeable minority of Germans 
expresses concerns about the loss of social security or jobs, 
the loss of national identity and culture, or increasing 
payments to the EU.
These apprehensions have remained largely unaddressed 
by political leaders in Germany. Over the past few decades 
German political elites across the left–right spectrum have 
carefully crafted an identity that is anchored in an integrated 
Europe. Most established political parties in Germany 
continue to advocate for the European project and pursue 
policies that are geared towards deeper European integration, 
focusing on the technical and pragmatic evaluations of the 
EU’s benefits. Even Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – often 
portrayed as Germany’s answer to right-wing Eurosceptic 
populists such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) or the 
French Front National – has not always campaigned against 
the EU or European integration per se. It was initially set up 
as a platform opposing Germany’s financial commitments to 
the EU in particular, and has now turned towards advocating 
for conservative migration policy rather than against EU 
integration as its core issue.6
The paradox of the EU’s declining image among 
German citizens while Germany is currently the EU’s most 
influential, most prosperous and – at least in terms of political 
elites – most Europhile member state raises the question of 
whether there is a gap between public and elite conceptions 
of the EU in Germany. What exactly drives fears about the 
EU among German citizens? Are EU-related fears in Germany 
a mere expression of a general culture of fear? Are political 
elites in Germany aware of these fears and, if so, how do they 
interpret them? 
In this report we present findings from a case study of 
concerns about the EU in Germany and their evaluation by 
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German political elites. We combine analysis of public opinion 
data with insights derived from elite interviews with German 
politicians and political analysts to further the understanding 
of these worries and explore how political elites evaluate and 
address them. Key insights presented in this report focus on 
the different types of concerns expressed by citizens, their 
drivers, and how they can be addressed by political elites. 
Throughout the report we compare citizens’ expressions of 
concern with how political decision-makers evaluate them. 
Using our understanding of the anxieties of German citizens 
and political elites we ultimately recommend strategies to 
approach these fears in the broader European context.
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Methodology
To further the understanding of concerns about the EU 
in Germany and determine whether there is a gap between 
citizens’ EU fears and their evaluation by political elites in 
Germany we contrast the analysis of public opinion data about 
attitudes towards the EU with insights derived from elite 
interviews with German politicians and political analysts. 
We aim to provide some explicit contrasts between elite and 
mass views and understand where public perceptions are 
adequately understood by decision-makers and where gaps 
in understanding may exist that demand further exploration.
Analysis of public opinion survey data 
on EU attitudes in Germany
To gain an understanding of citizens’ attitudes towards the EU 
in Germany, we analyse the German dataset from a comparative 
survey commissioned by Demos for the purpose of this project. 
A sample of 2,125 German adults (aged 18+), representative in 
age, gender and region, were interviewed about their fears about 
and attitudes towards the EU and their representation in it. 
In addition to capturing demographic data, education 
and income, the survey consisted of twelve questions, of which 
eight were asked across all countries included in the study 
(Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Sweden, UK) and four 
were specific to the German case study. Where possible, 
survey questions were adopted from existing standard surveys 
on political attitudes, such as the European Social Survey and 
the European Value Survey. The survey was conducted online 
by YouGov between 23 August and 7 September 2016. 
Respondents were invited through YouGov’s online panel 
and were included in the final dataset if they answered all 
questions. The final data have been weighted, taking into 
account last political vote, education and political affiliation. 
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Elite interviews with political leaders
To understand the extent to which we can speak of a gap 
between public and elite conceptions of the EU in Germany, 
we contrast data on public opinion with the views of political 
decision-makers, as expressed in our interviews with them. 
In doing so, we employ a broad definition of political elites 
that comprises all those who act as key representatives, 
decision-makers and gatekeepers or hold exclusive information 
about political processes. Within this definition political elites 
can include politicians at various levels of government or 
representation, staff at political institutions, political analysts 
and researchers’ as well as journalists. 
In this report we present insights from nine interviews 
with political elites in Germany. The sample includes 
politicians from several levels: regional, national and 
European. Regional party functionaries, members of the 
German Bundestag (MPs) and members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) have been interviewed. All four political 
parties constituting the current German parliament are 
represented in the sample. The sample further includes 
analysts from different political party think tanks and 
a journalist. The participants represent various regions 
in Germany (figure 1). 
Participants were recruited via d|part’s network and 
at high-level workshops about current policy issues. With 
the exception of analysts from party think tanks, they were 
selected in order to represent various areas of policy expertise, 
not specifically European affairs. The sample includes 
politicians focused on energy and transport policy, 
environmental policy, regional development, home and 
foreign affairs. In conversations lasting 45–60 minutes, 
we asked participants about their conception of citizens’ 
evaluations of the EU, the concrete concerns and fears of 
citizens in their constituency, and how they evaluate and 
plan to address them. Interviews took place in person or via 
telephone and were conducted between 14 September and 
17 October 2016.
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Figure 1   Areas represented by participants interviewed
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Results
Sizeable numbers of Germans participating in our survey 
expressed strong fears about the impact of the EU. Th ere 
are majorities with strong concerns about the loss of social 
security (53 per cent) and increasing payments to the EU 
(52 per cent) and signifi cant minorities with strong fears about 
the loss of jobs (45 per cent) and the loss of national identity 
and culture in Germany (42 per cent). We observe the lowest 
level of concern for the loss of power in the world, where only 
24 per cent of respondents can be classifi ed as strongly 
concerned (fi gure 2). 
F igure 2  Percentage of respondents expressing concern 
about the EU
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Taking a closer look at these aggregate figures we find that the 
levels of concern vary significantly across the different issues. 
Someone who is very worried about the loss of jobs may very 
well express little or no apprehension over other factors, 
suggesting that the driver of such concern is not a general 
sense of fear, but rather a more specific motivation. 
What is more, the population shows at least some fear 
about all five areas discussed. The loss of social security and 
increasing payments to the EU are of at least some concern for 
1 in 5 citizens. When asked about the loss of national identity 
and the loss of jobs more than 40 per cent of citizens say they 
are not at all worried, while 29 per cent and 27 per cent, 
respectively, express strong concern. 
These differences in distribution require further 
investigation. They suggest there are differences in the 
underlying drivers of fears: there are various reasons why 
citizens express distinct and specific worries. In the following 
section, we focus on the individual perspectives citizens and 
political decision-makers take over concerns about the EU 
in Germany. We investigate how far we can speak of similar 
drivers of apprehension in the German population and how 
politicians perceive citizens’ concerns. 
Insight 1: Diffuse, generalised perceptions of fear 
vs concrete, distinguishable concerns
Politicians in Germany believe there are no concrete, 
distinguishable fears or worries about the EU. Four out 
of six politicians say that they have not heard of or spoken 
to citizens in their constituency about concrete concerns in 
relation to the EU. Instead, they describe a latent feeling of 
general malaise. Looking at the macroeconomic condition 
rather than at people’s individual perceptions, politicians say 
that – in contrast to five or ten years ago when Germany was 
considered ‘the sick man of Europe’7 – the loss of social 
security or loss of jobs are not concrete fears of citizens in 
their constituency. If concrete concerns are mentioned at all, 
then they are only held by citizens who are perceived to hold 
extreme political opinions:
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I have honestly never heard of anyone afraid about a loss of power 
in the world for Germany. 
MP, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) 
The loss of jobs or social security is not an issue here at the moment. 
Whoever wants to work can work in Germany at the moment.
MEP, Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) 
I haven’t heard anyone in my constituency be concerned about 
the loss of their national identity or German culture. Maybe this 
is more of a concern in Frauke Petry’s constituency? 8
MP, CDU/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU)
Instead, politicians theorise about non-concrete fear and 
insecurity among the German public. This general feeling 
of insecurity is believed to originate from recurring crises 
and global challenges, but also in particular from citizens’ 
pragmatic evaluations of Germany’s economic condition. 
According to politicians, citizens may fear that Germany’s 
current economic prosperity is in danger and that social and 
economic decline are looming. Some mention that the 
recurring crises in the EU might lead citizens to project a 
general feeling of insecurity and precariousness onto the EU:
There is a general concern that stems from the constant crises 
that we are facing. They are mixed up somehow.
MP, SPD 
It is less of a concrete fear that you could personally be affected, 
but more a general emotional state.
MP, CDU/CSU
There is an accumulation of many anxieties about the future 
piled up. What will happen to my future? How about my job, 
my pension?
Analyst
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When looking at all the crises around us at the moment, I am 
not surprised when I hear people say ‘How is this going to affect 
Germany?’ The underlying question is of course whether we, 
too, will not do so well anymore in the future.
Analyst
In particular the refugees impersonate the worries of citizens 
whether or not we will be able to keep our current level of 
prosperity. 
Journalist
If we were to assume that there is indeed a generalised, diffuse 
feeling of fear among the German public, we would expect to 
see the majority of citizens report generalised concerns about 
all or most areas included in the survey: social security, jobs, 
national identity, power in the world and increasing EU 
payments. Yet, the survey data reveal that this is the case for a 
minority of Germans only: less than 15 per cent of respondents 
express concerns about all areas included in the survey 
(figure 3). 
Figure 3  Respondents expressing strong concern (0–3 on 11-point 
scale) across the five areas included in the survey (%)
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In other words, when we compare the concerns expressed by 
German citizens with political elites’ perceptions of their fears, 
we find that there is indeed a gap between public opinion and 
the political elite’s interpretations in Germany. While political 
decision-makers perceive fears and insecurities among the 
German public to be largely generalised, non-concrete or 
unrelated to their evaluation of the EU, citizens show a 
pattern of concrete, distinguishable fears that are relevant 
to their evaluation of the EU. There are various reasons why 
citizens are worried about the five areas included in this 
survey. It is necessary to distinguish carefully between 
different types of concerns, to uncover the experiences 
and views that motivate them.
As figure 3 shows, a minority of Germans are 
worried about the EU across the board. This group has a 
distinguishable profile: those who express similarly high levels 
of concern across all five dimensions are most likely to identify 
with the AfD (though closely followed by those who do not 
feel close to any party). They tend to be older, tend to identify 
as Germans only and feel least represented in the EU, 
especially by German political actors. Similarly 32 per cent 
of respondents find very little to be afraid of in relation to the 
EU. Those who feel close to the Green Party are least likely to 
show fears regarding the EU overall, but at times they share 
that position with other parties. For instance, those identifying 
with the liberal Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) tend to 
share the Greens’ low level of concern about potential social 
security losses, while they are significantly more uneasy about 
other aspects of EU membership.
In contrast to politicians’ perceptions of a generalised 
feeling of insecurity, the majority of citizens show a pattern 
of concrete, distinguishable concern. More than 50 per cent 
of respondents express significant anxiety about only a few 
topics. This suggests that we cannot speak about EU fears 
as an aggregate, generalised feeling, but need to distinguish 
between different types of concerns and their drivers. 
It is difficult to make out a particular demographic 
profile for those who express different types of apprehension 
although some of the variation in levels of concern correlates 
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with diff erent demographic characteristics. On all fi ve 
indicators, women are somewhat more likely to be fearful 
than men (fi gure 4). Younger people (aged 18–34 years) tend 
to be less apprehensive about the EU, but not to the same 
extent across all dimensions (fi gure 5). Eastern Germans are 
on the whole more worried about the EU than those who live 
in the west of the country (most pronounced for loss of social 
security and loss of national identity), but the diff erences are 
marginal (fi gure 7). We will take a closer look at Germany’s 
history of reunifi cation and the particular age groups driving 
this East–West diff erence in the section ‘Deep dive: where the 
East–West divide continues to exist’, below. Th e most 
consistent eff ect is found for education. Th ose who have 
enjoyed higher levels of education tend to be signifi cantly 
less concerned about the EU. Th e strength of this relationship 
is mostly consistent across all fi ve dimensions (fi gure 6). 
Figure 4  Fears of respondents by sex (mean scores with 95% 
confi dence intervals)9
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Figure 5  Fears of respondents by age (mean scores with 95% 
confi dence  intervals)
Figure 6  Fears of respondents by education (mean scores with 
95% confi dence intervals) 
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3 Germany
Figure 7  Fears of respondents by old states (East) and 
new federal states (West) (mean scores with 95% 
confi dence intervals) 
It is especially diff erences in party identifi cation across the 
types of concern that illustrate how we cannot speak of a 
latent sentiment of fear across the German population. Th ere 
are some parties whose supporters show distinct positions, but 
also clear diff erences between types of fears. Supporters of 
diff erent political parties have diff erent priorities and worries 
(fi gure 8), suggesting that we should not talk about EU fears 
in the aggregate but distinguish between them carefully.
Looking at the parties that form the current coalition 
government in Germany (CDU/CSU and SPD), CDU/CSU 
supporters are more worried about increasing payments from 
Germany to the EU and a loss of national identity than people 
supporting the Social Democrats. Yet, regarding fears of losing 
jobs, a loss of infl uence in the world and a loss of social 
security, SPD and CDU/CSU supporters appear to be equally 
concerned. Citizens who identify with Die Linke (together with 
those who feel closest to the Green Party) are least likely to 
show anxiety about a loss of infl uence in the world, while they 
are most concerned about a potential loss of social security.
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F igure 8  Fears of respondents by political party they have 
affi  nity for (excluding other parties with small sample 
sizes) (mean scores with 95% confi dence intervals)
Th us far, the results demonstrate that particular positions 
on the political spectrum are not so much associated with a 
general level of concern about the EU, but rather with worry 
about specifi c aspects of it. Th is suggests that if we can speak 
of a ‘latent fear’ at all, then it applies only for a small part of 
the population. Wh ile we do fi nd that high levels of general 
concern often coincide with support for the AfD or for no 
party at all, everything in between is quite complex. Because 
of this complexity we can refute claims that one party’s 
supporters are clearly more or less positive in appraising the 
EU than others. Th e exception is those who identify with 
the AfD or no party at all: they are most likely to show a 
pattern of generalised concern. For the remainder, we need to 
distinguish between diff erent types of fears and drivers of fear.
Insight 2: Citizens’ concerns are related to their 
evaluations of the future of the EU
Some politicians believe that citizens project their generalised 
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3 Germany
feeling of insecurity onto the EU, suggesting that citizens’ 
attitudes towards the EU bear little relation to concrete EU 
outputs. Recurring crises in the EU and a lack of legitimacy 
of EU institutions are believed to forge a connection between 
generalised fears and criticism of the EU and Germany’s 
long-term strategy in it: 
I don’t think there are concrete EU-related fears or worries. It is 
more a diffuse, abstract feeling of insecurity among citizens.
MP, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
For many people, the EU is the scapegoat for all sorts of problems. 
Regional party functionary, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
We have only talked about crises in Europe lately. No wonder 
citizens believe everything bad comes from the EU.
MP, SPD 
We find, however, that citizens’ concerns are directly related 
to their evaluations of Germany’s future strategy in the EU. 
Those respondents who say that Germany should leave the 
EU are significantly and substantially more likely to express 
fears across the different domains under investigation than 
any other group (figure 9). We also find that those who think 
that powers should be returned to the member states are 
significantly more likely to be concerned than those who want 
to maintain the status quo or increase the EU’s powers 
(though the difference tends to be smaller than with those 
advocating a full exit from the EU, except for increasing 
EU payments).
At the other end of the spectrum, however, there is no 
simple linear relationship between the degree of concern and 
Germany’s long-term strategy in the EU. In other words, 
a step towards more pro-EU views is not necessarily associated 
with decreasing EU fears. For most domains investigated there 
are no significant differences between those who want to 
expand the powers of the EU, those who want a single 
European government and those who favour the status quo. 
Those who favour the status quo are in fact less worried about 
195
a loss in social security, for example, than those who want 
to see more governance at the EU level. 
Th is suggests that the relationship between fears about 
the EU and constitutional preferences about Germany’s 
relationship with the EU is not simple or linear; it is 
asymmetric. Wh ile those who want to see the powers of the 
EU reduced or Germany to leave the EU indeed express more 
concern about the EU across the diff erent areas under 
investigation, we do not fi nd that the same applies for those 
favouring the status quo or an enhancement of EU powers 
compared with the most Europhile respondents. Taken 
together, those who favour the EU’s status quo are the least 
concerned across all areas. Th ose who want to either reduce 
or increase the EU’s competencies express distinct concern in 
at least some of the areas included in this survey. In the widest 
sense, this can be interpreted as a mandate for EU reform 
to alleviate individual concrete worries about the EU 
in Germany.
F igure 9  Fears of respondents by view of what Germany’s 
long-term strategy towards the EU should be 
(mean scores with 95% confi dence intervals) 
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3 Germany
Insight 3: Concerns about the EU depend on both 
pragmatic economic evaluations and emotive 
(latent) variables
What drives citizens’ concerns about the EU? The complexities 
in the distribution of concern, demographic patterns and 
party identification – as well as the asymmetric relationship 
between fears about the EU and constitutional preferences 
about Germany’s relationship with the EU we have seen so far 
– suggest that the underlying drivers of anxiety about the EU 
are not uniform either. We indeed find that citizens’ concerns 
about the EU depend on two types of considerations: 
pragmatic economic concerns and emotive variables such 
as the degree of national and European identification. 
Pragmatic economic evaluations as a driving force 
of EU concerns
We find a significant correlation between citizens’ concerns 
about the EU and their individual appraisal of their own 
economic prospects over the next 12 months. Those who have 
a negative outlook on their own position in the near future are 
also more concerned about the EU than those who have a 
positive outlook. Citizens who say that they have positive 
expectations for their own future are less likely to express 
unease across all five dimensions included in this study. 
However, the strength of the effect varies across the 
different domains of concern. It is least pronounced for the 
question of whether people fear a loss of influence in the 
world, where there is no significant difference between those 
thinking their own situation will be better and those who 
think there will be no change. In all cases the negative effect 
is stronger than the positive effect: the difference between 
those who expect their situation to become less favourable 
(and have greater fears) and those who expect no change  
is greater than the comparison between those expecting  
an improvement in their situation and those who expect  
no change. 
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Figure 10  Fears of respondents by expectations about how their 
personal situation will develop over the next 12 months 
(mean scores with 95% confi dence intervals) 
In their analysis, politicians and political analysts 
acknowledge that pragmatic economic considerations are 
the main driver of public concern. However, many focus 
on macroeconomic conditions. Looking at Germany’s 
outstanding economic indicators, they believe that citizens 
understand how the country’s current economic development 
is ‘completely diff erent from that in the rest of Europe’ (MP, 
SPD) and how Germany is ‘an island of the fortunate’ (MP, 
SPD). Citizens are thought to understand that ‘Germany is 
only doing well [economically] when others [in the EU] are 
doing well’ (analyst). According to politicians, citizens’ 
pragmatic evaluations of Germany’s export-oriented economy 
and its prospects in a crisis-ridden EU give rise to general 
insecurity and an overall ‘gloomy outlook’. Concerns about 
Germany’s economic prosperity are ultimately related to 
a feeling of relative economic precariousness and an 
(unfounded) fear of social and economic decline.
Few politicians diff erentiate between macroeconomic 
and individual evaluations of the economic situation: only two 
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3 Germany
of the politicians interviewed for this study admit that the 
economic evaluations are very different depending on who 
they speak to:
If someone has just lost their job, it doesn’t really help to gush 
about the macroeconomic benefits we gain from being a member 
of the EU.
MP, SPD
They recognise that there are big discrepancies between, 
for example, citizens in different types of work relations, 
economically advantaged and disadvantaged groups, citizens 
in Eastern and Western Germany, and those in urban and 
rural regions in Germany.
Deep dive: where the East–West divide continues to exist
Some 25 years after German reunification, differences between 
East and West Germany are still apparent in some areas of 
public opinion. While in most domains investigated for the 
purpose of this case study East–West differences are marginal, 
they persist especially in the evaluation of one’s personal 
(economic) situation and outlook on the future. One reason is 
that our evaluation of our personal situation is relative to the 
situation of others and to earlier life experience. The older we 
are the further we can look back: we compare whether our 
current situation is better or worse than previous experiences 
over the life course. This makes differences in evaluations of 
the personal (economic) situation especially sticky. 
Three interviewees (two political analysts and one 
politician whose constituency is in one of the new federal 
states) mention that it is the older generations of East 
Germans for whom evaluations of one’s personal economic 
situation matter the most. Particularly the generation of 
today’s 50–65-year-olds, who grew up and started their careers 
in the former German Democratic Republic, went through 
several major transformations over the course of their working 
lives (reunification during the 1990s, digitalisation, social and 
welfare reform during the 2000s, financial crisis during 
the 2010s):
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What we have seen are repeated devaluations of living conditions 
since 1989: first there was reunification, then the Hartz reforms, the 
financial crisis and now a refugee crisis. Naturally, this presented 
recurring challenges to identity.
Analyst 
90 per cent of these people do a completely different job today than 
they did in 1990.
MEP, CDU
These transformations brought challenges and significant 
hardships and left a number of people behind, especially in 
the new federal states of the former East. Even for those who 
successfully adapted to the changing environment of their 
working lives, the experience of knowing at least one family 
member or friend who failed to adapt to the many changes 
in state, labour market and economic conditions creates  
the perception that Germany’s current economic success  
is hard-earned and not to be taken for granted. As a 
consequence, this generation of (Eastern) Germans is 
especially wary of potential economic or social decline,  
the loss of social security (in particular over pensions) and 
potential increases in tax rates caused by ever-larger payments 
to the EU. In simple terms, nobody has any interest in going 
through further hardships:
It is almost a reflex that many people now have zero interest in 
going through similar transformations or to have to take similar 
risks yet again.
MEP, CDU
Accordingly, when we look at the expectations about how 
people’s personal situation will develop over the next 12 
months in both East and West Germany across different   
age groups, we find that it is especially the middle-aged  
group of Eastern Germans (those who underwent most 
transformation in their working lives) who are most likely to 
have a pessimistic outlook. Differences between age groups 
are more pronounced in East than West Germany. 
3 Germany
Figure 11  Fears of respondents by expectations about how 
their personal situation will develop over the next 12 
months (West vs East Germany) (mean scores with 
95% confi dence intervals) 
F igure 12  Fears of respondents by identity (mean scores with 
95% confi dence intervals) 
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This difference is also apparent in the levels of apprehension 
expressed about the EU: while the overall effect of pragmatic 
economic evaluations as a driver of different types of concern 
exists among both East and West Germans, it is more 
pronounced in East Germany, especially for fears of a loss of 
social security and increasing payments to the EU (figure 11).
Identity as a driving force of EU concerns
However, not everything is determined by pragmatic 
evaluations of the economic situation. There are also more 
emotive factors that we find to be connected to the fears 
people have about the EU. There is a clear association between 
national identity and concern about the EU (figure 12). Those 
who identify as solely German are significantly more likely to 
be worried about the EU, but even those who say that they are 
more German than European are more worried than those 
who say they are more European than German. However, the 
strength of the relationship varies greatly. Unsurprisingly it is 
most strongly correlated with fears about losing one’s national 
identity, but also quite a lot with a more pragmatic factor: the 
fear of increasing payments to the EU. 
It is a widely accepted myth that matters of national 
identity and culture have little impact on German public 
opinion. While it is true that German public opinion is  
less impacted by national identity than that of other EU 
member states,10 this does not mean it plays no role at  
all. It is therefore not surprising that politicians largely 
underestimate the impact of identity when assessing  
what drives EU-related concerns. 
Some claim that citizens in their constituency have not 
mentioned concerns about a loss of national identity and 
culture. Others argue that fears over a loss of German culture 
are important only in relation to objections to international 
trade agreements. If at all, it is at the extreme margins of 
public opinion that politicians believe evaluations of identity 
and culture can be a driver of insecurity and fear. Calls for 
‘Germanisation’ and a heightened awareness of German 
national identity are perceived to be an extreme view of 
a few members of the citizenry only:
3 Germany
I haven’t heard anyone in my constituency be concerned about 
the loss of their national identity or German culture.
MP, CDU/CSU
Nobody in my constituency would say something as extreme as 
‘Germany is not German enough anymore!’ But there are worries 
about the future of our cultural assets. For example, people are 
worried what will happen to our Franconian Bratwurst when 
things like CETA [Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement] 
or TTIP [Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership] come 
into place.
MP, SPD
This [national identity and culture] is a topic that is addressed 
by [a] few people with radical opinions only. The general public 
is less concerned about this.
MEP, CDU
Insight 4: Citizens’ perceptions of their 
representation in the EU matter
All politicians acknowledge that it is mainly their 
responsibility to address citizens’ anxieties. Civil society 
organisations, public administration, the media, and German 
industry and businesses (in their role as employers) are 
expected to contribute, but politicians as representatives of the 
people in their constituency carry most of the responsibility to 
address (and ideally offer solutions to) citizens’ concerns:
That’s our role as representatives. And I don’t want to shy away 
from it. 
MP, CDU/CSU
If citizens come to me to complain about the EU, that’s my role 
as an MP – to solve their problems. 
MP, Greens
Politicians are responsible for crafting a positive vision of Europe.
Regional party functionary, Greens
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Those politicians who perceive fears to largely be latent, 
non-concrete and (somewhat unfoundedly) projected 
onto the EU suggest the best way to restore trust in the 
EU among the German public is to explain the advantages 
of the EU to citizens: 
We have only talked about crises lately. We need to talk 
more about success stories in Europe.
MP, SPD
We need to explain better what Europe is all about.
MP, Greens
We need to take time to explain once more what it is that 
the EU offers.
MEP, CDU
Citizens are taking the EU’s successes for granted and only 
pay attention to the problems. We need to make them aware 
of the true achievements again.
MP, SPD
If explaining the benefits of the EU to German citizens 
were enough to restore trust in the EU, we would not expect 
a strong link between citizens’ evaluations of representation 
and fears about the EU. With a mere lack of understanding of 
the EU as a driver of concerns, we would have no grounds to 
expect that representation at any level – local, national or 
European – mattered in a distinct way, unless it was in some 
way related to citizens’ understanding of EU institutions. 
Instead, we would expect to find concerned citizens who feel 
well represented and those who feel less well represented.
By contrast, however, we find that perceptions 
of political representation matter a lot. There is a clear 
association between evaluations of representation at the 
national and European level and concerns about the EU in 
Germany. The better citizens feel that Germany is represented, 
the lower are their levels of fear across the five different 
domains (figure 13). 
3 Germany
F igure 13  Fears of respondents by how well people see Germany 
represented in the EU compared with most other member 
states (mean scores with 95% confi dence intervals) 
Th e relationship is least pronounced for worries about a loss 
of infl uence in the world, but still signifi cant. Again, we fi nd 
that positive eff ects are less pronounced than negative ones: 
compared with those who think Germany’s representation is 
neither better nor worse than that of other countries, those 
who think it is better show somewhat lower levels of fear, but 
those who consider the representation worse are much more 
fearful. Th ere is a clear imperative for politics: it is not 
ultimately important to make people feel that Germany is 
in a better situation than others, but to make them feel that 
it is at least not worse. 
Citizens’ evaluations of representation and government 
depend on assessments of legitimacy. Fritz Scharpf provides 
a helpful distinction when thinking about evaluations of 
legitimacy. He distinguishes between input-oriented and 
output-oriented legitimising beliefs.11 Input legitimacy, 
according to Scharpf, refers to the institutional settings that 
enable citizens to have their voices heard and justify the 
existence of institutions, even if this may not serve to further 
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one’s individual preferences. Output legitimacy, by contrast, 
arises from the substantive problem-solving capacity of 
governing institutions. Studies on legitimacy in the EU find 
that there is generally an emphasis on output legitimacy to 
justify EU governance.12
Most politicians recognise these two dimensions of 
legitimacy. Input legitimacy is believed to be lacking, in the 
sense that citizens perceive the EU to be distant and feel they 
have no say in it. According to politicians in Germany, the EU 
is an undefined political entity, far away from citizens’ daily 
lives. It is complicated for both citizens and politicians 
to understand what is going on in the EU. A weak European 
Parliament and an EU that is perceived as a political 
community without a face to citizens are deemed to further 
contribute to the impression of a lack of transparency and 
democratic control. The argument that an unreasonable piece 
of legislation ‘comes from Brussels’ or ‘from the EU’ is 
considered conclusive in itself when citizens question 
political decisions:
Nobody really knows who the leader of the Commission 
or the Parliament is really.
Regional party functionary, Greens
The EU is perceived as a bureaucratic monster.
MP, SPD
‘This comes from Brussels’ has become a legitimate excuse 
that no one [in Germany] questions any further. 
MP, Greens
Even as a member of parliament, I sometimes don’t understand 
what’s going on at the EU level. 
MP, SPD13
Output legitimacy is also perceived to be lacking, because 
citizens see an EU that does not offer solutions to global 
challenges. According to politicians, citizens perceive the EU 
to be especially incapable of dealing satisfactorily with those 
3 Germany
issues that are the EU’s ascribed core competency: enforcing 
migration and border security, preserving peace and economic 
prosperity, and implementing a joint environmental policy. 
The recurring crises in the EU have made the shortcomings 
of EU governance clear to many citizens in Germany: there 
is no common ground for joint solutions: 
The crises of the last couple of years showed that the EU has 
reached its limits as a political system.
Analyst
All European success stories are worth nothing if EU cannot 
find solutions to problems in imminent crises.
Journalist
However, when asked how to address citizens’ specific 
concerns, politicians focus on measures of input legitimacy 
only by explaining the EU’s procedures and increasing 
identification with the EU. Education about the EU and its 
institutions (eg in schools) and explaining the advantages of 
the EU better are first steps to address the EU’s legitimacy 
issues, according to some politicians. 
Politicians mention a range of concrete measures: 
city partnerships across the EU, an Interrail pass for young 
Europeans, school visits to Brussels, education about the 
EU in school curricula, a continuation and extension of the 
Erasmus programme. Some grasp that it is only a combination 
of these that can manage to address citizens’ concerns about 
their voice in the EU:
[An Interrail pass for young Europeans] might sound ridiculous at 
first, but if you think about it that’s exactly the kind of positive sign 
that creates the sense for cooperation that we called for.
MP, CDU/CSU
This [an Interrail pass for young Europeans] is something concrete 
at least. That’s worth looking into.
Regional party functionary, Greens
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Politicians focus on measures to increase input legitimacy 
in the EU to the neglect of measures to increase the EU’s 
problem-solving capacities. Only one politician specifically 
pointed out that soft measures to explain the EU are probably 
not enough to address concrete fears among dissatisfied 
citizens. Instead, the EU needs to offer solutions to concrete 
issues in order to improve its perception among the public. 
Another politician seemed to feel similarly, stating that a joint 
refugee policy in the EU would be perceived as a real success 
and could potentially change citizens’ evaluations of the EU. 
By contrast, all political analysts in the sample 
mentioned that the EU’s capacity to offer solutions to current 
crises and future challenges is key to addressing citizens’ 
concerns and alleviating the growing culture of fear:
Explaining more [about the EU] would probably help little. 
Those who are disgruntled already are also not coming to any 
of our events, not listening to us anyway.
MP, SPD
Europe needs to be able to offer solutions to concrete issues, 
such as the refugee crisis.
MP, CDU/CSU
If the EU managed to craft a picture of all member states acting in 
concert, this would be a real boost to citizens’ evaluations of the EU.
Analyst
[Our party] has a major strategic problem: that there is no strategy 
with regard to EU reform… There are several avenues for reform 
available, however, and they would make a big difference for how 
our supporters view the EU.
Analyst
We can only speculate as to why this view is so much more 
prevalent among political analysts than among politicians. 
While the sample of participants for our qualitative interviews 
is small and by no means representative of the entire political 
elite in Germany, one reason could be that political analysts 
3 Germany
are able to draw on comparative information. The political 
analysts interviewed for the purpose of this project referred to 
a range of empirical data, on both German public opinion and 
public opinion across Europe, which allowed them to compare 
the variety of views expressed by the German public with 
dominant views in other EU member states. Political analysts 
could then assign a key role to German political elites in the 
reform of EU institutions and policy:
Germany’s role in the EU has changed drastically; it is no longer 
the junior partner to France. But this new position doesn’t come 
without problems: Germany is obviously challenged to lead the 
way in finding joint solutions at the European level. 
Analyst
The German [representation] carries a lot of responsibility in 
Europe. It has to play a big role in restructuring how we look at 
the EU and its structure. Otherwise our entire party will just sink 
into insignificance in Europe. 
Analyst
Politicians, on the other hand, focus on the views of citizens in 
their individual constituency as that is their main task: to solve 
their constituents’ problems. A number of politicians mention 
that they find it difficult to create opportunities to talk to 
citizens about the EU: it is the citizens in their constituency 
who largely determine which events representatives are 
supposed to visit and what kind of topics they are supposed 
to speak about. If the EU is brought up as a topic 
by constituents, it is mostly in connection with complaints 
about specific pieces of regulation that affect local industry 
or people:
It is difficult to deliver a message about the EU to my constituency. 
If I just randomly started talking about the EU when I was meant 
to report back from Berlin, voters would probably say ‘Well, he 
didn’t get the problem, this is not of interest to us.’
MP, CDU/CSU
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It doesn’t happen often that citizens approach me with questions 
about the EU. If at all, then just as a torrent of complaints about 
bureaucracy and over-regulation.
MP, Greens
Recently I was invited to speak at a local business and the 
employees were invited to ask questions. Someone asked about 
the advantages of the EU. That was a rare opportunity for me to 
say something positive about the EU – this doesn’t usually happen.
MP, CDU/CSU
Comparative perspectives, access to empirical data and 
the opportunity to take a step back from the daily business 
of representation are all possible factors allowing political 
analysts to take a more holistic look at the current culture 
of fear in Europe, compared to politicians themselves. 
3 Germany
Conclusions
Using the latest assessments of public opinion in Germany, 
in particular the contradiction between positive pragmatic 
evaluations of Germany’s membership in the EU and the 
drastic decline in the image of EU as an institution, we can 
speculate on what might happen to German public opinion 
in the coming months. Among a range of possibilities, two 
alternative scenarios stand out:
 · Scenario 1: The EU’s image will bounce back to match the 
previous, rather low levels of Euroscepticism. This would 
suggest that the recent drastic decline in the perception of 
the EU among the German public was merely a temporary 
dip that could have been caused by citizens’ projections of 
generalised fear and insecurity onto the EU, which were 
particularly pronounced at the time of our research   
(summer 2016).
 · Scenario 2: The German public will become more Eurosceptic, 
also in their pragmatic evaluations of the country’s structural 
position within the EU, or make more vehement demands for 
German politicians to drive EU reform. The former would 
involve some citizens changing their views on Germany’s  
long-term strategy in the EU (advocating for Germany to leave 
the EU or to work towards reducing the EU’s power). The 
latter would put significant pressure on German politicians  
to put forth concrete ideas for EU reform.
Our analysis indicates that there are concrete and distinct 
reasons why citizens in Germany hold a negative image of the 
EU: we find no evidence of them having a generalised, 
abstract feeling of fear. Overall, the majority of citizens hold 
distinguishable concerns, suggesting that we cannot speak 
about EU fears in the aggregate. What is more: we find that 
citizens’ apprehensions are directly related to their perception 
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of Germany’s future strategy in the EU. This is reason to 
believe that the German public do not simply project 
a generalised feeling of insecurity onto the EU as an 
institutional scapegoat. Instead, they hold genuine concerns, 
which – if they remain unaddressed by politicians – may 
induce German people to become more Eurosceptic or to 
demand concrete measures of EU reform.
However, political elites perceive fears in Germany to 
be largely generalised, abstract or unrelated to evaluations of 
the EU, which is not borne out by our analysis. While we find 
citizens’ concerns to depend on both pragmatic economic 
considerations and emotive (latent) variables such as the 
degree of national and European identification, politicians 
focus on pragmatic economic aspects. They underestimate the 
impact of identity for the German public. Given this gap in 
understanding of fears between the public and political elites 
in Germany, it is not surprising that politicians have difficulty 
in addressing citizens’ concerns over the EU. 
Although all politicians recognise their particular 
responsibility to address citizens’ concerns, the measures 
they suggest to alleviate those that are EU-related are largely 
one-dimensional. Politicians realise that representation is 
crucial for the EU’s legitimacy and acknowledge that many 
citizens believe the EU currently lacks input as well as output 
legitimacy. However, they struggle to think of measures that 
specifically address output legitimacy and use various different 
ways to improve the EU’s problem-solving capacity (through 
reform of the EU or through national political institutions). 
Concrete suggestions increase input legitimacy directly at the 
EU level: they typically revolve around explaining the EU’s 
procedures and encouraging identification with the EU. 
Suggestions for EU reform are rarely mentioned.
Should the German public indeed become more 
Eurosceptic overall and should German politicians come 
under pressure to offer concrete measures for EU reform over 
the next months, their difficulty with exactly this task poses a 
major problem for German political institutions as well as the 
EU as a whole. The EU’s capacity to offer solutions to current 
crises and future challenges is key to addressing citizens’ 
3 Germany
concerns and alleviating the emergent culture of fear. With 
Germany currently being the EU’s most influential member 
state, political analysts assign an important role to German 
political elites in the reform of EU institutions and policy. 
In order to fulfil this role, it will be crucial for political 
decision-makers to understand and address citizens’ worries 
as concrete, distinct and directly related to the EU.
We can only speculate as to why it is so difficult for 
political elites in Germany to understand and address citizens’ 
concrete anxieties about the EU. Comparative perspectives, 
access to empirical data from across Germany and the 
opportunity to take a step back from the daily business of 
political representation are all possible reasons why political 
analysts can take a holistic look at the current culture of fear 
in Europe. In contrast, in their daily work MPs and MEPs 
zoom in on the views of citizens in their constituency. It is the 
citizens who largely dictate their agenda. Unless they are 
asked to address concrete concerns about the EU, politicians 
find it difficult to create opportunities to talk to citizens about 
the EU.
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Recommendations
In order to close the gap between elite and public opinions 
on the EU in Germany, it is crucial to contest the perception 
that there is a generalised, non-concrete feeling of fear among 
the German public. Instead, politicians need to be supported 
in their task of understanding and addressing citizens’ 
concrete concerns. It has been shown in different contexts 
that engaging and interacting with citizens about their various 
anxieties is often more effective in contesting a culture of fear 
than ignoring or opposing such views.14 The following 
suggestions are aimed at achieving four overarching goals, 
that we:
 · further the understanding of EU-related fears among political 
elites in Germany
 · shape the discourse about EU-related concerns in Germany
 · provide opportunities for public–elite dialogues about 
concerns
 · support politicians in addressing concerns about both types 
of legitimacy
It is important to enable politicians to understand and 
address the variety of citizens’ fears about the EU as well 
as the underlying drivers, both now and in the future. This 
requires a broader understanding of specific concerns, an 
ongoing discourse about future concerns and opportunities 
for dialogue between the public and political elites. 
Ultimately, a broad understanding of citizens’ distinguishable 
and concrete fears will enable politicians to address them 
adequately and phrase concrete measures that improve the 
EU’s capacity to offer solutions to current crises and 
future challenges.
The measures that can contribute to achieving these 
goals are discussed below.
3 Germany
Provide avenues for knowledge transfer 
from analysts to politicians
To further the understanding of EU fears among political 
elites in Germany, political institutions, analysts and  
third-party organisations that hold knowledge about public 
opinion need to provide avenues for knowledge transfer to 
allow politicians to draw on this knowledge. This includes 
transferring to politicians knowledge from analysts within 
political party think tanks, and that held by external 
organisations (such as independent think tanks, research 
institutions and commercial research organisations). In 
particular, third-party organisations which hold knowledge 
about the drivers of public opinion need to work more closely 
with political party foundations and staff of political 
representatives to develop explicit strategies for 
knowledge transfer. 
Make insights publicly accessible to shape 
discourses about EU concerns
Politicians need to be made aware of citizens’ views regularly, 
as these views evolve and change. To this end, we need actively 
and continuously to shape discourses about the EU. It is key 
that those who hold and generate knowledge about public 
opinion work with political institutions, civil society 
organisations and the media to make insights accessible and 
allow for broader engagement with these insights. Work with 
media professionals can play a particularly important role. 
Setting up good online information that makes insights 
accessible and easy to interact with is equally important 
to allow for general engagement. 
Develop instruments that facilitate mass–elite 
interaction about the EU
As politicians report that they find it difficult to create 
opportunities to talk to citizens about the EU, developing 
instruments to facilitate interactions with citizens about the 
EU and their concrete concerns will further politicians’ ability 
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to understand and address citizens’ concerns. Political 
institutions and third-party organisations (eg civil society 
organisations, associations, cultural institutions, local 
businesses or the churches) play a key role in this: they can 
offer (physical and virtual) spaces for politicians and citizens 
to come together, identify and address communities that have 
distinct views on the EU, and act as credible and neutral hosts 
for mass–elite dialogue. It is crucial to facilitate public–elite 
interaction at various levels: it is not necessarily the big 
national-stage dialogue, but rather small-scale community-
level interaction between citizens and local elites that can 
make all the difference for a better understanding of 
concrete concerns. 
Increase the range of suggestions to address 
EU concerns across levels of governance
With a better understanding of citizens’ concerns, we also 
need a broader range of potential measures to address them. 
It is crucial to work with political elites and citizens on 
increasing the range of suggested measures along different 
pathways of legitimacy. Instead of focusing on the EU level 
only, we need also to develop policy options that address 
citizens’ apprehension about the EU at national, regional and 
local level. Measures to amplify citizens’ voices within EU 
institutions are just as important as policy options aimed 
at increasing the EU’s problem-solving capacity.
Conduct further research on mass–elite 
comparisons that involves the public and elites
To counter the dominant narrative of a generalised feeling 
of insecurity, it is important to conduct further research that 
provides insights into some of the questions we raise in this 
preliminary analysis. What exactly drives individual concerns? 
Can we identify patterns of concern? Why do politicians have 
such difficulty in understanding the variety of citizens’ 
concerns? How can they address them adequately? To answer 
some of these questions, further research and explicit 
3 Germany
public–elite comparisons are necessary. Ideally, future 
studies will be designed in such a way that they involve 
political decision-makers and citizens in their roles as both 
informants and audiences from early on in the research 
process. This offers the opportunity for research in itself to 
create inroads for actual change by bringing citizens and 
political elites together.
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   Appendix 1: Survey 
questions – comparative 
and Germany-specific
Nothing to fear but fear itself? Survey questions – 
comparative and Germany-specific 
Demographic and background variables captured
 · Sex (male/female)
 · Age group (18–24 years / 25–34 years / 35–44 years / 
45–54 years / 55 years and older)
 · Region:
 · Nielsen 1: Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, 
Schleswig-Holstein
 · Nielsen 2: North Rhine-Westphalia
 · Nielsen 3a: Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland
 · Nielsen 3b: Baden-Württemberg
 · Nielsen 4: Bavaria
 · Nielsen 5: Berlin
 · Nielsen 6: Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Saxony-Anhalt
 · Nielsen 7: Saxony, Thuringia
 · Not living in Germany
 · Education (low/medium/high)
 · Monthly household income (net after tax): 
 · €0–980
 · €981–1,350
3 Germany
 · €1,351–1,660
 · €1,661–1,990
 · €1,991–2,340
 · €2,341–2,730
 · €2,731–3,200
 · €3,201–3,820
 · €3,821–4,840
 · €4,841+
 · Do not want to say
 · Voting behaviour in last parliamentary election, 2013:
 · CDU/CSU
 · SPD
 · Die Linke
 · Bündnis 90/Grüne
 · FDP
 · AfD
 · Other
 · Did not vote
 · N/A
 · Long-term party affiliation:
 · CDU/CSU
 · SPD 
 · Die Linke
 · Bündnis 90/Grüne
 · FDP
 · AfD
 · NPD
 · Piratenpartei
 · Freie Wähler
 · Other
 · No party
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Comparative questions across countries 
 · Q2. Do you think [country of respondent]’s long-term 
policy should be… 
<Single Select> 
1 to leave the European Union
2 to stay in the EU and try to reduce the EU’s powers
3 to leave things as they are
4 to stay in the EU and try to increase the EU’s powers
5 or, to work for the formation of a single European 
government?
6 don’t know 
 · Q3. Over recent decades the world has become more 
interconnected. There is greater free trade between countries 
and easier communication across the globe. Money, people, 
cultures, jobs and industries all move more easily between 
countries.
Generally speaking, do you think this has had a positive 
or negative effect on…
<Single select per each of these items> 
a Europe as a whole
b [Country] as a whole
c Your local area
d Your own life 
1 Very positive
2 Fairly positive
3 Fairly negative
4 Very negative
5 Don’t know
 
 · Q4. Generally speaking, do you think things will get 
better or worse for the following over the next 12 months?
<Single select per each of these items> 
a Europe as a whole
b [Country] as a whole
c Your local area
d You and your family
1 Much better
2 A little better
3 Neither better nor worse
4 A little worse
5 Much worse
6 Don’t know 
3 Germany
 · Q5. Which of the following best reflects your view?
<Single select> 
1 The best leaders have strong principles and carry them out 
without worrying what other people think, even if that means 
losing support 
2 The best leaders listen to other people and try to win the 
backing of as many people as possible, even if that means 
making some compromises
3 Neither
4 Don’t know  
 · Q6. Below are some ways that society has changed over recent 
decades. In each case, please say whether you think this has 
changed society for the better, or for the worse?
<Single select per each of these items>
a A greater acceptance of 
same-sex relationships
b A larger proportion of 
women going to work
c Our society becoming more 
ethnically and religiously 
diverse
1 Has changed society 
for the better
2 Has changed society 
for the worse
3 Neither
4 Don’t know 
 · Q7. The next question is about how much trust you have in 
certain institutions. On a scale from 0 (‘No trust at all’) to 10 
(‘Completely trust’), how much, if at all, do you trust each of 
the following institutions. 
<Single select per each of these items> 
a The (Nationality) 
Government
b The (Nationality) Parliament
c The European Parliament
d The European Commission
1 No trust at all
↕
10 Completely trust
88 Don’t know
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Germany-specific questions  
 · DE1. Do you see yourself as…?
<Single select>
1 (Nationality) only
2 (Nationality) and somewhat European
3 European and somewhat (Nationality)
4 European only
5 (Skip)
 
 · DE2. Some people may have fears about the European Union. 
Here a number of things which some people have said they are 
afraid of with regard to the European Union. For each, please 
state how much you – personally – are currently afraid of, 
if at all:
<Single select>  
<Randomize a–e>
 
a The loss of social security
b The loss of national identity 
and culture
c [Country of respondent] 
paying more and more to 
the European Union
d A loss of power in the world 
for [Country of respondent]
e The loss of jobs in [Country 
of respondent]
<Scale 1–10, Don’t know mutually 
exclusive with answer>
1 Very much afraid
↕
10 Not afraid at all
88 Don’t know
 
 · DE3. There are different people and organisations working to 
represent Germany in the European Union. For each of these, 
can you please tell me how well you think they represent 
Germany in the EU?
<Single select per item>
3 Germany
a Angela Merkel
b The German government
c German members of the 
European Parliament
d Lobby groups of German 
industry
e German NGOs [in German, 
please use: Deutsche 
Verbände und Stiftungen]
1 Very well represented
2 Rather well represented
3 Neither well nor badly 
represented
4 Rather badly represented
5 Very badly represented
6 Don’t know
 · DE4. Compared to the interests of other countries, how well 
do you think Germany’s interests are represented in the 
European Union?
<Single select>
1 Better than the interests of most other countries
2 Neither better nor worse than the interests of most 
other countries
3 Worse than the interests of most other countries
4 (Skip)
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Notes
1 Demos, ‘The Age of Fear: new polling reveals a gloomy, 
divided Europe’, press release, 2016, www.demos.co.uk/
press-release/the-age-of-fear-new-polling-reveals-a-gloomy-
divided-europe/ (accessed 17 Jan 2017). Survey of 1,661 GB, 
1,001 French, 2,125 German, 1,011 Polish, 1,000 Spanish, 
1,007 Swedish adults, conducted by YouGov between 23 
August and 7 September 2016.
2 European Parliament, European Parliament Eurobarometer 
(EB/EP) 84.1, Parlemeter 2015, part II, www.europarl.
europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2015/2015parlemeter/
eb84_1_synthese_analytique_partie_II_en.pdf 
(accessed 17 Jan 2017).
3 European Parliament, Standard Eurobarometer 85, 
‘Public opinion in the European Union, wave EB85.2’, 
2016, https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/
S2130_85_2_STD85_ENG (accessed 17 Jan 2017).
4 R Hilmer, ‘EU vor Bewährungsprobe – was erwarten, 
worum sorgen sich die Bürger? Eine repräsentative 
8-Länderstudie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, durchgeführt 
von policy matters’, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Berlin, 2016, 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/12328.pdf (accessed 
17 Jan 2017).
5 G Erber and H Hagemann, ‘Growth and investment 
dynamics in Germany after the global financial crisis’, 
DIW Economic Bulletin 2, 2013, www.diw.de/documents/
publikationen/73/diw_01.c.415240.de/diw_econ_
bull_2013-02-3.pdf (accessed 17 Jan 2017).
3 Germany
6 T Lochocki, The Unstoppable Far Right? How established 
parties’ communication and media reporting of European 
affairs affect the electoral advances of right-populist parties, 
Europe Policy Paper 4, German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, 2014, www.gmfus.org/file/3500/download 
(accessed 17 Jan 2017). 
7 ‘The sick man of the euro’, Economist, 3 Jun 1999, 
www.economist.com/node/209559 (accessed 17 Jan 2017).
8 Frauke Petry is the leader of Alternative für Deutschland, 
a right-wing political party. 
9 Sample mean plus or minus 1.96 times its standard error.
10 J Eichhorn, C Hübner, and D Kenealy, ‘The view from the 
continent: what people in other member states think about 
the UK’s EU referendum’, d|part, 2016, http://aqmen.ac.uk/
projects/euukreferendum (accessed 17 Jan 2017).
11 F Scharpf, Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity, 
MPIfG Working Paper, 2009, www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/
wp09-1.pdf (accessed 17 Jan 2017).
12 J Eichhorn, J Hensing and C Hübner, ‘Economic crisis 
and political legitimacy’ in M Voicu, IC Mochmann and 
H Dülmer (eds), Values, Economic Crisis and Democracy, 
Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2016.
13 Mentioned in similar words by two other politicians: MEP, 
CDU; MP, Greens.
14 S Reher, ‘Explaining cross-national variation in the 
relationship between priority congruence and satisfaction 
with democracy’, European Journal of Political Research 54, 
no 1, 2015, pp 160–81.
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Introduction
Very few European countries have proven immune to the 
appeal of right-wing populism. The exception is Spain: despite 
economic crisis and fast-eroding political trust, Spain has not 
seen any right-wing populist party obtain more than 1 per cent 
of the vote in national elections in recent years. What might 
explain this remarkable absence of an electorally successful 
Spanish right-wing populist party?
Using public data (including statistics and opinion 
polls), interviews with experts and original polling, this  
case study scrutinises various factors influencing right-wing 
populist success in Spain – or lack thereof.2 First it sets  
out why it is so remarkable that Spain should not have a  
right-wing populist presence in politics. Several explanations 
are discussed, including the historical weakness of the Spanish 
national identity and the Spanish people’s pro-Europeanism. 
These factors all seem to influence the (lack of) demand for 
a populist message by Spanish people. In and of themselves, 
however, these factors fail fully to explain the absence of a 
right-wing political party. Finally, this case study considers 
so-called supply-side factors, particularly the failure of parties 
that have tried to appeal to right-wing populist sentiments in 
Spain and the effects of the Spanish electoral system.
4 Spain
1   Migration, economic 
crisis and political 
dissatisfaction
Three sets of issues are particularly associated with the rise  
of right-wing populism: political corruption, economic  
crisis and concern over immigration.3 Spain has experienced 
all three. Between 1996 and 2007, the Spanish economy 
underwent a remarkable boom, based largely on a construction 
bubble, which led to (and was fuelled by) a massive influx of 
immigrants. While in 1998 immigrants accounted for 3 per  
cent of the population, by 2008 this number had risen to 13 per 
cent, and remained steadily high in subsequent years. The years 
of rapid economic, demographic and social change between 
1996 and 2007 were in many ways a golden period for Spain. 
Yet even then Spain had higher inequality, unemployment  
and population at risk of poverty than the Western European 
average (the rate of the so-called EU-15), and well below the 
EU-15 average of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. 
Only in 2005 and 2006 did Spain come close to reaching the 
EU-15 averages.
Migration
Between 2000 and 2009, Spain received half of all migrants 
to the EU-15 (figure 1). The net immigration per capita was 
the highest of any European Union (‘EU’) country. No other 
country in Europe has experienced such an intense and 
quick process of immigration in modern times.
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Figure 1   Average net migration in EU-15 countries per 1,000 
inhabitants, 1998–2009 
Source: Calculated from Eurostat figures.4
Figure 2  Foreign-born population of Spain, 1998–2016
 
Source: INE, ‘Padrón municipal’.5
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4 Spain
During the rapid economic expansion of the 2000s, 
immigrants from poorer countries (excluding Western 
European migrants) filled an ‘occupational gap’. They worked 
jobs which were often unskilled, mainly in construction, 
domestic service, retail, catering, other personal services and 
agriculture, where they occupied the least-desired positions. 
Very few were able to move up the occupational ladder and 
most remained in precarious, manual work.6 Figure 2 shows 
the figures of the foreign-born population in Spain between 
1998 and 2016.
Economic change
Then, in 2007, the bubble burst. The financial crisis hit 
Spain slightly earlier than it hit the rest of Europe, when the 
construction industry collapsed. In the following years more 
than 3 million jobs were destroyed and there was a surge in 
the unemployment rate, which rose from 8 per cent in 2008 
to 26 per cent in 2013, (compared with a rise from 7 per cent 
to 11 per cent across the EU in the same period). Also between 
2008 and 2013 real GDP fell by 8.9 per cent (compared with 
1 per cent in the whole EU), and average household spending 
fell by 14.5 per cent. 
The crisis affected two groups particularly: immigrants 
and lower-qualified male native workers, because of their 
concentration in the construction sector. Immigrants 
especially were put in a precarious position, lacking a safety 
net provided by family. They also had a difficult time finding 
new employment, as their social and professional networks 
tended to be narrower and their professional qualifications are 
on average lower than those of non-immigrants. According to 
the most recent data (for the second quarter of 2016), the 
unemployment rate among the Spanish foreign-born 
population is 27 per cent, compared with 19 per cent among 
Spanish citizens. Despite the crisis, the immigrant population 
continued to grow until the end of 2011 and only began to 
shrink in 2012. During three years, 2012–1014, the foreign-born 
population decreased by 650,000 persons or 10 per cent of the 
total, but in 2015 it began to increase again.7
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The crisis has provoked a very visible rise of poverty 
– mostly due to unemployment – and increased inequality 
(figures 6 and 7).8 From 2000 to 2015 there was a hike in the 
Gini coefficient of almost 3 percentage points (figure 5). 
In 2014, no EU country had a wider gap between the income 
of the richest 10 per cent and that of the poorest 10 per cent; 
29 per cent of the population is at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (figure 3). This is 6 points more than in 2007, as   
well as 6 points above the EU-15 average and 5 points above 
the EU-28 average.9
Consumer spending decreased every year between 
2009 and 2014, after years of continuous increases (figure 8). 
Finally, the budget cuts implemented since 2011 have affected 
the level of service provision, including public education and 
public health, likely impairing equality of opportunities. In 
2014 and 2015 the first signs of economic recovery could be 
seen, but levels of average well-being are still much lower than 
in 2007, as the effect of recovery in the labour market is still 
modest. Figure 4 shows the GDP in Spain compared with 
15 EU countries between 2000 and 2015.
Figure 3  The gap between rich and poor (10% with highest 
income; 10% with lowest income) in EU countries, 2014
Source: Eurostat.
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4 Spain
Figure 4  GDP (adjusted for infl ation) in Spain compared 
with 15 EU countries, 2000–2015
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 5  Gini coeffi  cient in Spain compared with 15 EU countries, 
2000–2014
Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 6  Percentage of population at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion in Spain compared with 15 EU countries, 
2005–2014
Source: Eurostat.10
Figure 7  Unemployment rate in Spain compared with that 
in 28 EU countries, 2000–2015
Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 8  Household expenditure in Spain, 2007–2015
Source: INE, ‘Encuesta de presupuestos familiares’.11
Political trust
In the political realm, the crisis correlated with a sizeable 
drop in trust in all kinds of public institutions, be they 
domestic, European or international. Political parties, which 
already enjoyed a very low level of trust before the crisis, have 
been the worst affected. The effects of the economic crisis were 
exacerbated for the main political parties by the discovery 
of corrupt practices. Scandals hit the ruling Partido Popular 
(Popular Party), and to a lesser extent the opposition, the 
Partido Socialista (Socialist Party), and the leading 
Catalonian nationalist group Convergencia Democrática. 
According to a Standard Eurobarometer report in 2014, 
91 per cent of Spaniards did not trust political parties 
(13 points above the European average) and 69 per cent 
were dissatisfied with the democratic system (21 points 
above the European average).12
Around the same time that the extent of the corruption 
became apparent, the government enacted painful budget 
cuts. The size of these cuts, imposed from 2011 onwards, was 
frequently compared to the vast quantities of money 
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embezzled by politicians. This connection between austerity 
and corruption in the eyes of the public further fuelled 
popular anger at the political status quo. When asked about 
the most pervasive negative aspects of Spain, corruption is   
the single most-mentioned issue, ahead of economic problems 
or unemployment.13 
The loss of trust in the parties that had dominated 
Spanish political life since the beginning of its democratic 
era has challenged Spain’s two-party system, with third parties 
winning a significant share of the vote for the first time since 
1977. Two relevant new parties appeared, Ciudadanos and 
Podemos. Ciudadanos (Citizens), which could be described 
as centre-right, has mainly campaigned on the fight against 
corruption and zero tolerance towards peripheral nationalism 
(such as the Catalan and the Basque independence 
movements). The second and more successful party is 
Podemos (‘We can’). Podemos is still balancing between 
a populist and a leftist profile, and has become the main 
electoral beneficiary of the strong protest movements that 
sprang up between 2011 and 2014. The so-called Movimiento 
15M was the most visible civil society response to the crisis and 
the social foundation of what became Podemos. Nothing 
similar has appeared on the right wing. Surprisingly, no group 
is currently mobilising traditionally right-wing voters who 
have suffered from the impact of the crisis, such as the 
shopkeepers and owners of small businesses affected by the 
loss of purchasing power and competition from immigrant 
shopkeepers and big supermarkets.
Hence, the protest has been dominated by the left, 
perhaps because a right-leaning party, the Partido Popular, 
has been governing since 2011. There are only the smallest 
signs of rightist responses, such as the appearance of an 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) called Hogar Social 
Ramiro de Ledesma, inspired by the Greek Golden Dawn. 
This group, based in Madrid, provides help (food, clothes, 
lodging) only to Spanish citizens, and it is connected to 
Falange Española and other small anti-democratic parties 
operating at the intersection of anti-capitalism, nationalism 
and fascism.
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In short, high levels of migration, economic crisis 
and low political trust are usually populism’s perfect storm, 
yet right-wing populist groups remain exceptionally weak 
in Spain.
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2  Public opinion: a weak 
national identity
The decline of the Spanish national identity
An explanation for the absence of a right-wing populist 
response to the crisis may lie in Spain’s particular relationship 
to national identity. Spanish national identity is relatively 
weak, as the Eurobarometer surveys show. The latest data from 
this survey indicate that Spain is below the EU average in its 
citizens’ feelings of ‘attachment’ to their country (by 4 points), 
while it clearly exceeds the average in their attachment to the 
EU (by 7 points).14 Another rough indicator of this same 
phenomenon is the self-esteem of citizens of each country, 
measured through the Country RepTrak poll, in which Spain 
stands out in recent years because of its very low self-esteem, 
well below the valuation of this country abroad.15 
The causes of the weak Spanish national identity 
have been extensively debated by historians, sociologists and 
political scientists. One frequent explanation is the legacy of 
the Franco regime. During this period, the Spanish admired 
the achievements of Western European countries – their 
political freedoms and material gains. This experience 
reinforced the inferiority complex of the Spanish, which had 
already begun in 1898 with the loss of the last Spanish colonies 
(Cuba and the Philippines). During Franco’s dictatorship, the 
regime exploited nationalist and Catholic rhetoric and 
national symbols, presenting Spain as an island of spiritual 
values in a sea of corrupt, materialist and egotist countries, 
and labelling all kinds of domestic or external criticism of its 
authoritarianism as fruits of an ‘international conspiracy led 
by Jews, communists and Freemasons’.16 The imperial past 
was continually evoked and the ‘brotherhood’ with Latin 
American countries emphasised. In fact, during years of 
international isolation, Latin American countries, many 
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of them also illiberal, were Spain’s main international 
partners.17 On the other hand, during the entire Francoist 
period, the regime established very good relations with Arab 
countries. As discussed below, this rhetoric about the 
friendship between Spaniards and Latin Americans has 
had an impact on the attitudes towards immigration during 
the 21st century.
The overuse of national symbols and of references 
to national identity during Francoism caused a  
counter-movement which still persists, a phenomenon  
which has been described by sociologists and historians.18  
The pro-democratic opposition to the regime rejected the 
exhibition of national symbols, the flag and the anthem,  
and Spanish nationalism was completely absent from their 
discourses. Instead, they looked to Europe. Spain was 
frequently presented as a backward country whose political, 
social and intellectual underdevelopment was due to the 
Francoist policies. Democratisation, modernisation and 
Europeanisation were seen as three parts of the same process.
In the same period, the late 1970s and early 1980s, strong 
peripheral nationalist movements were formed or reappeared 
in different regions, mostly in Catalonia and Basque Country, 
but also in Galicia, Valencia, the Canary Islands and 
Andalusia. The Spanish left enthusiastically supported these 
movements, presenting them as liberators and progressive 
forces both during the transition and for several decades after, 
further contributing to the weakness of Spanish national 
identity. Any person exhibiting the colours of the Spanish flag 
– in a watch strap, for instance – was immediately classified by 
the left and the peripheral nationalists as a Franco supporter. 
The very word ‘España’ (Spain) became suspicious and was 
often replaced by ‘the Spanish state’, an expression of little 
emotional resonance. Even the territorial organisation of the 
state in Autonomous Communities has diminished this 
identity, as regional educational policies have emphasised 
local histories and identities. Ruiz-Jiménez et al explain, 
Although it seems that the right has returned to an explicit 
reformulation of democratic Spanish patriotism more easily than 
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the left, the definition of Spain as a nation continues to be an object 
of political controversy, not only among nation-wide parties but 
also between these and regionalist/nationalist parties. In summary, 
Spanish parties have not instilled consistent feelings of 
identification with Spain as a political community.19 
Spanish national pride grew following the country’s entry 
into the EU in 1986. From the late 1990s onwards, it was 
further strengthened by a decade of solid economic growth. 
By the time the crisis hit in 2007, the Spanish were quite proud 
of their country, but their pride swiftly declined as the country 
was hit by economic decline and corruption scandals. This is 
visible in various statistics on national pride and national 
identification: if we compare the results of a wave of opinion 
polls conducted in 2002 (a period of intense economic growth 
in Spain) with the wave of 2015 (a time of enduring crisis) we 
see a decrease in the degree of identification with the country. 
Those who feel ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ close to Spanish people 
(compared with other groups, such as other Europeans, the 
inhabitants of their town or the inhabitants of their region) 
formed 90 per cent of respondents in 2002, but 85 per cent in 
2015, while the number of people who feel ‘just a little’ or ‘not 
close at all’ to Spaniards has increased from 10 per cent to 
15 per cent (table 1).20
When comparing levels of identification with different 
elements of feeling Spanish between 2002 and 2015 we see 
a marked drop in national identification across the board. 
There is a decrease in identification with the Spanish culture, 
the Spanish language, its history and its symbols. The 
strongest decline is observed in identification with 
independence, borders, the political and legal system 
and economic life (figure 9). 
Interestingly, the comparison between these two polls 
show local identities do not seem to be filling the void left 
by a weakening national identity. The percentage of Spanish 
people who feel close to the residents of their town and those 
who feel close to the inhabitants of their Autonomous 
Community have fallen 5 and 6 points respectively (table 1). 
Hence, localism is not replacing national identities. 
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Figure 9  The proportion of respondents who agree ‘quite’ or ‘very 
much’ with various statements on what they share with 
other Spaniards about Spanish life, 2002 and 2015
Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer 57, and Real Instituto Elcano, 
Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano, 36 Oleada.21
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The European identity of Spanish people
A related factor is the prevalent and persistent pro-European 
sentiment of the Spanish population. Identification with 
Europe and Europeans has remained steadily high, even 
increasing slightly during the last years: 59 per cent of 
Spaniards feel quite or very close to other Europeans, up 
2 points from 2002, while the percentage of those who feel 
only slightly or not at all close to other Europeans decreased 
four points (44–40 per cent). 
Table 1   Groups towards whom Spaniards feel attachment, 
2002 and 2015
2002 (%) 2015 (%) Change 
2002–2015 (%)
Inhabitants of the town 
or village
92 87 −4
Inhabitants of the region 86 80 −6
Spaniards 90 85 −5
Europeans 57 59 +2
Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer 57, and Real Instituto Elcano, 
Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano, 36 Oleada.22
Eurobarometers usually show Spaniards to be more pro-
European than average: in 2008 only 6 per cent of Spaniards 
had a negative image of the EU, well below the EU average 
(14 per cent). The economic crisis provoked a rise of anti-EU 
feeling all over Europe, including Spain, but even now 
negative attitudes towards the EU are less prevalent in Spain 
than elsewhere (23 per cent in Spain compared with a 27 per 
cent EU average). The high levels of identification of Spanish 
citizens with the EU are confirmed by the fact that only 28 per 
cent of Spaniards did not consider themselves in any way 
European citizens (compared with an average of 39 per cent 
across the EU).23
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Th is Europeanism presents itself not only as a cultural 
identifi cation with Europe, but also as sympathy with the EU 
as a political project. Th e Pew Research Center has recently 
confi rmed this remarkable Europeanism of the Spanish 
population.24 As fi gure 10 shows, the Spanish are least inclined 
of any European people to support returning power from the 
EU to the member states.
Figure 10  The views of respondents in EU countries on whether 
power should be returned from the EU to the member 
states, spring 2016
Source: Global Attitudes Survey, spring 2016.
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Our own polling also shows there is a high level 
of Europeanism among Spanish citizens: only 10 per cent 
would prefer for the country to leave the EU, and those who 
would like to reduce EU powers are outnumbered by those 
wanting to leave things are they are, increase EU powers or 
even advance towards a politically unified Europe. With 
Poland, Spain is least likely to favour leaving the EU, and with 
Germany the most likely to favour an increase of EU powers. 
Europeanism is especially strong among older citizens, 
who remember most acutely the period before Spain’s 
EU membership (tables 2, 3 and 4). 
Table 2   The views of respondents on what the long-term policy of 
Spain towards the EU should be, by age group, Sep 2016
Total 
(%)
18–24 
(%)
25–34 
(%)
35–44 
(%)
45–54 
(%)
55+ (%)
To leave the EU 10 10 7 13 15 7
To stay in the EU 
and try to reduce 
the EU’s powers
31 35 35 31 23 31
To leave things as 
they are
11 12 11 4 19 10
To stay in the EU 
and try to increase 
the EU’s powers
23 19 29 22 14 24
To work for the 
formation of a 
single European 
government
12 14 8 8 13 17
Don’t know 14 10 10 23 16 11
Source: Demos and YouGov poll, Sep 2016.
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Table 3   The views of respondents in six EU countries on what 
they think their country’s long-term policy towards the 
EU should be, Sep 2016
UK  
(%)
France 
(%)
Germany 
(%)
Poland 
(%)
Spain  
(%)
Sweden 
(%)
Average 
(%)
To leave the 
EU
45 22 16 8 10 25 21
To stay in the 
EU and try to 
reduce the 
EU’s powers
23 33 23 32 31 32 29
To leave 
things as 
they are
12 6 9 21 11 10 12
To stay in the 
EU and try to 
increase the 
EU’s powers
5 11 23 14 23 14 15
To work for 
the formation 
of a single 
European 
government
2 14 16 10 12 4 10
Don’t know 12 14 13 15 14 15 14
Source: Demos and YouGov poll, Sep 2016.
The most recent Standard Eurobarometer again shows the 
political climate in Spain to be much more pro-EU than in 
most member states.
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Table 4   The proportion of Spaniards who agree with statements 
about the EU, compared with that of all EU respondents, 
2015
EU average (%) Spain (%)
‘The EU means loss of our cultural identity’ 15 7
‘The EU means not enough control at external 
borders’
25 15
‘In general, the EU conjures up for me a 
negative image’
27 23
I see myself as [nationality] only’ 39 28
‘I oppose a common European migration 
policy’
26 12
‘[Our country] could better face the future 
outside the EU’
33 25
‘I oppose the European Economic and 
Monetary Union’
38 27
Source: European Commission, ‘Public opinion in the European Union.’25
On the downside, this remarkable Europeanism does not 
mean the Spanish are not critical of the functioning of the 
EU. Especially notable is a lower assessment of EU political 
life and EU management of the economy (comparing data 
from 2002 and 2015). But this criticism of the workings of 
the EU, which seems to be caused by the economic crisis, 
does not diminish the will to stay in it.26
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The acceptance of globalisation
Spanish people hold remarkably favourable attitudes to 
globalisation compared with other EU countries, a trait they 
have in common with the people of another country in the 
Demos sample, Poland. Both countries, which share a 
relatively late incorporation to the EU and a long experience 
of authoritarianism and international isolation, stand out for 
their enthusiasm for globalisation. Both countries are well 
above the average in their perception of the positive character 
of the impact of globalisation on Europe as a whole, on the 
country, on the local area and on the personal life of 
respondents (figures 12, 13 and 14). The economic crisis 
has hit Spain much harder than Poland, which may serve 
to explain the differences between two countries which are 
otherwise remarkably similar (table 5 and figure 11). 
Table 5   The proportion of Spaniards who have a negative opinion 
of globalisation and are against the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership, compared with those views 
held by all EU respondents
EU average (%) Spain (%)
Negative opinion of globalisation 40 32
Against TTIP 34 28
Source: European Commission, ‘Public opinion in the European Union’.27
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Figure 11  The views of respondents in six EU countries on whether 
or not globalisation has had a positive or negative eff ect 
on Europe as a whole
Source: YouGov polling for Demos, Sep 2016.
Figure 12  The views of respondents in six EU countries on whether 
or not globalisation has had a positive or negative eff ect 
on their country as a whole
Source: YouGov polling for Demos, Sep 2016.
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Figure 13  The views of respondents in six EU countries on whether 
or not globalisation has had a positive or negative eff ect 
on their local area 
Source: YouGov polling for Demos, Sep 2016.
Figure 14  The views of respondents in six EU countries on whether 
or not globalisation has had a positive or negative eff ect 
on their own life
Source: YouGov polling for Demos, Sep 2016.
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Table 6   Respondents’ answers to a question on how close 
they feel to various ethnic groups, 2002 and 2015
2002 (%) 2015 (%) Change 
2002–2015
How close do you feel to Moroccans?
  Slightly or not at all close 82 80 −2
  Quite or very close 14 18 +4
How close do you feel to Latin Americans?
  Slightly or not at all close 66 59 −7
  Quite or very close 32 38 +6
How close do you feel to US citizens?
  Slightly or not at all close 83 74 -9
  Quite or very close 14 23 +9
How close do you feel to Sub-Saharan African people?
  Slightly or not at all close 82 72 −10
  Quite or very close 15 25 +9
How close do you feel to Roma people?
  Slightly or not at all close 77 71 −6
  Quite or very close 19 27 +6
How close do you feel to Chinese people?
  Slightly or not at all close No data 82 No data
  Quite or very close No data 15 No data
Source: European Commission, Eurobarometer 57, and Real Instituto Elcano, 
Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano, 36 Oleada.28
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Increased acceptance of differences
When migrants started coming to Spain in large numbers 
around the start of the new millennium, most Spanish people 
saw these people as outsiders with whom they shared little. 
In an environment that had hitherto been extremely 
homogeneous, the presence of these new groups reinforced 
national identity. Opinion polls conducted by the Centre of 
Sociological Investigations showed little closeness between 
the Spanish and various national and ethnic groups. The 2002 
questionnaire included Moroccans, Latin Americans, sub-
Saharan Africans, Roma people and US citizens, with Chinese 
people added in the 2015 survey. 
A comparison between the results of the two surveys 
clearly indicates that in the 13 years since 2002, the level of 
acceptance of all groups has increased substantially in Spain. 
In all cases the number of respondents who feel ‘not at all 
close’ to Moroccans, Roma people, sub-Saharan Africans and 
other groups has fallen significantly. This is compensated by a 
rise in the number of respondents who feel only a ‘bit close’ to 
those groups, which could be just a more socially acceptable 
expression of the same sentiment, but there is also a significant 
increase in responses expressing closeness, especially 
noticeable towards US citizens and sub-Saharan Africans. 
The Moroccan population is the least affected by this trend 
and, with Chinese people, tops the list of groups to whom 
Spaniards feel least close (table 6).
According to these data, Spanish society has in these 
13 years become closer to ‘others’, for various reasons: the 
accumulated practice of cohabitation with immigrants; 
improvements achieved in socially integrating the local Roma 
population; Spaniards’ greater international experience 
through tourism and stays abroad as students or migrants; 
and the increased presence of Spanish companies in Latin 
American, European and Asian countries. 
In sum, Spanish people have come to identify less with 
national and regional collective identities over the past decade 
and a half. It seems as if the Spanish have on average become 
more accepting of ethnic difference, more individualistic and 
more cosmopolitan. At a time when many European states are 
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reappraising their nationhood, national identity and 
sovereignty, Spain appears to counter the trend. These 
indicators suggest that popular demand for a right-wing 
populist message is limited. 
The evolution of public opinion on immigration
Yet it would be too simple to say that Spain is 
straightforwardly accepting, open-minded and globally 
oriented. Public opinion on immigration, for one, has been 
volatile. Spain began the new century as the least xenophobic 
country in Europe, the most tolerant of cultural differences, 
and most favourable to immigration, significantly different 
from the European average (tables 7 and 8). Several factors 
were influential here: the low number of non-EU immigrants 
and their high concentration in a few geographic areas, 
leaving virtually no immigrants in most of the country; 
the recent memory of the Spanish migration to central and 
northern Europe; the influence of the Catholic Church, 
which has maintained a vocal favourable position towards 
immigrants; and the visibility of NGOs specifically devoted 
to immigration, asylum or anti-racism. Finally, the fact that 
many of the early migrants came from Latin American 
countries, speaking the Spanish language and sharing the 
Catholic religion, eased their acceptance into the Spanish 
society. The Catholic Church played a role in this process, 
as it found in Latin American migrant communities a new 
and more conservative inflow of believers. 
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Table 7   The percentage of respondents from five EU countries 
who agree with statements on immigration and 
immigrants, 1999
Italy  
(%)
France 
(%)
Spain 
(%)
UK  
(%)
Germany 
(%)
Mean 
(%)
Immigration 
is a threat to 
our culture 
and our 
identity
27.3 25.6 10.6 31.0 25.1 25.0
Immigrants 
are a 
threat to 
employment
32.2 28.3 18.7 - 28.8 -
Immigrants 
are a threat 
to public 
order and 
security
46.1 29.4 13.7 26.2 22.5 28.4
Source: Diamanti, ‘Immigration et citoyenneté en Europe.’29
As the country started receiving greater numbers of 
immigrants from the year 2000 onwards, Spanish public 
opinion on migration moved closer to the European average. 
In the boom years, the labour market could still absorb the 
newcomers, who were arriving at a rate of some 400,000 
people per year. Yet already then, the public mood was 
changing, as the result of several factors: a deterioration of 
social services, increased crime levels, increased competition 
in some sectors of the labour market, and everyday tensions 
between locals and immigrants where they shared apartment 
buildings, parks and public spaces.30 By 2006, 59 per cent 
of Spanish people saw migration as the country’s  
biggest problem.31
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Table 8   The proportion of respondents from several EU countries 
answering 'yes' to the question 'Do you personally find 
the presence of another [nationality, race, religion] 
disturbing in your daily life?', 2000
Other nationality 
(%)
Other race  
(%)
Other religion  
(%)
Greece 38 27 31
Denmark 24 24 26
Belgium 20 23 21
Ireland 17 20 17
UK 17 19 17
Netherlands 17 17 17
Germany 16 16 13
France 16 14 12
Austria 15 14 12
Italy 11 11 10
Sweden 11 11 10
Luxembourg 9 11 8
Portugal 9 10 8
Finland 8 9 8
Spain 4 5 6
Source: European Commission, ‘Racism and xenophobia in Europe’.33
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Figure 15  Views of respondents on whether immigration has had 
a positive or negative eff ect for Spain, 2008–2015
Source: Centre for Sociological Research, Opinion Barometer, several years.
Figure 16  The extent to which respondents agree with the 
statement ‘By accepting lower salaries, foreign workers 
bring down salaries in the country [Spain]’, 2000–2014
Source: Centre for Sociological Research, Opinion Barometer, several years.
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Figure 17  The extent to which respondents agree with the 
statement ‘Immigrants take jobs from Spaniards’, 
2000–2014
Source: Centre for Sociological Research, Opinion Barometer, several years.
Th e economic crisis provoked a surge of anti-immigration 
sentiment, recorded by several opinion poll sources,34 which 
reached its peak in 2011–2012. Around that time, the number 
of immigrants residing in the country started to decline, a fact 
broadly reported by the media, and negative attitudes became 
less prevalent, though they are still above pre-crisis levels 
(fi gures 15–17). 
Our results show that more than three-quarters of 
Spanish people feel that native workers should be hired 
over foreigners (77 per cent), a percentage that declines to 
61 per cent when respondents are voters for Unidos Podemos 
(table 9). 
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Table 9   The extent to which respondents agree with the 
statement ‘If there are two equally qualified workers,  
one Spanish and one from another country, the   
employer should hire the Spanish worker’, by political 
party affiliation
Total  
(%)
Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos 
(%)
Strongly 
agree
37 43 41 27 37
Tend to 
agree
40 40 38 34 44
Tend to 
disagree
17 10 16 29 16
Strongly 
disagree
6 7 4 10 2
Source: Demos and YouGov poll, Sep 2016.
Another major element of concern regarding immigration is 
crime. In fact, surveys suggest that perceptions of criminality 
are a bigger driver of unfavourable attitudes to immigrants 
than the economy and the labour market. Already by 2000, 
more than half (51 per cent) of those surveyed by the Centre 
of Sociological Investigations agreed with the statement ‘The 
increase in the number of immigrants contributes to the rise 
of crime in our country’, with 35 per cent disagreeing. The 
question was replaced in 2003 by another, asking people to 
respond to the statement: ‘Today in Spain there is a link 
between diminishing security and immigration’. More than 
half (58 per cent) of respondents agreed and 26 per cent 
disagreed. In the 2014 Centre of Sociological Investigations 
immigration survey, ‘crime and insecurity’ were the most 
frequent spontaneous answers to the open question about 
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potential negative consequences of immigration at 22 per cent, 
followed by labour market competition at 19 per cent and 
cultural integration problems at 16 per cent.35 However, 
despite these concerns about security and the terrorist attack 
of March 2004 in Madrid, Islamophobia is relatively weak 
in Spain. The association between terrorism and a specific 
religious or ethnic group has not gained popular support 
in a country that has suffered terrorism from the Basque 
nationalist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) for decades 
and has never blamed the whole Basque population for the 
crimes committed by ETA terrorists.
Moreover, the perceived impact of immigration on 
the welfare state has had a negative effect on public opinion: 
58 per cent of those surveyed by the Centre of Sociological 
Investigations in 2014 thought that immigrants receive more 
or much more from the Spanish state than they contribute to 
it; 52 per cent believed that immigrants ‘overused’ health care 
services; 48 per cent agreed that ‘immigrants receive more 
health services than Spaniards’; and 54 per cent felt that 
‘immigrant children receive more school-related financial   
aid than Spanish ones’. Nearly half (47 per cent) of 
respondents thought that immigrants receive some kind   
of help from the state, while only 21 per cent said the same   
about the elderly and pensioners and only 12 per cent about   
unemployed workers.
In line with this evolution of public opinion on the effect 
of immigration on Spanish society, public opinion on 
immigration policy has become more restrictive. While at the 
beginning of the 2000s, 36 per cent of Spaniards considered 
immigration laws to be tolerant or too tolerant, this had 
increased to 60 per cent in 2014 (Centre of Sociological 
Investigations), offering a sizeable public opinion base 
to support restrictive migration policies. 
In 2016, 74 per cent of Spaniards thought that the 
number of immigrants in the country is ‘a little too high’ 
or ‘much too high’, compared with just 22 per cent saying 
that the number is ‘about right’. The age group most active 
in the labour market, the 35–44 age bracket, was the most 
discontented with the level of immigration in Spain (table 10).
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Table 10  Respondents’ views on the current level of immigration 
into Spain, by age group, 2016
Total  
(%)
Age 18–34 
(%)
Age 35–44 
(%)
Age 45–54 
(%)
Age 55+ 
(%)
Much too 
high
34 37 44 21 29
A little 
too high
40 42 33 38 52
About 
right
22 19 19 33 13
A little 
too low
3 2 3 6 1
Much too 
low
1 1 1 2 5
Source: Demos and YouGov poll, Sep 2016.
This rise in discontent over immigration has brought Spain 
closer to the European mainstream mood, but the country is 
still well below EU averages (table 11). 
Could these attitudes towards migration translate into 
political support for right-wing populist parties? Some 19 per 
cent of those surveyed in 2014 believed that an eventual 
‘xenophobic or racist party’ could obtain popular support in 
the country. The equivalent percentage was 17 per cent in 2012. 
But the results are very different when the question is modified 
to: ‘Imagine there was a political party at the next election 
whose main aim was to reduce immigration to Spain. How 
well or badly do you think they would do at the election?’ 
According to our original polling, 61 per cent of respondents 
believe that such a party would do well or very well, while 
32 per cent think that such a party would not receive 
electoral support. 
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Table 11   Spanish respondents’ views on migration and migrants, 
compared with those of all EU respondents, 2015 and 
2016
EU average (%) Spain (%)
Negative feelings towards immigration 
from other EU countries
35 22
Negative feelings towards immigration 
from non-EU countries
58 39
Disagreement with the sentence: Immigrants 
contribute a lot to my country
52 40
Immigration is one of the two main issues 
facing the country
28 9
Disagreement with the sentence: My country 
should help refugees
30 14
Would feel uncomfortable working with 
a Roma person
20 7
Would feel uncomfortable working with 
a black person
6 2
Would feel uncomfortable working with 
an Asian person
6 3
Would feel uncomfortable working with 
a Jewish person
6 3
Would feel uncomfortable working with 
a Muslim
13 7
Sources: European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85 and 
Special Eurobarometer 437.36
When the question asks interviewees if they would vote for 
such a party, 41 per cent say they are ‘fairly likely’ or ‘very 
likely’ to vote for it, and 48 per cent say they are fairly or very 
unlikely to do it. Again, people between 35 and 44 years old 
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are most inclined to vote for an anti-immigration party. We 
found that voters of the right-of-centre Partido Popular would 
be most willing to vote for that party, followed by followers of 
the centrist Ciudadanos (figures 18 and 19).
In a climate of widespread distrust of traditional political 
parties, any new party could benefit from anti-establishment 
sentiment. But a single-issue party devoted to reducing 
immigration would almost inevitably have to appeal to 
nationalist feelings, as the refusal to accept immigrants can 
only be argued on the basis of their ‘otherness’ regarding 
a common national identity and shared interests. But such 
a discourse would face widespread mistrust in Spain because, 
as already explained, Spanish nationalism has not recovered 
from being overused during Francoism, while centrifugal 
territorial tensions have furthered eroded it. Finally, people 
do not consider immigration to be one of the most important 
problems the country faces. Currently only 3 per cent mention 
immigration when asked an open question about the three 
main Spanish problems, far outnumbered by unemployment 
(71 per cent), economic problems (24 per cent), corruption 
(38 per cent), the low quality of politicians and political life 
(30 per cent), or problems with health and education provision 
(12 per cent and 11 per cent).37 These data do not imply that 
migration is not a relevant concern for Spaniards: they only 
demonstrate that other issues, especially unemployment, are 
much more pressing. 
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Figure 18  Respondents’ views on whether a political party at the 
next election whose main aim was to reduce immigration 
to Spain would do well or badly, and how likely they 
would be to vote for this party, by party affi  liation, 2016 
Source: Demos and YouGov poll, Sep 2016.
Figure 19  Respondents’ views on whether a political party at the 
next election whose main aim was to reduce immigration 
to Spain would do well or badly, and how likely they 
would be to vote for this party, by age, 2016
Source: Demos and YouGov poll, Sep 2016.
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3  Electoral and party 
political factors
The flip side of the demand side of populism (the interest of 
the Spanish people in a populist message) is the supply side 
(the availability of groups and political parties offering such 
a message). Political demand influences the political offer and 
vice versa. In this respect, too, Spain occupies an interesting 
position. The electoral offer has been very limited, because of 
the disproportional effects of the Spanish electoral system and 
factors internal to these parties, which further explains the 
lack of populist mobilisation in Spain. 
A brief history of the far right in Spain
Since the beginning of the Spanish democracy in 1977, 
extreme rightist parties have had little electoral appeal. 
They were already weak in the first parliamentary election, 
when the so-called Fuerza Nueva (New Force) obtained   
no seats and only 0.3 per cent of votes. Its ideological core   
was Francoist nostalgia, and the party supported various   
anti-liberal and anti-democratic measures. Two years later,   
in the second parliamentary elections of 1979, they won a 
single seat with 2.1 per cent of votes. That was the last time 
they achieved parliamentary presence. During those first   
years of Spanish democracy, a bigger party, Alianza Popular, 
headed by a leading figure of the Francoist period, Fraga 
Iribarne, incorporated many high- and medium-rank   
officials from the Francoist period, and managed to attract   
the conservative and religious vote. This party, the   
predecessor of the now ruling party, Partido Popular, 
obtained 8 per cent of votes in 1977, and 6 per cent in 1979, 
and became the country’s second biggest party in 1982  
after the collapse of the Unión de Centro Democrático, the 
265
centre-right reformist group, which had been at the forefront 
of the transition to democracy. 
As Xavier Casals Meseguer explains, the extreme 
right in Spain was not aff ected by the wave of ideological 
renovation which modifi ed the nature of extreme rightist 
parties in other European countries during the 1960s as a 
result of reactions to decolonisation or to the 1968 cultural 
revolt.38 During the fi rst decades of the new democracy, the 
extreme right in Spain was the heir of Falange Española, 
the 1930s fascist movement that provided the ideological 
legitimation of the Franco regime during its fi rst years. 
In 1977, its discourse felt obsolete, with no resonance among 
the Spanish population, which saw them as a Civil War relic. 
Meanwhile, the Alianza Popular, a ‘law and order’ party which 
was ideologically close to Francoism while at least formally 
accepting the basic rules of liberal democracy, left little space 
for other rightist parties. 
Figure 20  Percentage of vote extreme-right parties in Spain have 
won in European, national and local elections, 1975–2020
Source: Elaborated by authors from data from the Ministry of Interior.
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The extreme right was disconcerted by transition to 
democracy and unable to react: soon it was divided into 
several groups, each of them claiming to be the true heirs 
of Falange Española, losing a common leadership. They 
gradually lost the voters they had gathered in 1979, who fled 
towards the Alianza Popular or abstention, and they have not 
gained near 1 per cent of the vote in parliamentary elections 
since. During the last two decades they have not even reached 
0.5 per cent in those elections. Their most salient success was 
the 2 per cent of all votes obtained in the 2014 European 
elections by a new party, Vox, led by a former Partido Popular 
leader, who almost managed to obtain a seat. But this same 
party won less than 0.3 per cent in the 2015 and 2016 
parliamentary elections (figure 20). 
The right wing and the political spectrum
Very few Spaniards would define themselves as extreme right 
on a 1–10 scale, where 1 is the extreme left and 10 the extreme 
right. Opinion polls steadily show only a small minority (8 per 
cent) choosing the right-hand 8, 9 and 10 scale positions, while 
27 per cent place themselves in the three leftmost positions, 
and 48 per cent identify with the central posts (4 to 7).39 Those 
who choose the extreme-right posts used to vote Alianza 
Popular and have from 1989 on voted for its heir, the Partido 
Popular. Within the Partido Popular, there are different 
ideological currents, from fiscal and social conservatism to 
economic liberalism and Christian democracy. The Partido 
Popular does not indulge in Francoist nostalgia, but the 
non-existence of a party on the fringe makes the Partido 
Popular the party of choice for the extreme right nonetheless. 
The particular history of the right wing in Spain has 
driven extreme right-wing voters to the Partido Popular. 
Despite its dependence on this right-wing support, the Partido 
Popular’s immigration stances have been fairly benevolent. 
Although it has historically been more vocal about 
immigration than the Partido Socialista, in practice their 
policies are similar. The influence of the Catholic Church 
in the Partido Popular is strong, and as a result notions of 
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compassion are central in its integration policies. When 
Partido Popular leaders did attempt to take severe measures 
against irregular migrants, they found significant resistance 
even within their own party. For instance, the decision of the 
Partido Popular government in 2012 to restrict irregular 
immigrants’ access to public health services, allowing them 
access only to emergency, maternity and child services, was 
reversed by the Autonomous Communities, including by those 
ruled by the Partido Popular itself, until finally the central 
government was forced to make a U-turn. 
The electoral system
The electoral system has also played a significant role in the 
lack of radical right-wing success, as Spain’s political system 
disadvantages nationwide small parties.40 The electoral 
constituency is the province (each province having between 
2 and 32 seats), where seats are allocated proportionally. But 
the electoral formula used to assign seats at the Parliament, 
the so-called D’Hondt formula, favours big parties. In fact, 
the D’Hondt formula, combined with a very large number 
of electoral districts of differing sizes, creates a kind of 
majoritarian rule in each province which tends to keep small 
national parties out of Parliament. In an imaginary electoral 
system of a single common district, Fuerza Nueva would have 
reached seven seats in the parliamentary election of 1979, 
gaining then public presence and public funds (which are 
distributed according to electoral results). 
Internal and party political factors
Several parties have tried to address concerns over 
immigration, an issue which the two big parties had largely 
neglected. In 2003, a new party, Plataforma per Catalunya, 
with a single-issue message of controlling immigration and 
improving public safety (which they also related to 
immigrants), won a local councillor in four middle-sized 
towns in Catalonia. In the next local elections, in 2007, 
Plataforma per Catalunya obtained 17 councillors in nine 
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towns, although none of them won the right to appoint a 
mayor. Its biggest success was winning 75,000 votes in the 
Catalonian regional election of 2011 (2.4 per cent of all votes), 
followed that same year by winning 66,000 votes and 67 seats 
in the local elections of Catalonia. From then on, internal 
divisions put an end to the advancement of the party, whose 
results in the local elections of 2015 were much smaller 
(27,000 votes). Although the party took part in the national 
parliamentary elections, it never reached the minimum 
electoral threshold of 3 per cent of votes in any of the 
provinces where it participated. 
The founder of Plataforma per Catalunya, Josep 
Anglada, was a former member of Fuerza Nueva, hence he is 
linked with the old extreme-right groups, heirs of Francoism 
and Falange Española. In Catalonia there is a very powerful 
pro-independence movement to which the Spanish extreme 
right has been the most belligerent enemy. In this framework, 
Plataforma per Catalunya was expressing simultaneously the 
protest against the political hegemony of Catalanism and the 
claims of right-wing voters who felt annoyed by the presence, 
labour competition and customs of immigrants. 
In 2000, a similar party was formed in Madrid, 
España 2000, a union of four small groups. Like Plataforma 
per Catalunya, España 2000 aimed to reduce immigration, 
associated with the old extreme-right groups and received the 
blessing of the French National Front. España 2000 won 
seven councillors in four towns near Madrid in 2000, plus one 
in a small locality in the province of Valencia. Plataforma per 
Catalunya and España 2000 have signed an agreement to 
present shared candidates in the next general parliamentary 
elections, but this has not improved their chances of  
electoral success.41
The new party Vox emerged in 2013, led by former 
Partido Popular leader Aleix Vidal Quadras. He had been 
the president of the Partido Popular in Catalonia (1991–96) 
and vice president of the European Parliament (2004–14). 
The new party’s priorities were defending the unity of Spain 
(it opposed the centrifugal tendencies of several Autonomous 
Communities, especially Catalonia, and proposed to 
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recentralise the semi-federal Spanish system), taking back 
power from Brussels, limiting Muslim migration to Spain 
and Europe, and protecting conservative values (including 
reinstating an abortion ban). They tried to attract right-wing 
voters disappointed with the Partido Popular policies and   
they were almost successful in the European elections of 2014, 
obtaining 247,000 votes (1.6 per cent), only 15,000 votes short 
of a seat. 
It must be taken into account that in Spain (as in many 
other European countries) European elections are to some 
extent second-order elections, where voters are more interested 
in casting a protest vote to punish domestic governments than 
in influencing the European Parliament. Because of the 
completely proportional results (as the seats are allocated per 
country and not per district) obtaining a good result as a small 
party is far easier in these elections than in the Spanish 
elections. Hence, the results of Vox were seen as disappointing 
and caused a grave internal crisis: Vidal Quadras and several 
other leaders quit the party that summer. The party has lost 
steam and media attention since and only got 57,000 votes 
(0.23 per cent) in the parliamentary elections of 2015. Its 
electoral base in 2014 was concentrated in Melilla, a Spanish 
African town with a large Muslim population of Moroccan 
origin. Its other bases of support were the richest and most 
right-leaning areas of Madrid (Majadahonda, Las Rozas, 
Pozuelo and the district of Salamanca), but its nationwide 
electoral prospects are very poor.42 
Vox could be described as the first attempt to form a 
modern right-wing populist party in Spain, with no echoes of 
the Francoist period. Rather than bank on Francoist nostalgia, 
the party aimed to attract right-wing voters dissatisfied with 
Partido Popular policies. Like Plataforma per Catalunya, Vox 
was initiated in Catalonia, where the main political cleavage 
is the division between those pushing towards independence 
from the Spanish state and those wishing to remain part of 
Spain. Not only in Catalonia, but in the whole of Spain, the 
Catalonian challenge to the Spanish territorial integrity is a 
divisive political issue. Right and left have opted for different 
approaches to this tension, with the right typically 
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emphasising unity and the left more willing to yield. On 
the other hand, both the Partido Socialista and the Partido 
Popular have frequently given in to peripheral nationalist 
demands in exchange for political support for the formation 
of regional or national governments. 
Vox was trying to represent Spaniards who are 
dissatisfied with the fragmentation of the country into 
18 Autonomous Communities, many of which are always 
pleading for more competences and powers. In many ways, 
it seems, the territorial distribution of power is a double-edged 
sword for the populist right: on the one hand, the weakness 
of the single Spanish identity makes it difficult to draw in 
large numbers with a nationalist appeal, while on the other 
hand it makes it possible to appeal to frustration over 
separatist demands. 
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Conclusions
Looking at the severe impact of the economic crisis, the 
high unemployment and poverty rates, and the rapid pace 
of immigration in Spain, it becomes all the more surprising 
that Spain has not seen a successful anti-European,   
anti-globalisation, xenophobic or extreme right-wing 
movement. This chapter has sought to explain the Spanish 
exception through three complementary aspects of political 
and electoral spheres: the political demand (what do citizens 
want to hear from politicians?), the political offer (what do 
political parties offer to voters?), and the institutional and 
political framework (electoral norms and the political conflicts 
that dominate the agenda).
The political demand
Research consistently demonstrates that only a very small 
part of the Spanish electorate identifies with the extreme-right 
positions on the ideological scale. Furthermore, Spaniards 
stand out for their support for the EU and globalisation. 
Despite a rise in dissatisfaction with immigration,   
anti-immigration sentiment in the country is still well below 
the European average. Moreover, immigration does not 
occupy a high position among the most important problems 
Spaniards think the country faces. 
One potential explanatory factor is the relative weakness 
of Spanish national identity. The abuse of national symbols and 
national identity during Francoism caused a counter-movement 
during the transition which still persists. Also the strong 
peripheral nationalist movements in different regions, mostly 
in Catalonia and the Basque Country, have further contributed 
to the lack of a strong Spanish identity with a wide appeal. 
Other European countries, like Spain, experienced 
authoritarian regimes during the 20th century but are now 
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cradles of successful nationalist–xenophobic movements. The 
key to Spanish peculiarity, which it shares with Portugal, is 
that the authoritarian past is more recent than in Germany or 
Italy, with around half of the population who lived during that 
period still alive. Contrary to what happened in communist 
countries, nationalism was the main ideological tool used to 
legitimise the regime, while internationalism was used in 
communist European countries to justify their alliance or 
submission to the Soviet Union. This communist past now 
allows and favours the blossoming of nationalist parties, but 
prevents it in Spain and Portugal.43
In sum, relatively favourable attitudes to immigration 
and globalisation, compounded by the lack of a strong, 
common Spanish identity to appeal to, make Spain 
inhospitable terrain for the populist extreme right. 
The political offer
Since the birth of Spanish democracy in 1977 the extreme 
right has been associated with Falange Española, the fascist 
movement born during the 1930s, which inspired the 
legitimation of the Francoist regime during its first decades. 
The Falange discourse is obsolete and of little resonance   
to the Spanish population, which tends to see its followers   
as nostalgic for the Francoist past. Its anti-capitalism, 
nationalism and traditionalism does not appeal to a 
modernised society.44 Furthermore, the Falange movement 
has been unable to present a common front and has divided 
into many small groups. As a consequence, its electoral results 
have been negligible during the whole democratic period.
Tensions between locals and immigrants have inspired 
the formation of right-wing populist parties, namely Plataforma 
per Catalunya and España 2000, but those parties keep close 
relations with the old extreme right (Fuerza Nueva, Falange), 
which de-legitimises them for most citizens. These parties have 
achieved only limited success in several municipalities in 
Catalonia and in the provinces of Madrid and Valencia. 
Only recently, in 2013, has a right-wing populist party 
with no echoes of the Francoist period almost been able to 
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obtain some success in Spain. This new party, Vox, could 
be described as the first attempt to form a modern right-wing 
populist party in Spain, aimed at disgruntled Partido Popular 
voters. Political dissatisfaction created by the economic crisis 
has mostly been channelled through Podemos, a populist 
leftist party, born from the street protests of the so-called 15-M 
movement. This group is still defining itself, balancing 
between a traditional leftist profile and a more catch-all 
approach. It could be labelled as populist but it is neither 
rightist nor anti-European nor anti-globalisation and most 
certainly not xenophobic or anti-immigration.45 Podemos 
has experienced a very remarkable and surprising success 
(winning 21 per cent of the votes in the 2016 parliamentary 
elections), and its support equals that of the Partido Socialista 
in the most recent opinion polls.46 
The political framework
The electoral system in Spain, though technically 
proportional, has highly disproportional effects, which has 
further disadvantaged right-wing populist parties. It is much 
easier to gain a foothold as a concentrated local party than as 
a small nationwide party. However, had the electoral system 
been the main obstacle for right-wing populist parties, we 
would have expected to see a stronger showing in the 
(proportional) European elections.
A second important aspect of the political framework 
is the dominance of the centre–periphery divide as a political 
factor throughout the history of Spanish democracy. This has 
left little space for populist parties to put their own issues on 
the agenda. Criticisms of the EU or of globalisation have been 
relatively neglected in the public sphere. Immigration was the 
subject of public debate only briefly in the early years of the 
new millennium and even then it was not a central theme. The 
conflicts between Basque and Catalonian nationalist parties 
on the one hand and the central government and the rest of 
the Autonomous Communities on the other have been the 
permanent ideological battlegrounds of Spanish political life. 
Public opinion is deeply divided on this issue, with a quarter 
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of the population supporting the centrifugal tendencies and a 
third opting for the recentralisation of power.47 More recently, 
corruption has become a major political issue, with politicians, 
rather than migrants, becoming something of a scapegoat for 
the economic crisis. 
In summary, despite the hardships suffered by a good 
part of the Spanish population since 2008, and despite the 
broad loss of confidence in institutions and old political 
parties, it is difficult to imagine an extreme right-wing, 
xenophobic, anti-globalisation and/or anti-EU party gaining 
a foothold in Spain in the foreseeable future. 
The hypothesis that an authoritarian, rightist and 
nationalist recent past acts as a vaccination against   
extreme-right parties in the present is given further weight   
by the similarities between Spain and Portugal: both shared   
a similar experience of four decades of nationalist, Catholic   
and corporatist authoritarianism, and both countries have 
until now been immune to this wave of right-wing populist 
parties, despite the grave economic and political crisis they 
have suffered.
275
   Appendix 1: Attendants 
at the meeting on 
27 September 2016
 · Beatriz Acha, Public University of Navarra
 · Fernando Arias Canga, Pluralism and Coexistence 
Foundation, Ministry of Justice
 · Marina del Corral Téllez, General Secretary on Immigration 
and Emigration, Ministry of Employment and Social Security
 · Gonzalo Escribano, Senior Researcher, Real Instituto Elcano
 · Karoline Fernández de la Hoz, Director of the Spanish 
Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia (OBERAXE)
 · Mercedes Fernández García, Director of the University 
Institute for the Study of Migrations (IUEM), Universidad 
Pontificia Comillas
 · Margarita Gómez-Reino, Professor of Political Science, 
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
 · Jose Pablo Martínez, Research Assistant, Real Instituto 
Elcano
 · Jose Ramón Montero, Full Professor of Political Science, 
Autonomous University of Madrid
 · Elena Soto, Research Assistant, Real Instituto Elcano
 · Federico Steinberg, Senior Researcher, Real Instituto Elcano
 · Consuelo Valbuena, University Francisco de Vitoria
4 Spain
   Appendix 2: Results 
of the Demos–YouGov 
opinion poll in Spain, 
September 201648
Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
If there were a general election held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?
Partido 
Popular
25 85 1 1 4
Partido 
Socialista
17 1 70 11 3
Podemos/
Marea
17 3 3 78 6
Ciudadanos 10 4 2 1 59
Partido 
Nacionalist 
Vasco
1 0 0 0 2
Esquerra 
Republicana 
de Catalunya
0 0 0 0 0
Convergencia 0 0 0 0 0
Other 5 0 6 3 1
Would not 
vote
13 4 11 1 10
Don’t know 11 3 6 4 13
277
Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
Do you think Spain’s long-term policy should be…
To leave the 
EU
10 2 11 17 10
To stay in the 
EU and try to 
reduce the 
EU’s powers
31 34 26 43 33
To leave 
things as they 
are
11 13 11 8 12
To stay in the 
EU and try to 
increase the 
EU’s powers
23 29 23 17 29
To work for 
the formation 
of a single 
European 
government
12 14 13 9 11
Don’t know 14 9 17 7 5
Over recent decades the world has become more interconnected. There is greater 
free trade between countries and easier communication across the globe. Money, 
people, cultures, jobs and industries all move more easily between countries. 
Generally speaking, do you think this has had a positive or negative effect on…
Europe as a whole
Very positive 27 36 19 26 36
Fairly positive 48 54 50 47 53
Fairly 
negative
11 5 19 12 8
Very negative 5 1 2 11 2
Don’t know 8 3 9 5 0
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
Spain as a whole
Very positive 21 26 21 13 30
Fairly positive 42 57 35 41 51
Fairly 
negative
19 9 28 24 15
Very negative 9 2 7 18 4
Don’t know 9 6 9 4 0
Your local area
Very positive 16 23 15 11 24
Fairly positive 44 52 43 45 48
Fairly 
negative
20 13 26 23 19
Very negative 10 5 3 15 6
Don’t know 10 6 13 7 3
Your own life
Very positive 18 24 18 13 22
Fairly positive 46 53 43 50 41
Fairly 
negative
15 11 17 18 18
Very negative 8 3 8 8 7
Don’t know 13 9 15 11 12
279
Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
Generally speaking, do you think things will get better or worse for the following 
over the next 12 months?
Europe as a whole
Much better 9 18 4 3 11
A little better 27 34 22 23 29
Neither better 
nor worse
38 37 48 34 35
A little worse 15 7 15 26 22
Much worse 5 1 4 12 2
Don’t know 6 4 6 3 1
Spain as a whole
Much better 6 12 4 4 9
A little better 26 37 20 16 30
Neither better 
nor worse
31 31 41 27 23
A little worse 22 13 22 30 32
Much worse 9 2 7 20 6
Don’t know 6 5 5 3 1
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
Your local area
Much better 6 12 4 4 5
A little better 23 28 21 17 28
Neither better 
nor worse
40 39 48 37 39
A little worse 19 16 15 26 21
Much worse 7 2 5 12 6
Don’t know 6 4 8 4 2
You and your family
Much better 7 14 3 4 7
A little better 23 27 21 18 26
Neither better 
nor worse
45 46 52 44 39
A little worse 12 8 13 17 18
Much worse 6 2 5 7 6
Don’t know 7 3 6 10 4
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
Which of the following best reflects your view?
The best 
leaders 
have strong 
principles and 
carry them 
out without 
worrying what 
other people 
think, even if 
that means 
losing support 
58 68 60 59 64
The best 
leaders listen 
to other 
people and 
try to win 
the backing 
of as many 
people as 
possible, even 
if that means 
making some 
compromises
15 22 10 16 11
Neither 19 7 21 21 21
Don’t know 7 3 9 4 4
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
Below are some ways that society has changed over recent decades. In each case, 
please say whether you think this has changed society for the better, or for the worse?
A greater acceptance of same-sex relationships
Has changed 
society for the 
better
74 72 78 85 83
Has changed 
society for the 
worse
9 10 10 6 12
Neither 10 12 8 6 4
Don’t know 7 6 5 3 1
A larger proportion of women going to work
Has changed 
society for the 
better
80 81 83 85 84
Has changed 
society for the 
worse
9 8 11 5 11
Neither 5 5 1 7 2
Don’t know 7 7 4 2 2
Our society becoming more ethnically and religiously diverse
Has changed 
society for the 
better
50 43 56 59 46
Has changed 
society for the 
worse
23 32 21 18 25
Neither 16 15 15 17 22
Don’t know 11 10 8 6 6
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
The next question is about how much trust you have in certain institutions.  
On a scale from 0 (‘No trust at all’) to 10 (‘Completely trust’), how much,  
if at all, do you trust each of the following institutions? 
The Spanish Government
0 – No trust 
at all
32 9 34 57 32
1 6 3 9 6 5
2 7 3 8 11 6
3 8 6 8 7 10
4 7 4 10 5 14
5 11 13 20 6 7
6 8 17 2 4 9
7 7 16 2 1 12
8 5 11 2 1 5
9 2 5 0 1 1
10 – 
Completely 
trust
4 10 2 0 1
Don’t know 4 3 3 1 0
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
The Spanish Parliament
0 – No trust 
at all
29 6 31 48 28
1 6 4 8 8 4
2 8 6 9 8 8
3 8 6 10 9 12
4 9 6 11 6 15
5 12 20 17 4 11
6 8 17 3 7 8
7 7 16 2 3 9
8 4 6 3 2 5
9 1 4 2 0 0
10 – 
Completely 
trust
3 7 1 1 1
Don’t know 5 3 4 1 0
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
The European Parliament
0 – No trust 
at all
18 4 21 36 14
1 6 2 8 11 11
2 8 1 12 9 8
3 7 5 7 8 9
4 9 9 10 10 10
5 17 22 20 14 15
6 8 16 4 4 11
7 8 14 5 3 8
8 6 11 5 2 10
9 2 4 0 2 1
10 – 
Completely 
trust
3 7 2 1 1
Don’t know 6 3 6 2 1
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
The European Commission
0 – No trust 
at all
18 4 21 35 13
1 7 2 10 10 9
2 7 1 8 11 7
3 8 4 11 10 12
4 10 8 11 9 10
5 16 22 17 11 15
6 8 13 6 5 10
7 9 15 4 3 10
8 5 9 3 1 10
9 2 6 1 1 1
10 – 
Completely 
trust
4 10 2 1 1
Don’t know 7 4 6 2 1
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
Thinking about immigration, do you think that the current level of immigration into 
Spain is…
Much too high 34 37 44 21 29
A little too 
high
40 42 33 38 52
About right 22 19 19 33 13
A little too low 3 2 3 6 1
Much too low 1 1 1 2 5
Thinking about hiring workers in Spain… to what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: If there are two equally qualified workers, one Spanish 
and one from another country, the employer should hire the Spanish worker 
Strongly 
agree
37 43 41 27 37
Tend to agree 40 40 38 34 44
Tend to 
disagree
17 10 16 29 16
Strongly 
disagree
6 7 4 10 2
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
Imagine there was a political party at the next election whose main aim was to reduce 
immigration to Spain
How well or badly do you think they would do at the election?
Very well 14 19 16 10 7
Fairly well 47 49 49 40 54
Fairly badly 32 26 29 39 33
Very badly 7 6 6 11 5
And how likely would you personally be to vote for this party?
Very likely 15 21 23 6 11
Fairly likely 26 31 24 20 29
Fairly unlikely 31 29 36 28 29
Very unlikely 29 19 18 45 30
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Total (%) Partido 
Popular 
(%)
Partido 
Socialista 
Obrero 
Español 
(%)
Unidos 
Podemos 
(%)
Ciudadanos-
Partido de la 
Ciudadanía 
(%)
Thinking about the last six months, in which, if any, of the following places have 
you heard or seen negative comments about immigrants? Please tick all that apply
Among 
friends
39 44 47 32 42
Among 
relatives/ 
family
29 34 23 28 34
In public 
places (eg 
metro, bus)
45 42 52 48 44
Radio or 
television
28 20 37 36 29
In the 
newspapers
18 17 19 22 20
Internet 42 44 42 43 44
At work 28 26 32 29 35
Other 24 28 22 23 23
I have 
not heard 
negative 
comments 
about 
immigrants
15 9 12 13 15
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Notes
1 Jose Pablo Martínez, Research Assistant at Real Instituto 
Elcano, has gathered a good part of the information on 
which this report is based. Also Elena Sotos, from the 
Real Instituto Elcano, has been very helpful in the data 
collection process. I’m especially grateful to Xavier Casals 
Messeguer, who generously travelled to Madrid to offer 
us his insight on the extreme right in Spain. The chapter 
of this report dealing with these kinds of parties benefits 
greatly from his work. Finally, I thank the experts who 
attended the meeting in Madrid on 27 September 2016, 
where some of the hypotheses of this report were discussed, 
and whose names are included in appendix 1.
2 YouGov surveyed adults (aged 18+) in six countries online 
between 23 August and 7 September 2016. The sample sizes 
were as follows: France – 1,001; Germany – 2,125; Poland 
– 1,011; Spain – 1,000; Sweden – 1,007; UK – 1,661 (only 
adults from Great Britain were surveyed in UK polling). 
The figures have been weighted and are representative 
of adults aged 18+ on age, gender and region. Four 
YouGov panels (GB, France, Germany and Sweden) also 
took account of other factors such as last political vote, 
education and political affiliation. Two non-YouGov panels 
(Poland and Spain) were sampled by age, gender and 
region and weighted by these variables in addition to last 
political vote and education post-fieldwork. All respondents 
were asked a set of common questions. YouGov is a member 
of the British Polling Council.
3 See, for instance, E Iversflaten and F Gudbrandsen, 
‘The populist radical right in Western Europe’ in Europa 
Regional Surveys of the World, London, Routledge, 2014, 
https://scholar.uib.no/sites/default/files/ivarsflaten/files/
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manuscript_the_populist_radical_right_in_western_
europe_ivarsflaten.pdf (accessed 21 Jan 2017).
4 Eurostat, ‘Your key to European statistics’, nd, http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-
migration-projections/migration-and-citizenship-data/
database (accessed 21 Jan 2017).
5 INE, ‘Padrón municipal’, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 
1 Jan 2016, www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2
Ft20%2Fe245&file=inebase&L=0 (accessed 21 Jan 2017).
6 LG Medina and MM Busto, ‘Dinámica laboral de la 
inmigración en España durante el principio del siglo XXI’, 
Panorama Social 8, Jan 2009.
7 INE, ‘Encuesta de Población Activa’, Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística, Mar 2016, www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/
operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736176918&menu
=ultiDatos&idp=1254735976595 (accessed 21 Jan 2017); INE, 
‘Padrón: población por municipios’, 1 Jan 2016, www.ine.es/
prensa/np1010.pdf (accessed 21 Jan 2017).
8 See J Carabaña, Ricos y pobres, Los libros de la  
Catarata, 2016. 
9 Eurostat, ‘Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income 
– EU-SILC survey’, Dec 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
web/products-datasets/-/ilc_di12 (accessed 21 Jan 2017).
10 Eurostat defines the risk of poverty as follows: ‘This 
indicator corresponds to the sum of persons who are: 
at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living 
in households with very low work intensity. Persons are 
only counted once even if they are present in several 
sub-indicators. At risk-of-poverty are persons with an 
equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty 
threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median 
equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). 
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Material deprivation covers indicators relating to   
economic strain and durables. Severely materially   
deprived persons have living conditions severely 
constrained by a lack of resources, they experience at  
least 4 out of 9 following deprivations items: cannot afford 
to pay rent or utility bills, keep home adequately warm, face 
unexpected expenses, eat meat, fish or a protein equivalent 
every second day, a week holiday away from home, a car, a 
washing machine, a colour TV, or a telephone. People living 
in households with very low work intensity are those aged 
0–59 living in households where the adults (aged 18–59) 
work 20 per cent or less of their total work potential during 
the past year.’
11 INE, ‘Encuesta de Polbacion Activa’, ‘Encuesta de 
presupuestos familiares’, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 
2007–2015, www.ine.es/prensa/epf_prensa.htm (accessed 
23 Jan 2017).
12 European Commission, ‘L’opinion publique dans 
l’Union Européenne’, Standard Eurobarometer, 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb81/
eb81_publ_fr.pdf (accessed 21 Jan 2017).
13 Real Instituto Elcano, Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano 
(Brie), 35 Oleada, resultados de Abril de 2014, 2014, www.
realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/07d7df004416eb
adba5fff80bc5a2e3e/35BRIE_Informe_Mayo2014.pdf?MO
D=AJPERES&CACHEID=07d7df004416ebadba5fff80bc5a
2e3e (accessed 21 Jan 2017).
14 European Commission, ‘Public opinion in the  European 
Union’, Standard Eurobarometer 84, autumn 2015, http://
ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.
cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/70297 (accessed 
21 Jan 2017).
15 Real Instituto Elcano, La reputación de España en el mundo: 
Country RepTrak, 2012–2016, www.realinstitutoelcano.org/
293
wps/portal/rielcano_es/observatorio-imagen-espana/
estudios/ (accessed 21 Jan 2017).
16 For a broad description of the historical formation and 
weaknesses of the Spanish national identity see P Jaúregui 
and AM Ruiz-Jiménez, ‘A European Spain: the recovery of 
Spanish self-esteem and international prestige’ in A Ichijo 
and W Spohn (eds), Entangled Identities, Ashgate, 2005, 
pp 72–87; and JP Fusi, España: La evolución de la identidad 
nacional, Madrid, Temas de Hoy, 2000.
17 B Pollack and G Hunter, The Paradox of Spanish Foreign 
Policy: Spain’s relations from Franco to democracy, London, 
Pinter, 1987.
18 XM Núñez Seixas, ‘La nación en la España del siglo XXI: 
un debate inacabable’, Pasado y Memoria: Revista de Historia 
Contemporánea 9, 2010, pp 129–48.
19 A.M. Ruiz Jiménez et al (2017). "Country-level variables  
and imagined national communities within EU-15 
countries". Política y Sociedad (working paper).
20 C González-Enríquez, ‘El declive de la identidad 
nacional española’, Real Instituto Elcano, 2016, 
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/
contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/
elcano_es/zonas_es/demografia+y+poblacion/ari50-2016-
gonzalezenriquez-declive-identidad-nacional-espanola 
(accessed 21 Jan 2017).
21 European Commission, Eurobarometer 57, no 2, 2002, 
and Real Instituto Elcano, Barómetro del Real Instituto 
Elcano (Brie), 36 Oleada, resultados Abril–Mayo de 2015, 2015, 
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/73037a00
48b71bdd9f479fc2d8a74536/36BRIE_Informe_Junio2015.
pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed 21 Jan 2017).
22 Ibid.
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23 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, 2016.
24 B Stokes, ‘Euroscepticims beyond Brexit: significant 
opposition in key EU countries to an ever closer union’, 
Pew Research Center, 7 Jun 2016, www.pewglobal.
org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit (accessed 
24 Jan 2017).
25 European Commission, ‘Public opinion in the European 
Union’.
26 González-Enríquez, ‘El declive de la identidad nacional 
española’.
27 Ibid.
28 European Commission, Eurobarometer 57, and Real 
Instituto Elcano, Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano (Brie), 
36 Oleada; see also González-Enríquez, ‘El declive de la 
identidad nacional española’.
29 I Diamanti, ‘Immigration et citoyenneté en Europe: une 
enquête’, Critique Internationale 8, no 1, 2000, www.persee.
fr/doc/criti_1290-7839_2000_num_8_1_1443 (accessed 
23 Jan 2017).
30 C González-Enríquez and B Alvárez- Miranda, 
‘Inmigrantes en el barrio: un estudio cualitativo de 
opinión pública’, Madrid, Observatorio Permanente de la 
Inmigración, 2005. For a discussion of competition in the 
labour market see C González-Enríquez et al, Los sindicatos 
ante la inmigración, Madrid, Observatorio Permanente de 
la Inmigración, 2008. 
31 S Alonso and C Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Spain: no country 
for the populist radical right?’, South European Politics and 
Society 20, no 1, 2015, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1
080/13608746.2014.985448?journalCode=fses20 (accessed 
21 Jan 2017). 
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32 European Commission, L’opinion publique ‘Racism 
and xenophobia in Europe’, Special Eurobarometer 138, 
2000, https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/
S193_53_0_EBS138 (accessed 23 jan 2017).
33 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas; Real Instituto 
Elcano; Anàlisis Sociòlógicos, Económicos y Politico 
(ASEP); and regional centres such as Opiniones y Actitudes 
de la Población Andaluza ante la Inmigración (OPIA) 
in Andalusia.
34 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Carabana J, 
Barometers on immigration, 2000, 2003 and 2014, www.cis.
es/cis/opencm/EN/11_barometros/index.jsp (accessed 22 
Jan 2017).
35 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 85, 
2016, and European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 
437, 2015.
36 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, ‘Distribuciones 
marginales’, Barometer 3156, Oct 2016, www.cis.es/cis/
export/sites/default/-Archivos/Marginales/3140_3159/3156/
es3156mar.html (accessed 22 Jan 2017).
37 XC Meseguer, ‘La renovación de la ultraderecha española: 
una historia generacional (1966–2008)’, Historia y Política 
22, 2009, pp 233–58, www.cepc.gob.es/publicaciones/
revistas/revistaselectronicas?IDR=9&IDN=682&IDA=27595 
(accessed 24 Jan 2017).
38 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, ‘Distribuciones 
marginales’.
39 Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘Spain’.
40 According to the most recent available data, neither of   
these two groups appear in the spontaneous answers to an 
open question on which party interviewees would vote for. 
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See Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas,  
‘Distribuciones marginales’.
41 Vox would obtain a 0.1 per cent of the votes according to 
Barometer 3156 of the Centre of Sociological Investigations; 
see Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, ‘Distribuciones 
marginales’.
42 The Greek case is very different from the Spanish and 
Portuguese ones. Greek dictatorship lasted for only seven 
years (1967–74) and Greek leaders never tried to present 
it as anything else than an exceptional period devoted to 
destroying the communist influence in the country. Greek 
nationalism has been always very powerful as a reaction 
to centuries of submission to the Ottoman Empire. 
43 Results of our original polling show that Spanish society 
is one of the most liberal of our case study countries 
regarding issues such as acceptance of homosexuality, 
female incorporation into the labour market, and religious 
and ethnic diversity.
44 JI Torreblanca, Asaltar los Cielos: Podemos o la política después 
de la crisis, 2015, www.ecfr.eu/madrid/asaltarloscielos/libro 
(accessed 24 Jan 2017).
45 See the results of the poll published in El País on 13 Nov 
2016.
46 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, ‘Distribuciones 
marginales’.
47 See note 2.
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Summary
Poland has often been proclaimed the poster child 
of democratic transitions and European Union (EU) 
enlargement. In a remarkably short time, Poland became 
a fully fledged democracy with a thriving market economy. 
Yet despite a large and sustained economic boom, highly 
Europhile attitudes and comparatively low levels of 
immigration, authoritarian populists (the Law and Justice 
party) gained a majority in the 2015 parliamentary elections. 
How can their success be explained? This case study 
examines not only the causes of their electoral success but also 
the actions and policies undertaken by the populist-dominated 
government and parliament. It sketches an overview of the 
political developments of 2015 and 2016 and considers three 
potential explanations for the surge in support for the 
authoritarian populist Law and Justice party from academic 
literature, centred on economics, globalisation and 
sovereignty, and identity politics and cultural anxieties. 
The results of this study fully support our initial research 
hypothesis on the dynamics of the politics of fear in Poland, 
which states that socioeconomic factors, especially income 
inequality, do not fully explain the electoral success of 
authoritarian populism in Poland. Therefore political rhetoric 
and communication, for instance in the discourse on identity, 
should be recognised as crucial in generating support for the 
Law and Justice party by amplifying fears triggered by the 
vast economic and sociocultural changes in Poland over   
the last quarter of a century. This study draws on a recent 
survey conducted for the purpose of this project by YouGov 
for Demos.1
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   Introduction – what 
happened to the ‘poster 
child’ of democratic 
transitions?
In 2015, Poland’s populist Law and Justice party (Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość) returned to power after eight years of 
government by a centrist coalition consisting of the Civic 
Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and the Polish Peasants’ 
party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe). The previous stint of the 
Law and Justice party in government (2005–2007) ended after 
just two years, triggered by a crisis in the three-party ruling 
coalition led by the Law and Justice party. In the subsequent 
early elections, fears related to the autocratic tendencies of 
Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński’s government led to a 
spectacular defeat of the Law and Justice party, mainly due 
to young urban voters, who turned out to vote in relatively 
large numbers. 
In 2007 the newly formed government under Prime 
Minister Donald Tusk promised to return Poland to the 
European political mainstream, and it has been widely seen   
as successful in making good on this promise. Working in 
tandem with charismatic foreign minister Radosław Sikorski, 
Tusk forged strong links with Germany, which became 
Poland’s key international partner, and allowed Poland   
to punch above its weight in European politics. The Tusk–
Sikorski tandem pushed for the EU to deepen its relations 
with the countries of former Soviet Union, especially Ukraine, 
by proposing (together with Sweden) the so-called Eastern 
Partnership policy. At the same time, Tusk’s government 
launched its own version of the ‘reset’ with Russia, which 
ended abruptly when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2013. In 
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recognition of his (and Poland’s) contribution to European 
integration, Donald Tusk was elected in 2014 as the president 
of the European Council, the highest position in the EU.
Poland was the only EU member state not to fall into 
recession following the 2008 global financial crisis, which 
strengthened the Civic Platform government’s reputation for 
good economic governance in Poland and abroad. In 2011, 
Tusk managed to get his party re-elected for the second term 
in office, a feat unseen since the first democratic elections in 
1989. All in all, between 2006 and 2014, the Civic Platform 
defeated the Law and Justice party eight times in a row, in 
local, national, presidential and European elections. Many 
analysts believed that the Law and Justice party under 
Kaczyński had become unelectable because of its mixture 
of authoritarian longings and extremely conservative social 
ideology, out of touch with the aspirations and views of 
quickly modernising and increasingly affluent Polish society. 
Kaczyński’s successive defeats were attributed to an electoral 
‘glass ceiling’, which limited his party’s appeal to older, less 
educated and poorer sections of the society.2 
However, Kaczyński had demonstrated unusual 
resilience as a political leader, able to stay at the helm of 
his party despite repeated electoral defeats and defections. 
He held on to both his leadership and his party’s core 
constituencies and never seemed to lose his belief in an 
ultimate victory, his very own ‘Budapest in Warsaw’ (referring 
to the reign of the authoritarian Fidesz party in Hungary), 
which he promised his supporters in his concession speech3 
following the 2011 parliamentary elections. Four years later, in 
2015, his patience was rewarded when voters handed him and 
his party control over the lower and upper chamber of the 
parliament (Sejm and Senat) as well as the presidential office, 
which had been won earlier that year by a relatively unknown 
Law and Justice party politician called Andrzej Duda, a 
protégé of the late President Lech Kaczyński (Jarosław 
Kaczyński’s twin brother, who tragically died in the Smolensk 
plane crash in 2010).
While many of Kaczyński’s supporters and critics 
like to compare his victory to Viktor Orbán’s conquest of 
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the Hungarian political scene, the circumstances of the Polish 
elections seem different in many respects to those in which 
Orbán won his first landslide elections in Hungary in 2010. 
While Hungary in 2010 suffered from a deep economic 
recession and the ruling socialists were rocked by a string of 
corruption scandals, Poland enjoyed strong economic growth 
for more than a decade and falling unemployment (which in 
2015 hit the lowest level since the democratic transition) and 
steadily improved its position in Transparency International 
and other international corruption surveys.4 Last but not least, 
the support by Poles for European integration had remained 
around 80 per cent, one of the highest in the EU.5 
Explaining the electoral success of Poland’s populists is 
far from simple or straightforward, despite their affinities with 
Orbán’s Fidesz party and other populists in Europe and 
beyond. No single-sentence answer, such as the split between 
‘winners and losers of the democratic transformation’ or any 
other simple appeal to socioeconomic divisions, seems to 
provide us with a satisfactory explanation. Instead, we must 
analyse the interplay of factors that led to such an outcome.
2015 and beyond
The next section will sketch the Polish political climate 
leading up to and since the 2015 presidential elections. By 
2015, the mere fact of being in power for eight consecutive 
years – an unprecedented feat in Polish politics – had 
undoubtedly ensured more time for blunders and contributed 
to the public’s fatigue with the Civic Platform. During the 
eight years of rule, balancing between opposite public policy 
poles in an attempt to satisfy very different voting blocs, the 
Civic Platform ultimately managed to alienate broad parts 
of the electorate. For socially conservative voters, whom the 
party was desperately trying to keep, the political 
establishment was too liberal, for instance regarding public 
funding of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment, which had 
been strongly condemned by the Polish Catholic Church. For 
progressives, it was too conservative, because of its failure to 
deliver on same-sex civic partnership legislation, among other 
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things.6 Statistics showed that economic growth in Poland 
led to increased wealth for a vast majority of individual 
households, while the number of people in poverty and 
unemployment rates were systematically declining. 
Nonetheless, expectations were growing faster than incomes. 
The popular perception was that salaries were not keeping 
up with growth.7 
This mismatch between the rhetoric of Poland’s ‘golden 
age’ and popular perceptions of stagnation and decay was 
behind the first defeat of the Civic Platform in the presidential 
elections in May 2015. The then-incumbent Bronisław 
Komorowski, who at the onset of his campaign was a clear 
favourite in the presidential race against relatively young and 
unknown Andrzej Duda, based his strategy on the narrative 
of Poland’s successful transition with little or no room for 
voters’ particular discontents. Komorowski’s narrative proved 
to be especially disconnected from the feelings of the younger 
generation. There are perhaps parallels here with many 
European mainstream politicians during the euro-crisis 
– a failure to respond adequately to voters’ sentiments. 
As a result, Komorowski lost the crucial support of 
younger voters to the anti-establishment candidate Paweł 
Kukiz, who based his bid for presidency on a mix of anti-
European, nationalist and xenophobic slogans without much 
of a substantive political programme, except for a reform of 
the electoral system, which he believed would bring about the 
end of the party system in Poland. Kukiz scored 20 per cent 
and came third in the first round of elections. In the second 
round of the presidential elections, Kukiz supporters largely 
favoured the younger and politically less ‘tainted’ Mr Duda. 
As a result, Komorowski, with 48.5 per cent of the vote, lost 
the race to Duda, who received 51.5 per cent of the vote. 
The ‘Poland in ruin’ campaign
Duda’s unexpected success was largely due to the 
miscalculated campaign of the then-incumbent President 
Komorowski. Nonetheless his victory threw the ruling Civic 
Platform into disarray, broke the glass ceiling holding back 
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the Law and Justice party, and paved the way for the party’s 
successful parliamentary campaign. 
The weaknesses of the Civic Platform were skilfully 
exploited by the Law and Justice party, which managed to 
integrate the (often contradictory) discontents of different 
social groups into a counter-narrative, dubbed by its critics 
as the ‘Poland in ruin’ campaign, depicting Poland as a 
country where few benefited from growth and the masses were 
increasingly impoverished. The success of such a campaign 
is perhaps difficult to understand by looking at various social 
and economic indicators. It may read as a triumph of fear over 
reason and gut feeling over expert knowledge, akin to the 
success of the Leave campaign in the UK’s referendum on 
EU membership.
Poland’s ‘alt-right’ or hipster right-wing radicalism
The Law and Justice campaign managed to soften the party’s 
radical image, with the authoritarian elements so prominent in 
earlier Law and Justice party politics tucked away, and people 
representing this radical face of the Law and Justice party 
(including Kaczyński himself) carefully placed out of public 
view. The official campaign slogan – ‘Good Change’ –helped 
to woo undecided voters looking for an alternative to the 
‘boring’ Civic Platform. Kaczyński tapped into this feeling by 
presenting his party as ‘compassionate conservatives’. A good 
illustration of the effectiveness of this step is the support for 
Andrzej Duda by some prominent lesbian, gay, bisexual   
and transgender (LGBT) rights activists, claiming that   
Civic Platform is as conservative as the Law and Justice   
party anyway.8
The right-wing conservatives’ rebranding was assisted 
by the increased prominence of young and hip right-wing 
public intellectuals as well as by the social media and social 
networking platforms, which helped make the Law and Justice 
and other anti-establishment right-wing parties attractive to 
young voters. Nationalist, xenophobic messages stopped being 
associated exclusively with muscular track-suit-wearing, 
close-shaven youngsters and old ladies in mohair hats, 
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but gained a new, elegant and even glamorous wrapping.9 
Research on electoral behaviour of different social groups 
demonstrates that the Law and Justice party’s electoral 
victories are much attributed to the mobilisation of young, 
well-educated committed supporters of the right-wing political 
forces and active users of the internet.10 Social networking 
sites and online media have fanned the flames of frustration 
with the current anti-elite sentiments, xenophobia and 
a craving for ‘good change’. 
Nominating Beata Szydło as Law and Justice party 
candidate for prime minister (instead of the controversial 
Jarosław Kaczyński) as the friendly face of Law and Justice 
was a key part of the party’s strategy to rebrand itself by 
shifting the debate to more social issues. Szydło presented 
a number of very well-targeted proposals that addressed 
many of the aforementioned discontents people had with 
the otherwise successful Civic Platform track record in 
government, including a generous, for Polish standards, 
child benefit, a minimum wage and rolling back the recent 
retirement age reform.11
This successful Law and Justice campaign led 
to that party’s parliamentary victory in November 2015.   
The five parties that entered the parliament included the Law 
and Justice party with the largest share of votes (38 per cent), 
Civic Platform with 24 per cent of votes, anti-establishment 
Kukiz’ 15 with 9 per cent, the Modern Poland party (8 per 
cent) and the Polish Peasants’ party (5 per cent). The newly 
founded Modern Poland party is liberal in social and 
economic terms, and it attracted some votes from more 
progressive voters disappointed with the Civic Platform. 
Importantly, none of the left-wing parties managed to pass   
the 5 per cent electoral threshold.12 With a turnout of around 
50 per cent, only 18.6 per cent of eligible voters cast their   
votes for the Law and Justice party, which gained a similar 
number of individual votes as the Civic Platform had four 
years earlier. However, the electoral failure of the divided   
left wing and some other parties13 translated into many more 
parliamentary seats left for sharing between the electoral 
winners, most of which went to the Law and Justice party, 
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giving the winner an absolute majority in parliament (51 per 
cent of seats).14 
Majoritarian ‘demokratura’
Thus, while the actual electoral result of the Law and Justice 
party far from justifies their claims to have the mandate to 
make radical changes ‘in the name of the people’, the majority 
in parliament enables them to rule with disregard for the views 
of the opposition, especially since the Kukiz’15 party also 
supports the government on many policy issues. The Law 
and Justice party applied its doctrine of majoritarianism to 
the Constitutional Tribunal, the prosecutor’s office, public 
media and the civil service, using their majority to dismantle 
the existing checks and balances within the Polish democratic 
architecture, while severely limiting the role of the opposition 
or opportunities for public consultations.15
During the Law and Justice party’s first stint in 
government, some of the most controversial acts of Jarosław 
Kaczyński’s government, most notably the radical ‘lustration 
law’, which broadened its scope to include not only public 
office holders, but also journalists and academics, were 
constrained by rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal.16 In 
2015, having won control of the lower and upper chambers of 
the parliament as well as the presidency, Kaczyński decided 
to wage a frontal attack against the tribunal as the only 
remaining bulwark against his plans to radically remodel 
Poland according to his party’s nationalistic and conservative 
ideology. It should be noted that, unlike Orbán in Hungary, 
the Polish voters did not deliver Kaczyński enough MPs to 
change the constitution, even if we include sympathetic 
deputies from the Kukiz’15 faction. Hence the control of   
the Constitutional Tribunal became a focal point of the 
struggle between the Law and Justice party government   
and the opposition.
The excuse for the assault was provided by the 
recklessness of the previous ruling party, the Civic Platform. 
Three weeks before the parliamentary elections on 25 October 
2015, the Civic Platform–Polish Peasants’ party majority 
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elected five judges to be sworn in by the president. While three 
of them were to take seats vacated before the elections, two 
others were to take seats during the mandate of the incoming 
legislature starting on 12 November. The president refused to 
take the oath of all the five elected judges, while the new 
government introduced a bill to annul the previous judicial 
nominations by amending the law on the Constitutional 
Tribunal, adopted via an accelerated procedure. On  
2 December 2015 five new judges were nominated. 
Rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal from 3 December 
and 9 December 2015 confirmed that the previous legislature 
had the right to nominate three judges, but not the two judges 
due to take seats after the end of the outgoing legislature’s 
term of office, under the new government’s mandate. A 
shortening of the terms of office of the incumbent president 
and vice president of the tribunal, also envisaged by the 
government bill, were ruled unconstitutional as well. 
However, the Law and Justice government decided 
to ignore the Constitutional Tribunal rulings by refusing 
to publish them, so that they would not come into force. 
In the meantime the president took the oath of the five judges 
nominated by the new, Law and Justice party-dominated 
legislature, making the composition of the tribunal a matter 
of dispute. Crucially, further amendments adopted on 
28 December 2015 made the capacity of the tribunal to review 
the constitutionality of the adopted legislation more difficult, 
if not impossible, by increasing the majorities needed to pass 
judgments and increasing the number of judges on cases. 
Even more controversial was the requirement that the 
tribunal should consider the cases as they come, without the 
ability to set its own agenda. The new law was ruled as 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal but the 
government refused to recognise the ruling, arguing the 
tribunal should have applied the procedures stipulated   
under the new legislation. The struggle for the control of  
the constitutional court has continued so that during its first   
year in office, the ruling majority passed no fewer than eight 
different acts of parliament referring to the Constitutional 
Tribunal, in the attempt to assume control over the tribunal   
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and to tire out the domestic and international criticism of  
its actions.17
In a similar fashion, disregarding standard 
parliamentary procedures of debate and consultations, 
the so-called ‘small media law’ was adopted on 31 December 
2015. The new law made provision for the immediate dismissal 
of the existing supervisory and management boards of the 
public service broadcasters. Moreover, the newly appointed 
management and supervisory boards were put under the 
control of the Treasury Ministry, which compromised their 
independence. The new law side-lined the constitutional body, 
the National Board for Radio and Television, which is charged 
with the regulation and guarding of media independence. The 
government appointed a Law and Justice party spin doctor as 
president of public television and promptly conducted a purge 
of journalists and media workers suspected of lack of 
enthusiasm for its political agenda.18
Domestic reactions – the KOD and others
The imminent rise of a broad social protest movement against 
the authorities’ handling of the Constitutional Tribunal as 
well other democratic infringements came as a huge surprise 
to both supporters and opponents of the Law and Justice 
government. The key force behind the protests is the 
Committee for the Defence of Democracy (Komitet Obrony 
Demokracji; KOD), a grassroots initiative, which has united 
people of different political persuasions.19 The presence of 
former prominent representatives of the Solidarity movement 
(Solidarnosc), including Henryka Wujec and Władysław 
Frasyniuk, made it difficult for Law and Justice party 
politicians to dismiss the KOD as a top-down group mobilised 
by the post-communist elites. In fact, parallels with the 
anti-communist Solidarity and Committee for the Defence 
of Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotników; KOR) movements 
are emphasised by KOD sympathisers – the campaign against 
authoritarian governments, in defence of democratic values, 
attracting wide support from ordinary citizens. KOD 
supporters often draw parallels between the Law and Justice 
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party government and former communist rulers of Poland, 
which is rather embarrassing to a party claiming a monopoly 
on anti-communist opposition. Since its beginnings in 2006, 
the KOD has been organising rallies and marches regularly 
in support of the Constitutional Court, and against the 
new media laws, drawing tens if not hundreds of thousands 
of protesters. 
In response to the perceived growing Euroscepticism 
of the government, a Freedom, Equality, Democracy Coalition 
formed under the auspices of KOD, uniting different political 
actors under one banner of shared European values. Apart 
from the Civic Platform, the biggest among the opposition 
parties, and a newly formed left-wing Together party, all 
centre and centre-left political parties, left-of-the-centre 
associations and individual members of the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) European 
Parliament group joined the Coalition. The rally organised 
by the Coalition on 7 May 2016 ostensibly focused on Poland’s 
membership of the EU and Poland’s ‘European choice’, 
and was probably the biggest political demonstration in 
post-1989 Poland.
The reaction from the government and pro-government 
media was to suggest that KOD is a movement of people who 
unjustly benefited from the previous years of liberal rule and 
are now afraid to be brought to justice. Some of the insults 
poured out by Jarosław Kaczyński and others have become 
instant classics. For example, his depiction of KOD 
demonstrators as ‘Poles of the worst sort’ was reappropriated 
and printed on t-shirts and badges worn by participants in 
successive demonstrations, in a way reminiscent of communist 
propaganda depictions of Solidarity activists as ‘anti-socialist 
elements’, which they embraced with pride. The Law and 
Justice party strategy was to present their opponents as a 
relatively small minority, whereas the government claimed 
to speak for ‘the people’ or all ‘true Poles’. As we already 
noted, neither the results of the elections nor the subsequent 
opinion polls validate such a claim.
5 Poland
1   Social cohesion and 
economic fears
Dominik Owczarek
The pendulum in Poland has swung decisively from the 
liberal, globally oriented Civic Platform to the authoritarian 
nationalists of the Law and Justice party. Three sets of 
explanations are often provided to make sense of such 
political shifts: some explain the rise of populist parties 
in terms of economic factors such as unemployment and 
a changing labour market, others in terms of the ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ of globalisation, or in terms of pervasive 
cultural anxieties.20
The economy-based thesis posits that right-wing populist 
parties are sustained by economic hardship and inequality, 
causing the ‘left behinds’ to vote for any alternative to the 
status quo. As far as macroeconomic indices are concerned, 
however, Poland is one of the best-performing countries in 
Europe since the collapse of Iron Curtain. Reports by 
international organisations like the World Bank consistently 
show there has been a remarkable economic expansion in 
Poland over the past 27 years. Gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita increased by over 10 per cent in real terms 
(corrected for changes in purchasing power).21 This is the best 
result among all post-Soviet and post-socialist countries. Since 
1989, there has not been a single year of economic contraction 
in Poland, not even during the 2008 economic crisis or the 
subsequent Eurozone crisis. Because of this outstanding 
performance, Poland has been labelled a ‘green island’ of 
economic growth contrasted with the rest of Europe.22 
Economic acceleration has been mirrored also in a significant 
change in the Human Development Index, which rose from 
0.713 in 1990 to 0.843 in 2014.23 One of the effects of the 
317
transformation, however, was an increase in the Gini 
coefficient, reflecting increased income inequality. During the 
1990s, the coefficient rose from 0.27 in 1990 to 0.33 in 2000. 
The figure stabilised around 2005 and remains around the 
level of 0.34–0.35 since then.24 Another negative effect of the 
transformation was a massive increase in unemployment 
throughout the 1990s, reaching a peak of 20 per cent in 2003 
and 2004.
Table 1   Macroeconomic indices for Poland: GDP growth rate, 
minimum monthly wage, average yearly earnings, 
2004–2015
2004 2006 2008 2010 2011
GDP growth 
rate
5.1% 6.2% 4.2% 3.6% 5.0%
Minumum 
monthly 
wage 
€182.16 €221.72 €35.99 €337.58 €347.34
Average 
yearly 
earnings 
€5,964.26 €7,513.28 €9,598.53 €9,042.23 €9,357.12
2012 2013 2014 2015
GDP growth 
rate
1.6% 1.3% 3.3% 3.6%
Minumum 
monthly 
wage 
€353.04 €368.87 €404.16 €417.55
Average 
yearly 
earnings 
€9,298.24 €9,873.12 €10,123.56 €11,787.78
 
Source: Eurostat.25
The turning point was almost certainly the accession to the 
EU, when the Gini coefficient stabilised and unemployment 
rates started to decline. The pre-crisis period from May 2004 
to mid-2008 was very favourable to society and the economy 
due to opening of the EU labour market to Polish employees, 
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and an infl ow of European structural funds and foreign 
investment. Th is resulted in strong GDP growth and increases 
in wages and the employment rate coupled with a decrease 
in unemployment and poverty rates. Th e economic crisis and 
the post-crisis period brought economic slowdown (but not 
recession) and a rise in unemployment (especially among 
young people) and in extreme poverty rates, as well as 
a decrease in average yearly earnings. It must be noted, 
however, that despite economic slowdown, some positive 
pre-crisis trends continued: the decrease of relative poverty 
and the consistent increase in the minimum wage. Since 
2013/2014, most major macroeconomic indices have been 
improving and by the end of 2015 the economy was in a better 
shape than before the crisis by most measures (table 1). 
Figure 1   Poverty indicators in Poland, 2004–2015
Data labels are given every second year for clarity. Source: Central Statistical 
Offi  ce.
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
00
05
15
10
20
Relative poverty rate Extreme poverty rate
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2013 2015201420122010
319
Taking into account the whole period since accession to the 
EU (2004–2015), Poland performed relatively well despite 
the crisis: nominal average yearly earnings nearly doubled,26 
minimum wage increased more than twice,27 unemployment 
decreased by 11.6 percentage points,28 relative poverty 
dropped by 3.3 percentage points and extreme poverty 
dropped by 5.3 percentage points (fi gure 1).29
However, this bright picture is overshadowed by at least 
two factors. Th e fi rst is a massive emigration that started in 
2004. Current estimates suggest there are over 2.3 million 
Poles (or about 6 per cent of the total population) temporarily 
living abroad.30 Post-accession migration is mostly caused 
by economic factors and to some extent should be assessed 
as a rational choice when the level of wage divergence between 
EU countries is taken into account. In 2014, average earnings 
in Poland were more than three times smaller than average 
earnings in the EU and just over a fi fth of the average wage 
in the UK – the preferred destination for Polish migrants. 
Figure 2  Labour market indicators in Poland, 2004–2015
Data labels are given every second year for clarity. Source: Eurostat.
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The second factor is the poor quality of employment.   
It is expressed in relatively low wages compared with other   
EU countries and a lack of job stability. Poland has the highest 
share of temporary employment in the EU (figure 2). In   
2015, those on temporary contracts formed 28 per cent of all 
employees, whereas the EU average was 14.1 per cent. Among 
those aged 15–24 this share was as high as 72.7 per cent (higher 
only in Slovenia – 75.5 per cent), whereas the EU average was 
43.3 per cent for this age group. The temporary employment 
rate also includes those employed under civil-law contracts, 
which are not subject to protection under the Labour Code. 
Social security contributions are usually not paid on these 
contracts either. Furthermore, Polish employees work some 
of the longest hours in the EU, raising questions about the 
work–life balance of Poles. Some of those employed under 
temporary contracts should be thought of as precarious 
employees. In short, economic indicators paint a mixed 
picture. On the one hand, the impressive economic 
performance expressed in GDP growth is not to be dismissed. 
On the other, not all groups benefited equally from this 
economic growth. A significant rise in income inequality 
coupled with notoriously high rates of unemployment in the 
1990s, mass emigration after 2004 and the highest levels of 
temporary employment in Europe are the main sources of   
this ambivalence. 
However, contrary to most Western European countries, 
it is not the post-2008 recession that is providing fertile 
ground for populist movements. The social impact of the   
crisis was much smaller than the impact of the transformation 
process of the 1990s and in fact never led to a recession in 
Poland. Therefore it is hard to argue that the success of 
populist movements and parties in 2015 is purely the result   
of a deterioration of social and economic conditions, because 
the populist electoral successes are much larger than the 
economic climate seems to warrant. 
There is another discrepancy, between Polish people’s 
subjective assessment of satisfaction with their personal life 
on the one hand and their assessment of politics and the 
economic conditions on the other. Since 1989, majorities 
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of Poles have assessed the political situation and economic 
conditions in the country as being bad year after year. There 
were only three periods when they formed a different political 
assessment: in 1989–1990, just after the fall of the Soviet 
Union; in 1997 when the government gained stability for the 
first time since 1989 (equal positive and negative ratings);   
and between late 2007 and early 2008, when the Civic 
Platform government won parliamentary elections and the 
economic situation was improving. There were only two 
periods when they formed a different economic assessment: in 
2007–2008, when economic indicators were exceptionally 
high; and in 2016, when indices showed the situation to be the 
best it has ever been historically.31 At these times respondents’ 
positive assessment of their personal life – their living 
conditions, their household’s economic situation and their 
general situation in the workplace – started to overshadow 
their negative assessment of these dimensions in the period 
2003–2006 and this pattern persists in 2017. Currently over  
50 per cent of respondents assess their living conditions 
positively (8 per cent negatively), 46 per cent view their 
economic situation positively (9 per cent negatively) and 59 
per cent view the general situation at their workplace 
positively (11 per cent negatively). The discrepancy between 
the positive assessment of respondents’ personal situation and 
the negative assessment of the political and economic shape of 
the country appears to be constant. Populist groups in Poland 
have often relied on this subjective sense of deprivation rather 
than hard data.
From ‘green island’ to ‘Poland in ruin’ 
The Polish case seems to illustrate that growing prosperity 
per se is not necessarily an antidote to populist authoritarian 
rhetoric. Where the ruling Civic Platform built its rhetoric 
around the positive trends shown by economic indicators,   
the Law and Justice party relied on the subjective sense of 
deprivation discussed in the previous paragraph. Where one 
spoke of Poland as a ‘green island’ of economic growth the 
other presented an image of ‘Poland in ruin’. In retrospect, it 
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seems economic indicators were not as electorally compelling 
as the Civic Platform assumed. 
As others have pointed out, economic explanations 
of populism attribute almost no part of populist electoral 
success to political actors.32 Yet it was precisely clever political 
leadership and fine-tuned rhetoric that appeared to be decisive 
in the Law and Justice party’s victory. The rhetoric of the Civic 
Platform – the ruling party between 2007 and 2015 – revolved 
around successful economic development, the emergence of 
a middle class and the growing importance of the country 
in Central Eastern Europe and in the EU. 
In the first term of office of the government formed 
by the coalition of Civic Platform and the Polish Peasants’ 
party (2007–2011) one of the main symbolic points of reference 
was the above-mentioned positive GDP growth, contrasted 
with economic recession in other European countries. In 
2009, Poland was the only country in the EU with positive 
GDP growth, and was often seen as a green spot on a red map 
of countries with negative growth, giving the country its 
nickname of ‘green island’. This symbol loosely referred also 
to the economic success of Ireland, identified as an effect of 
liberal reforms in a Catholic country, which was also one 
of the main migration destinations for Poles after accession 
to the EU in 2004. Moreover, the image of the ‘green island’ 
was used to argue the effectiveness of Poland’s use of 
structural funds, which were spent mostly on infrastructure 
development (roads, highways). 
In the electoral campaign of 2011, when the Civic 
Platform was re-elected for the second term, the main 
rhetorical figure of the ‘green island’ was supplemented  
with the slogan ‘Poland under construction’, emphasising  
that there was still much to be done. This narrative was  
well supported by statistical data and presented by  
politicians and experts – economists and sociologists. Despite 
the crisis, the message was that the economy is growing, there 
are more investments, general economic conditions are 
improving, and Poland has fulfilled its dream of becoming 
part of the democratic Western world just after accession to 
the EU. 
323
From 2013 onwards the ruling coalition seemed to be 
more alienated from the issues important to many social 
groups. Moreover, it overestimated the impact of the ‘green 
island’ rhetoric. Heightened levels of social discontent 
and frustration were surprising and incomprehensible when 
compared with growing economic indicators. This seeming 
paradox can be explained by Polish people’s mixed social 
perceptions and cumulated fears far beyond macroeconomic 
indices, which has been deftly captured and irrationally blown 
up by opposition populist parties in their emotional rhetoric. 
Once the great goals from the transformation period – 
accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and EU structures – that challenged society and motivated 
sacrifice for the sake of these goals were achieved, Poles sensed 
they were facing an uncertain future. The sense of hope that 
unified social aspirations was replaced by fear of external 
threats: the economic crisis that came from the USA and 
Eurozone, war between Russia and neighbouring Ukraine, 
later on the refugee crisis, then Brexit and the possibility that 
some entitlements for migrants (including Polish migrants) 
would be limited in several Western European countries.
Meanwhile, the emerging middle class – the main social 
group supporting Civic Platform – started to see limits in its 
growth. The fragility of the emerging middle class has been 
revealed most of all by an increase in the value of the Swiss 
Franc (Confederazione Helvetica Franc; CHF), which hit 
thousands of holders of mortgages denominated in that 
currency. The fragility of the middle classes is expressed also 
in their lack of sense of affluence and stability in the longer 
run. This bastion of the Civic Platform begun to sink in 
frustration and lose respect for rational rhetoric despite 
GDP growth and incremental improvements in the situation 
of their households.33
Similarly, frustration and fear among the young 
generation is a result of their unsustainable success. The 
Millennials in Poland were the first generation with college 
attendance rates at the level of Western European countries 
(some 50 per cent among those below 30 years of age) – the 
highest ever. Half of this generation has acquired high 
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occupational qualifications, learnt foreign languages and 
visited foreign universities during scholarships, which 
obviously created high expectations about their future career 
and lifestyle. Young Poles believe that they have equal 
economic status and perspectives with their Erasmus friends 
from Germany, the UK or France. Graduates collided with 
reality in at least two different ways: they tried to enter the 
poor labour market with high competencies and expectations, 
and they have taken the hardest hit of the crisis. They have 
been forced to take prolonged, mostly unpaid, internships, or 
temporary employment under civil-law or fixed-term contracts; 
had interrupted employment; had to live with parents as there 
are very limited chances to rent (lack of rental housing) or buy 
a flat; and altogether faced severe difficulties with being 
self-sufficient and able to start a family. Some young people 
had to move back to their home towns from bigger academic 
cities or sought jobs for which they were over-qualified, which 
they experienced as a failure.34 
Nevertheless, in both the presidential and parliamentary 
electoral campaigns in 2015 Civic Platform continued its 
rhetoric of claiming success despite growing social discontent. 
A symbolic example of the incomprehension of social moods 
was an answer Bronisław Komorowski gave to a young person 
who asked him for advice for his sister, who after graduating 
from university could only find a job that paid 2,000 PLN 
(less than £400) a month, emphasising the situation of many 
university graduates who can be classified as ‘working poor’. 
The president advised her ‘to change her job, to take a loan’ 
and reminded her that unemployment in Poland was falling, 
unlike in the UK. This incident was filmed and amplified 
through opposition media, especially social media.35 
The Law and Justice party countered the slogan of 
the ‘green island’ with their own catchphrase, ‘Poland in ruin’. 
To build Poland back up, the party promised to lower the 
retirement age, to vastly expand family benefits under the 
so-called Family 500+ (Rodzina 500+) programme, and to 
build many new apartments on state-owned land. The funding 
for these programmes remains a point of contention. The 
government estimated that Family 500+ would cost 
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approximately 16 billion PLN (roughly equivalent to 
£3 billion) in 2016 and 21 billion PLN in 2017. It will be one 
of the causes of public debt and increased public deficit, 
likely in contravention of European budget rules. Public 
spending related to the social programmes was supposed 
to be covered by better collection of VAT, a new sales tax 
and a new bank tax. None of these programmes has yet 
been successfully implemented. 
Yet despite severe criticism from experts and opposition 
leaders, the social programmes, especially Family 500+, still 
seem to have bolstered the support for the Law and Justice 
government. Large majorities of Law and Justice party 
supporters feel their party has done well or very well at 
improving the quality of life, keeping its promises, and 
maintaining democracy and the rule of law. Above all, 
the figures show a divided Poland: 50 per cent think the 
government is performing badly in implementing its electoral 
promises, while some 56 per cent of those surveyed are critical 
of its approach to democracy and rule of law. Among the 
liberal and left-wing opposition – Civic Platform, Modern 
Poland party (Nowoczesna) and United Left – this figure 
shoots up: some 70 per cent of them think that the Law and 
Justice party government has performed very badly in 
safeguarding democracy (table 2).36
5 Poland
Table 2   Respondents’ answers to the question ‘How well or badly 
do you think the Law and Justice government, which 
came to power following the 2015 elections, are doing 
at the following…’
Total 
(%)
Law and 
Justice 
party 
support-
ers (%)
Civic 
Platform 
support-
ers (%)
Kukiz’15 
support-
ers (%)
Nowoczesna 
supporters 
(%)
United 
Left 
support-
ers (%)
Improving the quality of life of the majority of Poles?
Very well 8 20 3 4 4 3
Fairly well 36 59 21 44 21 16
Fairly badly 24 10 35 24 32 35
Very badly 21 5 34 21 37 38
Don’t know 10 6 7 6 7 7
Implementing the promises they made before the election?
Very well 7 19 2 4 2 0
Fairly well 35 59 19 39 26 11
Fairly badly 26 14 31 31 28 40
Very badly 24 4 45 22 40 41
Don’t know 8 4 4 5 4 7
Maintaining democracy and the rule of law?
Very well 9 23 2 5 3 3
Fairly well 25 47 7 18 14 7
Fairly badly 20 13 18 32 14 17
Very badly 36 6 70 37 69 70
Don’t know 11 11 2 8 1 3
Source: YouGov polling for Demos.
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2  Globalisation and 
European integration
Aleksander Fuksiewicz
A second prominent theory on populism focuses on the 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation. The populist right 
wing is said to mobilise ‘the cultural anxieties of the losers 
of globalisation’.37 Yet our polling shows that the Polish do 
not consider themselves to be losers of globalisation at all. 
Both Law and Justice party supporters and Civic Platform 
supporters are overwhelmingly positive about the effect of 
globalisation on their country, local area and personal lives. 
Poland is more content with globalisation than any other 
country in our sample (table 3). 
Moreover, this positive attitude towards globalisation 
goes hand in hand with consistent support for European 
integration and Poland’s EU membership. In comparative 
Eurobarometer surveys Poles usually express the most positive 
opinions about the EU and the most positive assessment of the 
benefits of membership of all EU countries. For instance, in 
the last poll before the 2015 elections, the number of positive 
responses to the question ‘does the EU conjure up for you 
a positive, neutral or negative image’ in Poland was the fifth 
highest in the EU. In the first poll after the elections it   
was the second highest (after Croatia).38 According to Polish 
surveys, the number of those in favour of EU membership  
has not dropped below 70 per cent over the last decade, 
reaching a peak of 89 per cent in 2014.39 According to  
Polish polls, in 2015 some 84 per cent of Poles were in   
favour of EU membership, 10 per cent were against and  
6 per cent undecided.40 
5 Poland
Table 3   Respondents’ views on the statement ‘Over recent 
decades the world has become more interconnected. 
There is greater free trade between countries and 
easier communication across the globe. Money, people, 
cultures, jobs and industries all move more easily 
between countries. Generally speaking, do you think 
this has had a positive or negative effect on…’
Total  
(%)
Law and Justice 
party supporters 
(%)
Civic Platform 
supporters  
(%)
Europe as a whole
  Positive 79 76 90
  Negative 12 16 6
  Don’t know 9 9 4
Poland as a whole
  Positive 80 79 91
  Negative 13 14 7
  Don’t know 7 6 3
Your local area
  Positive 77 76 88
  Negative 11 14 5
  Don’t know 12 10 6
Your own life
  Positive 72 72 82
  Negative 11 13 7
  Don’t know 17 15 11
Source: YouGov polling for Demos.
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These general pro-European attitudes have been 
grounded in the perception of many that Poland has benefited 
from membership in the EU on numerous levels. According to 
a survey conducted on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of 
Polish membership in the EU, these benefits include freedom 
of movement (especially free flow of labour) and the transfer 
of EU funds to Poland. According to the same poll, most   
Poles believe that accession to the EU has strengthened the 
international security of the country (72 per cent) and 
Poland’s position in Europe (74 per cent).41
How is it possible a Eurosceptic party such as the Law 
and Justice party can manage to win parliamentary elections  
in one of the most pro-globalisation and Euro-enthusiastic 
countries in the EU? The possibility of leaving the EU remains 
taboo in the mainstream public debate and even Eurosceptic 
Law and Justice party politicians do not mention it as an 
option, arguing instead for a repatriation of EU powers back   
to member states, for example by giving national parliaments 
the power to veto legislation coming from Brussels.
Table 4   Respondents’ answers to the question ‘Do you think 
Poland’s long-term policy should be…’
Total (%) Law and 
Justice party 
supporters (%)
Civic Platform 
supporters (%)
To leave the EU 8 13 1
To stay in the EU and try 
to reduce the EU’s powers
32 46 23
To leave things as they are 21 12 40
To stay in the EU and try to 
increase the EU’s powers
14 10 17
To work for the formation of 
a single European government
10 6 10
Don’t know 15 12 8
Source: YouGov polling for Demos.
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Despite the generally positive appraisal of the EU and 
globalisation, the ‘sovereignty instead of cooperation’ 
approach of the Law and Justice party appears to resonate 
with large parts of the Polish electorate. Our original polling 
shows that while only 8 per cent of Poles would support 
leaving the EU, another 32 per cent support staying in the 
EU and trying to reduce the EU’s powers, which is the 
pronounced policy of the Law and Justice party government 
(table 4).
According to these figures, 40 per cent of Polish citizens 
(the 8 per cent who want to leave the EU and the 32 per cent 
who want EU powers to be reduced) are at least to some 
degree Eurosceptic.42 It should be noted that this issue is 
strongly correlated with party preferences. Eurosceptics make 
up the majority of the Law and Justice party electorate (59 per 
cent), but only 22 per cent of the pro-European Civil Platform 
electorate. In another poll from October 2015, the Institute of 
Public Affairs obtained similar results: one-third felt that the 
EU’s competences should be reduced (51 per cent of Law and 
Justice party supporters and 26 per cent of Civic Platform 
voters).43 Looking at these results, one can assume that the 
Law and Justice party’s sovereignty narrative has been 
accepted by the majority of the party’s supporters.
However, the Law and Justice party has received 
significant pushback from the opposition and civil society 
organisations on its EU stance. This has been expressed in 
KOD protests against the government, where EU flags were 
always an important symbol. A very large KOD demonstration 
in Warsaw in May 2016, which brought together all 
mainstream parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties and 
politicians opposing the Law and Justice party, had as 
its motto ‘We are and will be in Europe’.
Refugees – successful use of fear (and xenophobia) 
in the election campaign
Insofar as globalisation was a (latent) theme in the election 
campaign, it was primarily through the fierce debate on 
immigration. One of the keys to the Law and Justice party 
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victory in the 2015 elections was the refugee crisis. The Law 
and Justice party warned that Poland was in grave danger of  
a massive inflow of Muslim immigrants – and only they could 
prevent this. The refugee issue might have been decisive in 
breaking the party’s electoral ‘glass ceiling’ (its lack of support 
among more educated, urban, middle-class voters, as 
discussed above) which was believed to exist for Kaczyński’s 
party. Many different groups of society shared an aversion to 
accepting refugees, not only the traditional Law and Justice 
party voting blocs of less educated and less wealthy citizens.
The refugee crisis started at the worst possible 
moment in the Polish public debate – just before the electoral 
campaign. Poles were already suspicious of immigrants, but 
the refugee crisis combined with the political campaign 
caused an unprecedented outburst of xenophobia publicly and 
on social media. This debate was characterised by emotional 
narratives, stirring up fears of Muslim refugees, and a systemic 
disregard for facts and data.44
Emotional messages found fertile soil in Poland. 
Knowledge about immigration is limited in Polish society 
and stereotypes are widespread. For instance, one-fourth 
of Poles believe that foreigners account for 10 per cent of the 
population, while the real number is less than 1 per cent.45 
According to the Pew Research Center almost all Poles want 
immigration to be limited or kept at the current level (but not 
increased). Half of the citizenry thinks that immigrants are 
a burden for Poland and only one-fourth that they strengthen 
the country (compared with some 70 per cent who believe this 
in countries like Germany or the UK).46
During the refugee crisis there was a dramatic increase 
of negative opinions about immigration. In May 2015 (before 
the campaign started), 21 per cent of Poles said that Poland 
should not accept any refugees. By December 2015 (just after 
the elections) this ratio had grown to an absolute majority, 
53 per cent.47 Moreover, polls show that the fear of an inflow 
of refugees was prevalent across social groups. The views of 
less-educated, rural respondents (the traditional Law and 
Justice party support base) were exactly the same as those 
among well-educated people from large cities (traditionally 
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not the Law and Justice party electorate).48 Moreover, young 
people were generally even more opposed than older people  
to accepting immigrants. Everything was favoured the Law 
and Justice party in this regard.
The refugee crisis was critical for the ruling party, as 
it had to negotiate accepting refugees at the EU level (and 
obligatory quotas proposed by the European Commission), 
which it knew would be difficult to accept at home. The Civic 
Platform government criticised the Juncker plan of taking in 
obligatory quotas, but agreed to accept 7,000 refugees. Prime 
Minister Ewa Kopacz said publicly, ‘We want to accept 
refugees, those who cannot feel safe in their home countries… 
this is a decency test for Poland.’49 Nevertheless, mainstream 
Polish politicians (including those from the left) were 
lacklustre in their defence of the decision to accept refugees in 
Poland. Only some in civil society tried (with limited success) 
to influence the debate with some positive message.50
The ‘crisis’ created a great opportunity for the Law and 
Justice party to build support using fear and xenophobia. 
It accused the government of betraying the country and its 
Central European allies (such as Hungarian Prime Minister 
Victor Orbán, also opposed to quotas). Law and Justice party 
politicians argued that the problem was not Poland’s, but the 
Germans’, who let refugees in; Poland lacked money to finance 
the life of refugees in the country; and the crisis was a 
consequence of the colonial past of the Western EU members. 
Law and Justice party leader Jarosław Kaczyński directly 
encouraged Poles to fear refugees by arguing that refugees 
might bring to Europe ‘various kinds of parasites, protozoa, 
which are harmless in organisms for those people [refugees], 
but can be the dangerous here [in Poland]’.51 In another widely 
discussed statement (expressed during parliamentary debate) 
Kaczyński had no qualms about using tabloid-style 
stereotypes of Muslim refugees – he claimed that there are 
54 no-go zones of Sharia law in Sweden, that they use 
churches as toilets in Italy, and in France there are Muslim 
patrols enforcing Sharia law.52
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Table 5   Respondents’ answers to the question ‘Which, if any, 
of the following do you think are the biggest problems 
facing Poland at the moment? Please tick up to three’
Total (%) Law and 
Justice party 
supporters (%)
Civic Platform 
supporters (%)
Economic instability 27 17 35
The gap between the rich 
and poor
27 27 22
The low birth rate and how 
Poland will fund our ageing 
population
22 27 21
Islamic terrorism 42 53 30
Russian aggression and 
expansionism
27 40 25
Immigration 27 37 19
Political parties undermining 
democracy and the rule of law
33 20 51
Growing social liberalism, 
such as gay rights, feminism 
and abortion
9 11 3
Growing social conservatism, 
such as restrictions on 
abortion and gay rights
22 12 35
The security forces being 
given too many powers and 
freedoms
16 5 27
None of these 1 0 1
Don’t know 7 8 2
Source: YouGov polling for Demos.
The Law and Justice party benefited from this approach, but it 
seemed to have greatly increased feelings of insecurity among 
Polish people. Although in Poland there are very few refugees 
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or immigrants from Arab countries, and although the country 
has not had any terrorist attacks, our polling indicates that 
Polish people feel the biggest problem currently facing Poland 
is Islamic terrorism. This is especially true for, but not limited 
to, Law and Justice supporters. According to Law and Justice 
party supporters, the three biggest problems facing Poland are 
Islamic terrorism, followed by Russian resurgence (40 per 
cent) and – again – immigration (37 per cent). In contrast, 
supporters of the oppositional centre-right Civic Platform 
perceive the undermining of democracy and the rule of law 
as being the biggest of Poland’s problems (51 per cent), 
followed by economic instability and growing social 
conservatism (35 per cent each) (table 5). One may conclude 
that while opposition to refugees from Muslim countries is 
certainly not confined to the Law and Justice constituency, 
the political priorities of the supporters and opponents of 
the Law and Justice party government are very different.
Public debate during the crisis focused on the much-
maligned obligatory quotas. There is a widely accepted 
narrative that Germany made a mistake in accepting refugees 
and Berlin was trying to shirk its responsibilities by forcing 
quotas, supported by the European Commission. 
Table 6   Respondents’ views on whether Polish society becoming 
more ethnically and religiously diverse has changed 
society for the better or for the worse 
Total (%) Law and 
Justice party 
supporters (%)
Civic Platform 
supporters (%)
Has changed society for the 
better
23 22 32
Has changed society for the 
worse
40 46 37
Neither 13 11 11
Don’t know 24 21 19
Source: YouGov polling for Demos.
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According to the Demos survey, 4 in 10 Poles think that the 
fact that society is becoming more ethnically and religiously 
diverse is a change for the worse. Similar percentages believe 
in the conspiracy theory, promoted by right-wing websites 
and social media, that ‘supporters of migration from Muslim 
countries want to destroy traditional Polish and Christian 
values’ (table 6).
Table 7   The extent to which respondents agreed with the 
statement ‘Supporters of migration from Muslim 
countries want to destroy traditional Polish and 
Christian values’
Total (%) Law and 
Justice party 
supporters (%)
Civic Platform 
supporters (%)
Strongly agree 23 34 12
Tend to agree 19 24 16
Neither agree nor disagree 23 24 23
Tend to disagree 15 6 23
Strongly disagree 14 3 24
Don’t know 8 9 3
Agree 42 58 28
Neither agree nor disagree 23 24 23
Disagree 29 9 47
Source: YouGov polling for Demos.
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Post-election developments: the clash of 
authoritarian populism with international 
institutions and its reflection in the society
The Law and Justice party government’s attack on the judicial 
branch of government during its first months was criticised by 
international organisations, the Venice Commission (a legal 
body within the Council of Europe) and the European 
Commission. The situation in Poland was also a subject of 
debate in the European Parliament. Polish society is very 
much divided in its response to the criticism of the Law and 
Justice party government by international institutions. 
According to polling by the Public Opinion Research Center, 
the percentage of respondents who oppose the decision of the 
European Commission to start rule-of-law procedure against 
Poland more or less equals the number of those who assess   
it positively and the results are clearly correlated with   
political preference.53
So far there is scarce evidence that criticism from 
EU institutions has significantly changed Poles’ attitudes to 
EU membership or trust in EU institutions. Public trust in the 
European Commission, which is Poland’s main international 
critic, remains unchanged from before the elections.54 
Table 8   Public trust in public institutions (average score   
on a 0–10 scale)
The Polish Government 3.31 (low trust)
The Polish Parliament 2.98 (low trust)
The European Parliament 4.45 (medium trust)
The European Commission 4.51 (medium trust)
Source: YouGov polling for Demos.
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Our polling demonstrates that the sovereignty narrative 
of the Law and Justice party is supported by a minority of 
Poles only. Although trust in EU institutions is not very high, 
it nonetheless remains higher than trust in Polish national 
institutions: 60 per cent of Poles have medium or high trust 
in the European Commission and 59 per cent in the European 
Parliament, whereas just 42 per cent and 38 per cent 
respectively have medium or high trust in the Polish 
government and the Polish parliament. The deficit of trust in 
both national and EU institutions is even more pronounced 
when we look at the average ratings (table 8). 
These figures make two things abundantly clear:
 · Polish citizens have disconcertingly low levels of social 
and political trust. No institution averages above 5 out   
of 10 in trustworthiness.
 · It is difficult for the Law and Justice party government to 
exploit the fairly low level of trust the public has in European 
institutions, which it has repeatedly clashed with, since Polish 
institutions are mistrusted even more. 
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3  Social conservatism 
and the cultural 
backlash in Poland
Małgorzata Druciarek
Mainstreaming the culture war:  
the anti-gender campaign
A third and final thesis focuses on cultural backlash, 
not just against migrants and cultural outsiders, but against 
a liberal, global orientation in general. As Inglehart and Norris 
write: ‘Xenophobia is only one part of a much broader cultural 
backlash among the older generation, rejecting many other 
liberal and cosmopolitan values diffusing throughout post-
industrial societies.’55 The divide between social conservatives 
and social progressives is always an important cleavage in 
Polish society, sustained by the active engagement of the 
Catholic Church in public and political life. In times when 
political affiliation becomes especially important – during 
electoral campaigns, or when government is drafting 
important legislation – the role of the Catholic Church turns 
out to be crucial in shaping narratives. Its unique position in 
the Polish public sphere dates back to the 1980s, when the 
country was transitioning to a democratic system. At that time 
the Catholic Church was the only institution treated seriously 
as a real political power by the communist regime, which has 
cemented its central and stable position in Polish political 
life.56 No other institution in Poland gained so much with the 
democratic transition. The mixing of religion and state is 
widely accepted by Polish politicians and a matter of ‘political 
common sense’.57 However, an opinion poll carried out by the 
Institute of Public Affairs in 2013 showed that a considerable 
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majority of Poles (70 per cent) opposed members of the clergy 
offering official statements and comments on political affairs.58 
Moreover, almost half of the respondents claimed that the 
political influence of the Catholic Church was too strong   
in Poland. 
From election to election, the political presence of the 
Church becomes more or less visible, depending on the 
current political situation. It was directly involved in the 
presidential elections in 2010, just after the Smolensk aircraft 
disaster, but such direct Church involvement received a lot of 
criticism from the general public and, unintentionally, helped 
the anti-clerical Palikot Movement to succeed in the 2011 
parliamentary elections, where the party came third with 
10 per cent of the votes. Palikot’s victory, which was a 
consequence of the flourishing of liberal values that had 
started after 2007,59 has resulted in the launch of what one 
could call ‘the counter-reformation programme’, aimed at 
stopping the advances of secularisation already visible in 
Polish society.60 The crucial moment for this culture war 
was the public debate on whether the Polish government 
should sign the Council of Europe Convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and domestic violence 
(the Istanbul Convention), initiated in 2011. At that time, 
the Polish Episcopal conference noted that the Istanbul 
Convention was the first official document to offer a definition 
of ‘gender’ as being socially constructed. The bishops noted, 
‘The convention redefines gender as a social construct rather 
than as a distinction grounded in biology, and suggests 
violence towards women is systemic, with roots in religion 
and culture.’61 
And so the ‘anti-gender ideology’ campaign was 
born. Gender was not understood and explained in public 
discussion as a social construct of characteristics pertaining, 
in a given society, to femininity and masculinity. It was 
presented by Church hierarchy and conservative politicians 
as an ideological concept designed to ruin the traditional 
Polish family.62 ‘Gender ideology’ became a catchphrase 
for everything that the Church disliked and feared in modern 
Western societies: not only general secularisation, but also 
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women’s empowerment, LGBT rights, reproductive rights and 
even such medical procedures as IVF. Right-wing media used 
the expression to smear all activities and actions aimed at 
preventing discrimination and promoting gender equality   
in Poland. This specifically Polish definition of the term even 
became associated with alleged sexualisation of children.63 
Educational projects carried out in kindergartens in different 
parts of the country were suddenly banned because various 
media outlets presented gender equality initiatives as mixing 
up children’s sexes, making boys wear skirts and teaching 
children about sexuality. The ‘anti-gender campaign’ did not 
succeed over the Istanbul Convention – the Polish government 
eventually signed it in 2012 – but it did succeed in making 
Poles afraid of ‘gender’, especially when it came to teaching 
young people about gender equality. 
Church support for Jarosław Kaczyński played a crucial 
role in getting the Law and Justice party elected. However, 
having learnt its lessons after 2010, the Church refrained from 
being too visibly active in the 2015 electoral campaign. 
Nonetheless, Church backing secured the loyalty of 
Kaczyński’s more religiously conservative voters. Both the 
Catholic Church and Law and Justice’s traditional electorate 
knew that with the Law and Justice party back in power, 
moral issues would return to the political agenda.
Payback time – legislative process after the 
2015 parliamentary elections
Just after winning the 2015 parliamentary elections, the   
Law and Justice party’s balancing act between its hard-core 
voters and the new, more moderate ones came to an end. The 
Law and Justice party found itself under pressure from the 
Catholic Church and Church-based civil society groups,   
who felt it was payback time for their electoral support.   
Since the party gained an absolute majority in the legislature 
and did not need any coalition to form the government,   
the process of transforming the country – the so-called   
‘good change’ – could be officially launched and moral  
issues returned. 
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In order to understand the process that had began in 
2016, we shall explain the so-called ‘abortion compromise’   
that existed in the country since 1993. Access to legal abortion 
had been seriously restricted in Poland after the political 
transformation of 1989. Before the adoption of the 1993 Family 
Planning Act, in line with standard practice across Europe, 
women in Poland had been legally entitled to access abortion 
services on request. Restriction of abortion law was proposed 
by the Catholic Church and supported by politicians from   
the former democratic opposition. The Church was successful 
as many of those opposed to abortion were Catholic, and   
also – even mainly – because the Catholic Church had an 
important role in the democratic transition.64 Further, 
women’s position just after the democratic transition was 
weak, even though they had actively participated in the 
opposition movement. 
Solidarity’s female activists did not present their 
interests from a gender perspective, which contributed 
significantly to the deterioration of women’s position in society 
after 1989 in various aspects (eg reproductive rights, political 
presence, labour market participation). The 1993 Family 
Planning Act was without doubt a symptom of a cultural 
backlash regarding women’s rights and constituted the 
so-called ‘abortion compromise’, which has been shaping 
the discourse on reproductive rights in Poland for decades. 
The Act permits termination of pregnancy in three cases 
only,65 so even before the Law and Justice party came to 
power, Poland – alongside Ireland and Malta – had the 
most strict abortion law in Europe. 
In practice, even women who do meet the requirements 
for legal termination of pregnancy are generally not able to 
access abortion services in the public health care system.66 
The highly restrictive nature of the law regulating abortion, 
and the punitive and stigmatising environment around 
abortion, undermine effective implementation of Poland’s 
abortion law, and there is no effective regulation of   
conscience-based refusals of care by doctors. All the  
above-mentioned factors, accompanied by the absence of any 
semblance of guidelines and procedures that would facilitate 
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women’s access to legal abortion services, leave women who 
want to terminate pregnancy but do not fall into the 
exceptional circumstances mentioned with three choices: 
undergo clandestine, and potentially unsafe, abortion in 
Poland; source safe and legal abortion services in another 
country at their own expense; carry an unwanted pregnancy 
to term. 
According to various estimates, up to 100,000 Polish 
women each year undergo abortion in private clinics, using 
pills imported from abroad or by travelling to countries where 
abortion is legal and safe. The high cost of obtaining a safe 
abortion divides society into those who can afford to have 
a choice over their reproductive rights and those who are 
deprived of it.
The ‘abortion compromise’ was clearly not a real 
compromise. It was a solution dictated by an influential 
minority to all Polish women, the majority of whom had more 
liberal views at the time.67 However, it was also clear at the 
beginning of the 1990s that the Church’s hierarchy would not 
stop there. Looking at opinion polls, one would conclude that 
over the last two decades many in Polish society got used to 
that ‘compromise’. According to a survey carried out in April 
2016 by the Public Opinion Research Center, the majority of 
Poles support upholding the current ‘abortion compromise’.68 
They consider it should be permitted to terminate pregnancy 
in the three cases that are currently legal: when the pregnancy 
poses a threat to the life (84 per cent) or health (76 per cent) of 
a mother, when it is a result of rape (74 per cent) and when the 
foetus is seriously damaged (60 per cent). About 80 per cent 
are against legalising abortion on demand, or if a woman has 
a difficult economic or personal situation; 11 per cent of Poles 
think it should be legal to terminate pregnancy for 
socioeconomic reasons. Respondents’ religious practices are 
the greatest influence on their opinion about abortion law. 
In July 2016 the citizen’s bill entitled ‘Stop Abortion’, 
prepared by the ultra-conservative organisation Ordo  
Iuris, was introduced into parliament. This success of the   
anti-abortion organisations and the Catholic Church was 
preceded by collecting signatures, which eventually amounted 
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to almost half a million.69 This draft law was aimed at 
introducing a total ban on abortion in Poland. It prohibits 
termination of pregnancy that occurs as a result of rape  
or a pregnancy that poses a threat to the life of the   
pregnant woman, and also termination of seriously ill, 
deformed foetuses. The proposed legal changes   
criminalise the intentional termination of pregnancy and 
miscarriage by putting such cases under investigation by  
the public prosecutor.70 
Parallel to the ‘Stop Abortion’ draft law, and probably 
inspired to a certain extent by this ultra-conservative move,  
the collection of signatures supporting another citizen’s bill 
was initiated. The counter-proposal of the Legislative Initiative 
Committee ‘Save Women’ was aimed at liberalising abortion 
law in Poland and included proposals to provide access to  
legal and safe abortion, provide high-quality health care at 
all stages of pregnancy, give access to modern contraceptive 
methods, and teach sex education in public schools. The 
introduction of this draft would bring Poland more in line   
with the stance of other European countries on abortion. 
Although the government had promised to discuss all citizens’ 
bills at a first reading, even those it opposed on moral grounds, 
only the ‘Stop Abortion’ project was passed on to be processed 
further by the Justice and Human Rights Committee in the 
Sejm on 23 September. The counter-proposal ‘Save Women’ 
was rejected at the first reading. Not only did the Law and 
Justice party show it didn’t treat citizens’ legal initiatives 
equally, but it also confirmed that its members were ready to 
undo the so-called ‘compromise’. It was too much to accept 
for Polish women.
Mainstreaming feminism? Women’s resistance 
to the conservative backlash
Many women objected to the radicalisation of the already 
restrictive anti-abortion law, and on 3 October 2016 (‘Black 
Monday’) there was the first mass mobilisation of Polish 
women in defence of their rights. The National Women’s  
Strike was initially a social media phenomenon, and political 
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commentators did not expect it to turn into such a success. 
The number of participants and their geographical spread 
surpassed the expectations of the organisers themselves.71 The 
Black Monday protests gathered around 100,000 participants 
not only in urban agglomerations but also in smaller towns.72 
The support for the women’s strike could probably have been 
even greater had it not been almost impossible to protest 
openly in smaller towns on a working day.73 It is also 
noteworthy that on Black Monday Polish streets were filled 
with women (as well as men and children) of different ages 
and levels of education, from different parts of the country, 
representing various backgrounds and moral beliefs. The 
protest was followed by a debate at the European Parliament 
and solidarity actions in many locations across the globe.
The key to the success of the Black Monday protest was 
the radicalism of the proposed law, which mobilised those 
women who in other circumstances would not have left their 
homes to protest on the streets. However, the organisers of   
the strike emphasised that they were not fighting for the 
liberalisation of the law, nor in favour of the status quo.   
What brought all those women together was the threat of 
radicalisation of the anti-abortion law. 
The Black Monday protest affected opinion polls on 
reproductive rights. In the middle of preparations for the 
massive mobilisation, OKO Press commissioned a survey 
on Poles’ approach to existing legal regulations of abortion.74 
It found there was a growing number of Poles who declared 
themselves in favour of liberalising existing abortion laws. 
Polish society appeared to have become increasingly liberal in 
the months since the survey carried out by the Public Opinion 
Research Center.75 The poll found that 39 per cent of women 
and 35 per cent of men considered it should be legal to 
terminate pregnancy because of a woman’s difficult life 
situation. Support for radicalising existing abortion laws 
remained at about 10–12 per cent. Future surveys will 
demonstrate whether Polish people’s views on abortion are 
really becoming more liberal. It is clear, though, that the 
women’s protest was widely supported in Poland. According 
to an Ipsos opinion poll, around 50 per cent of respondents 
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supported the protest against a total ban on abortion. 
Only 14 per cent of Poles declared themselves against 
Black Monday.76 
Just three days after the women’s protests, the Justice and 
Human Rights Committee of the Polish Sejm, dominated by 
Law and Justice MPs, reacted negatively to the ‘Stop Abortion’ 
draft law, rejecting the citizen’s bill in a night-time session of 
parliament on 6 October. The Polish and international media 
announced the victory of the women’s movement.77 The 
massive mobilisation of Polish women proved that the feminist 
movement in Poland is not as weak as many tend to think. 
It also showed that values, and not only economic factors, 
can play a crucial role in shaping politics. The impact of the 
mobilisation on the women’s movement in Poland much 
depends on the future decisions of the government. Just after 
Black Monday, Prime Minister Beata Szydło announced Law 
and Justice’s project for the ‘protection of life’ and for support 
of those pregnant women who decide to give birth to a 
severely disabled child. At the beginning of November 2016 
the president signed a new law, whereby mothers who give 
birth to severely disabled children will receive a one-time 
benefit of 4,000 PLN (around €900). Two days later she 
declared that the current abortion law was not protecting 
children with disabilities enough, so the ‘abortion 
compromise’ was not sufficient. It seems clear that the 
government will now aim to introduce new restrictions on 
reproductive rights and other women’s rights. The populist 
backlash against women and the culture war will continue, 
because they lie at the heart of Law and Justice ideology.
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   Conclusions – resilience 
and resistance to 
populism in power
One of the received theories on the rise of authoritarian 
populism across the Western world is that populism is 
a response to growing social inequality, a product of a 
neoliberal ‘Washington consensus’ predominant after 1989 
and resulting in the financial and economic crisis of 2008. 
What makes this theory plausible is that populism draws its 
support from the less affluent and less educated sections of 
society, especially men, whose economic position has become 
precarious in the globalised post-industrial economy. 
However, this theory of the ‘mobilisation of the dispossessed’ 
has limited explanatory power. As Pippa Norris pointed out: 
Populist authoritarian leaders have arisen in several affluent 
post-industrial ‘knowledge’ societies, in cradle-to-grave welfare 
states with some of the best-educated and most secure populations in 
the world, like Sweden and Denmark – where you’d expect social 
tolerance and liberal attitudes instead of xenophobic appeals.78
As we argue in this case study, the rise of authoritarian 
populism in Poland can serve as an argument that the 
‘inequality’ theory has limited explanatory value. The Law 
and Justice victory in Poland came about during a period of 
stable economic development, falling unemployment and a 
reduction in poverty rates. The level of inequality, as measured 
by the standard Gini coefficient, puts Poland close to the EU 
average, worse than the egalitarian Nordic countries but 
better than the UK and crisis-stricken southern members   
such as Greece. We can only conclude that inequality and 
socioeconomic deprivation, while definitely creating fertile 
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grounds for the rise of authoritarian populism, nevertheless 
fail to explain its political success in particular countries, such 
as Poland. 
The rise of authoritarian populism in Poland cannot be 
explained by reference to the ‘fear of globalisation’. According 
to the Demos survey, Poles are among the most enthusiastic 
supporters of globalisation of any group in the sample. 
Interestingly, in this case both the supporters of the populist 
Law and Justice party and those of the conservative–liberal 
Civic Platform tend to see more benefits then threats resulting 
from globalisation. The same can be said about European 
integration, where the Polish public has been firmly 
supporting Polish EU membership since the country joined 
the EU in May 2004. As we demonstrated, support for the 
Law and Justice party’s ‘soft Euroscepticism’, largely fuelled 
by opposition to a refugee quota system, is mainly a   
post-election phenomenon, driven by the successful exercise   
of the politics of fear by the government.
All in all, the analysis of the Polish case prompts us to 
agree with Pippa Norris, who argues that ‘authoritarianism 
can best be explained as a cultural backlash in Western 
societies against long-term, ongoing social change’.79   
Poland has undergone very intensive social and cultural 
change since the breakup of the communist regime in 1989 
and especially since it joined the EU in 2004. Integration with 
the Western political and economic structures as well as the 
opening up of the borders (visas to most West European 
countries were abolished in 1991/92) has resulted in a quarter 
of a century of sustained economic development and vast 
investment in infrastructure (fuelled by EU structural funds) 
but also diffusion of liberal social norms and modes. After 
2007, under the central-right government, many ideas and 
policies once promoted by relatively marginal groups of 
feminist and LGBT activists have become mainstreamed even 
if they have not always managed to influence legislation. 
Although most Poles formally remained members of the 
Roman Catholic Church, studies show a growing social  
and political divide along moral–cultural rather than 
socioeconomic issues.80 
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The rise of authoritarian populism should be seen 
as a reaction to these liberal tendencies. Although the Law 
and Justice party was elected on the ticket of generous 
socioeconomic promises, its dominant position on the right 
wing of the political spectrum and resilience after years in 
opposition came from its strong adherence to identity and 
sovereignty issues and a mutually exclusive alliance with the 
Polish Catholic Church. The refugee crisis, and especially 
the controversial policy of the European Commission for 
mandatory quotas of Syrian refugees for each member  
state, in a matter of months brought about an upsurge of 
xenophobia, which in turn made the Polish brand of populism 
rather similar to its West European counterparts. More 
troubling for Law and Justice propagandists are the 
ideological parallels between their conservative agenda and 
the Kremlin’s promotion of anti-liberal and anti-European 
counter-norms that emphasise ‘state security, civilisational 
diversity and traditional values’.81 
The victory of Kaczyński’s party would not have been 
possible without the creation of a highly effective ‘anger 
industry’, which fed on the many discontents of different social 
groups. Traditional and internet-based right-wing media 
contributed to the creation of a ‘parallel reality’ of ‘Poland in 
ruin’, where indignation at alleged economic downturn, social 
injustices and political malpractices allowed the dismissal and 
side-lining of experts and moderate political voices as agents 
of the purportedly intolerable status quo.82 The Polish 
populist victory can thus be seen as an exemplification of what 
was aptly termed post-truth politics, mastered by Putin’s 
propaganda machine, for domestic and international 
purposes, but also present in Donald Trump’s successful bid 
for the US presidency and the UK’s ‘Leave’ campaign during 
the Brexit referendum. After the elections and the assault on 
public media, the politics of parallel reality has gained access 
to public resources, reminding many older Poles of the 
‘unreality’ of state media, especially television, under the 
communist regime.
At the same time, Kaczyński’s brutal attack against 
the Constitutional Tribunal and his inflammatory rhetoric 
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has generated an unprecedented response from civil society 
as well as general support for democracy as the best form of 
government. The government takes advantage of the good 
state of the economy by implementing expensive social 
programmes to prop up its popularity, and by using public 
resources to fund sympathetic media and non-governmental 
organisations. The opposition has mobilised government 
critics by organising successful street protests and building 
up presence on social media. International criticism, either 
from Europe or the USA – although dismissed by government 
propagandists – has also contributed to maintaining the 
opposition’s resilience and determination. 
At the time of finalising this report (in January 2017) 
the political conflict in Poland has entered a new, more radical 
phase. The Constitutional Tribunal has finally been brought 
under the control of the ruling party. At the same time 
members of the two main opposition parties launched an 
unprecedented sit-in in the main debating chamber to protest 
against restricting media access to parliament and the 
arbitrary exclusion of members of the opposition during   
key debates and breaches of parliamentary procedures by the 
speaker. Outside parliament protests continued throughout 
the Christmas 2016 recess, with occasional interventions from 
the police against the protesters. Kaczyński, who controls the 
key institutions of government, including the president, has 
declared that his opponents attempted a ‘putsch’ against the 
legally elected government and threatened the protesters with 
criminal proceedings. The spectre of autocracy, which has 
been hanging over Poland since the 2015 election, seems to 
have materialised rapidly.83 
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Introduction
In Swedish migration and asylum politics 2015 and 2016 were 
turbulent years, with a rapid move from mass demonstrations 
welcoming refugees, including speeches by the prime   
minister, to the largest asylum seeker inflow in history,   
to border closure. Support for the Sweden Democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna), an anti-immigration party, has 
fluctuated since 2015, as asylum policies have moved towards 
their position. Yet it has been constantly above the party’s 
2014 general election result, which was an all-time high. Public 
debate also appears to have taken a nationalist turn. Previous 
research shows that exclusive forms of national identity are 
strong explanatory factors of attitudes to immigration. In this 
study we are interested in whether narratives on national 
identity in Sweden have been exclusionary during this 
turbulent time. 
We begin with a short historic overview of Sweden 
as an immigration country, giving key statistics and useful 
background knowledge about recent changes in party politics 
and policies. In order to investigate recent narratives on 
national identity and how they relate to public opinion, 
we then undertake a mixed method design, where we combine 
a qualitative analysis of speeches by political party leaders 
with a quantitative analysis of new public opinion survey 
data.1 The combination of methods enables us to examine 
the elite discourses on national identity by political party, 
and public understanding of national identity by party 
preferences, and the consequences of such understanding. 
The chapter ends with a short summary of our findings. 
Themes to be explored in this case study are party politics, 
policy, narrative, rhetoric and identity.
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Key statistics for Sweden
During the last 150 years Sweden has gone from being 
a country of emigration to a country of immigration. After 
the Second World War net immigration to Sweden started to 
increase, although as a percentage of the population it was   
still fairly low. However, in 2015, 1.6 million of Sweden’s 
population were born abroad, which was a little over 16 per 
cent of the population.2
Figure 1   Net immigration to Sweden, 1860–2000
Source: Migrationsinfo.se.
The Second World War led to an increase in refugees 
to Sweden, mainly from the Baltic and Nordic countries, 
Germany and Poland.3 After the Second World War there 
was a labour shortage in Swedish industry, which had not 
been damaged by the war, and this contributed to an influx 
of labour migrants in the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1960s 
regulation of labour migration tightened and in the mid-1970s 
the Swedish labour market transitioned, as industry made way 
for a rapidly growing service sector. This meant that new 
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migrants came mainly as family members of settled migrants 
or as refugees.4 Th is is still the case today: family reunifi cation 
and people seeking international protection are the most 
common categories to seek resident permits. (Nordic and EU 
citizens are not included, since they do not need a permit to 
come to Sweden.)5 Figure 1 shows the net immigration to 
Sweden between 1860 and 2000.
Figure 2  Asylum applications to Sweden, 2013–2016
Source: Migrationsinfo.se.
Since 2000, the number of asylum seekers to Sweden 
has increased from 16,000 to 50,000 a year (with some 
variations over time).6 Th e number of people applying for 
asylum in Sweden reached historically high levels in 2014 
and 2015, mainly due to the war in Syria and the diffi  cult 
situation in refugee camps in nearby countries. Th e high 
numbers were also related to the increased repression in 
Somalia, and instability in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
neighbouring countries in the Middle East. Th e lack of an 
adequate European burden-sharing response to the refugee 
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crises also contributed to the number of people coming 
to Sweden.7 Over 160,000 persons applied for asylum in 
Sweden in 2015, of which about 50,000 were from Syria, 
about 40,000 from Afghanistan and 20,000 from Iraq. 
Some 35,000 were unaccompanied minors, of whom 23,000 
were from Afghanistan.8 In 2016, the number of asylum 
applications to Sweden dropped dramatically, primarily 
an effect of the EU–Turkey agreement, increased border 
controls in many EU countries and far-reaching changes 
to Swedish asylum policies. In 2016, only 28,930 persons 
applied for asylum in Sweden (figure 2).9
Recent policy changes
In recent years Sweden has introduced several policy 
changes as a way of limiting the number of people seeking 
asylum. The current government introduced ID checks on 
most forms of transport, temporary border controls and new 
temporary asylum and family reunification legislation. 
As a part of EU regulations, Sweden for many years 
had so-called ‘transporter’s liability’ for airline companies with 
flight routes to Sweden, whereby airline companies had a duty 
to verify the identity of any customers travelling with them. 
However, in January 2016 ID checks (transporter’s liability) 
were introduced on trains, buses and ferries. All transport 
companies have to check the identification papers of all 
passengers travelling with their specific transportation, and 
failure to do so results in a considerable fine. These checks 
take place before passengers reach the Swedish border, and 
they have recently been extended until at least the beginning 
of 2017.10 
Additionally, in the fall of 2015, temporary border 
controls were introduced. The official reason for this given 
by the government was that it was necessary for internal 
security and public order.11 The border controls take place 
on Swedish territory and are conducted by the police at 
selected locations around Sweden, in the south and on the 
west coast (train stations and ports). Every person passing 
through these checks needs to be able to prove their identity. 
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Citizens from outside the EU are also required to show a valid 
residence permit.12 
If approved by the European Council and the European 
Commission, the government has the option to extend the 
temporary border controls for three months at a time. On 
11 November 2016, a new three-month period was initiated. 
The government argued that the threat to internal security 
still remained, and so long as other EU countries were not able 
to agree on a burden-sharing solution and securing the 
external EU border, Sweden was forced to extend national 
border controls.13 Another reason given for extending the 
border controls was to limit secondary movement of refugees 
who are already in the EU. 
The three most substantial changes in the new temporary 
asylum and family reunification legislation are explained 
below. First, there are now only three categories of protection 
in Sweden (instead of five): 
 · protection according to the Geneva Convention on   
refugees subsidiary protection according to international  
and EU legislation
 · quota refugees via the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)
The two categories (‘otherwise in need of protection’ 
and ‘particularly distressing circumstances’) which related 
specifically to Swedish legislation, are not a part of or have 
been restricted in the new temporary asylum legislation. The 
new temporary legislation is designed to provide the lowest 
level of protection possible without violating international 
and EU law.
Second, temporary permits are now the standard permit 
granted to refugees, except quota refugees, who are still 
granted permanent resident permits.14 Until October 2015, 
permanent permits were standard for most refugees in 
Sweden. With the new temporary legislation, refugees, both 
adults and minors, are granted either a three-year permit 
(under the Geneva Convention) or 13-month permit (under 
subsidiary protection).
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Third, restrictions on family reunification have been 
put in place with the new asylum policy. Refugees with a 
subsidiary protection permit are only allowed to bring family 
members to live in Sweden in exceptional cases. This affects 
a large number of people, since the majority of the Syrian 
refugees are included in this protection category. The 
government has also introduced a more extensive liability to 
be able to provide for a family member of an existing refugee 
who wants to come to live in Sweden (Geneva Convention 
refugees are exempted if they apply for family reunification 
within three months of receiving their own permit). 
The main criticism of the new legislation has been that it 
was prepared hastily. As a result, it lacks an impact assessment 
of the legal difficulties that could arise and consideration of 
how the new changes will affect people’s opportunities to 
integrate into society. The fact that many residence permits 
will only be awarded one year at a time will complicate the 
situation for housing, employment and education. The 
introduction of ID checks has been heavily criticised because 
the long-term effects for the greater Copenhagen region 
(Copenhagen and the south of Sweden) have not been 
assessed.15 A recent report by the Swedish National Audit 
Office concluded that the evaluation of the effects of the 
border controls was not adequate. By extension, the basis 
for the decision to prolong the border controls was also 
not sufficient.16 
Some of the recent changes, such as making temporary 
permits standard, were a part of an agreement made by all 
the political parties in the parliament (except the Sweden 
Democrats and the Left party) in the fall of 2015, although the 
more extensive changes made by the government since then 
(eg more restrictive family reunification regulations and fewer 
exemptions to temporary permits) have been criticised by 
some of the parties who were a part of the initial agreement. 
Even though it is temporary legislation, which will only apply 
for three years, the legislation could become permanent. 
The Moderate party (Moderaterna), the second biggest party 
in the parliament, have supported the idea and have already 
announced that they will continue to do so if they win the 
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2018 elections. The Sweden Democrats and the Christian 
Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) have also supported 
a proposal that the temporary legislation should 
become permanent.17 
Party politics – an overview 
Sweden has long been seen as the exception to other 
countries in Europe, where there is growing support for 
populist anti-immigration parties. This changed with the 
2010 elections, when the anti-immigrant party Sweden 
Democrats gained enough electoral support to enter the 
Swedish parliament. This was much later than in neighbouring 
countries, such as Denmark and Norway, and many other 
European countries, where anti-immigrant parties have 
influenced national politics for much longer. So why was 
Sweden the exception for so long? 
Jens Rydgren has argued that four key factors 
serve to explain why Sweden held out against populist 
anti-immigration parties for so long, and significant changes 
to these factors can consequently explain why this is no 
longer the case:
 · Sweden used to be characterised by strong class-based voting. 
 · Socioeconomic issues used to dominate the political debate 
and agenda. 
 · The left–right divide between the political parties was 
perceived clearly by voters. 
 · The Sweden Democrats were considered too extreme.18 
Thus the decline in class-based voting, increasing salience 
of sociocultural political issues, party convergence towards 
the centre and the distancing of Sweden Democrats from   
their neo-Nazi past have all contributed to the success of 
the Sweden Democrats. 
The 2014 election produced a hung parliament, where 
the now sizeable Sweden Democrats (13 per cent) held the 
swing vote. In order to avoid a re-election and a parliamentary 
situation in which the government had to rely on support from 
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the Sweden Democrats, a cross-party agreement was made 
between all parties apart from the Left party and Sweden 
Democrats. This agreement allowed the minority  
government, a coalition between the Social Democrats 
(Socialdemokraterna) and the Green party (Miljöpartiet de 
gröna), to get its budget passed in parliament. The agreement 
was formally abandoned in October 2015.
While the opposition is still allowing the Social 
Democrats–Green Party government to govern, much of 
the political debate in Sweden is devoted to the question 
of how a majority government may be formed after the 2018 
election. The most controversial issue is whether any of the 
mainstream parties are to break the taboo and seek some form 
of cooperation with the Sweden Democrats in order to govern. 
While most parties are still fiercely against this, statements by 
leaders and representatives of the Moderate party, the 
Christian Democrats and the Liberal party (Liberalerna, 
previously Folkpartiet) have suggested that they may be 
willing to negotiate with Sweden Democrats in the future.19 
A recent poll also suggests that the voters for these parties are 
the most positive about having some form of cooperation with 
Sweden Democrats.20 In recent polls, support for the Sweden 
Democrats stands at 18 per cent.21
In short, Swedish immigration politics has changed 
substantially and rhetorically in the past few years, with 
asylum policies taking a restrictive turn following a large 
influx of asylum seekers, support for the Sweden Democrats 
rocketing and immigration taking an uncharacteristically but 
seemingly unmovable central position on the political agenda. 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of Swedish people who 
think immigration is one of the two most important issues 
facing Sweden between 2005 and 2016, and the proportion 
who thought it was the single most important issue the 
country faced between 1987 and 2014.
383
Figure 3  The proportion of Swedish people who think immigration 
is one of the two most important issues facing Sweden, 
1987–2014 and 2005–2016
Source: SOM, 2015; Eurobarometer interactive database, Jan 2017.22
We now look at some of the political rhetoric and public 
opinion that is part of this shift. 
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1   Identity and political 
narratives – a theoretical 
background 
One of the noticeable changes in the political debate on 
immigration in Sweden is the increasing focus on national 
identity. In order to understand and explain attitudes to 
immigration, much of the research literature has focused 
on the ways in which native citizens perceive immigration as 
a ‘threat’. For example, citizens may worry that immigration 
threatens the country’s economy. Yet one of the key drivers 
of attitudes to immigration has been shown to be of a 
symbolic nature, with perceived threats to one’s culture and 
national identity often lying at the heart of negative attitudes 
to immigration.23 However, the relationship between national 
identity and attitudes to immigration is complicated by the 
kind of national identity citizens have. 
The main theoretical distinction in forms of national 
identity is between on the one hand ‘thick’, ‘ethnic’ or 
‘cultural’ forms, and on the other more ‘thin’ or ‘civic’ forms 
of national identity.24 The ethnic aspect is characterised by 
ascribed or objective features, such as country of birth, and 
the dominant religious faith. The civic or voluntaristic   
aspect includes a community of laws and institutions and a 
minimum of common values, traditions or sentiments that 
binds people together. 
National identity is both a property of groups as 
well as an individual sentiment, or affiliation with the nation. 
On a societal level national identity is the shared belief in 
having something in common with others who live in the same 
society. National identity is an independent force that binds 
people together. The understanding of national identity as a 
collective property is widely shared in historical and political 
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science: national identity is typically seen as a collective 
cultural identity,25 which serves as a focal point for the 
definition of the in group and out group, and as a 
precondition of state formation. 
National identity is also an individual sentiment that 
people develop towards the nation, where it is an important 
part of individual identity formation.26 It is a way for 
individuals to understand who they are, in relation to others. 
On the individual level, national identity derives its power 
from providing a clear distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
This relationship exists irrespective of whether those ‘others’ 
are situated within or outside the state borders. National 
identity in this regard is the individual’s alliance with a 
specific community or nation. This alliance with the nation 
can vary across nations as well as between individuals of the 
same nation and can comprise ethnic and civic aspects. The 
quantitative part of the chapter will hence focus on national 
identity as a sentiment and the consequences 
of such sentiments.
There is no clear-cut division, or mutual exclusion, 
between ethnic or civic national identity on the societal level 
or individual level. As research has repeatedly shown, these 
two aspects of collective national identity are two different 
dimensions of attachment that are realised at the same time 
rather than mutually exclusive categories. Given the divergent 
connotations each of these forms of national identity has, 
corroborated in previous research,27 we know that ethnic 
national identity tends to go together with more opposition 
towards immigration, as the ethnic version of identity is more 
exclusive than a civic national identity. However, it is possible 
that the relationship between national identity and   
anti-immigrant attitudes differs across different groups, for 
example, those dependent on the salience of these issues 
within different groups of people.
As many have observed, contemporary political rhetoric 
on national identity and immigration in Western Europe tends 
to use civic components in exclusionary ways.28 Liberal, 
universal values have not only become part of the exclusionary 
rhetoric of the populist radical right,29 but also increasingly 
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among mainstream politicians. When such values are 
‘nationalised’, described as an essential part of the inherited 
culture of the majority, immigrants may be perceived as a 
threat to such values by not sharing the national, majority 
culture. Immigrants, in particular Muslims, are portrayed 
as incapable of adopting liberal ‘Western’ values owing to 
their cultural differences in a way that turns civicness into 
a tool of exclusion.30 
This trend of blurring civic and ethnic components in 
exclusionist narratives about immigration has been observed 
to some extent at the elite level as well as in public opinion. 
The relationship between these two levels of constructing 
national identity is hotly debated: whether national identity 
is a ‘top-down’ or a ‘bottom-up’ construction, or a combination 
of both. Studies on the extent to which elite rhetoric overlaps 
with and/or drives public opinion on national identity have 
had somewhat mixed results.31 Therefore, at a time of 
turbulence when narratives on national identity and 
immigration in public discourse are both changing and 
becoming increasingly politicised, we believe it is fruitful to 
study elite narratives and public opinion in conjunction. 
Sweden, we suggest, is in the midst of such turbulence. 
Swedish national identity
Sweden has been described as a country where nationalistic 
sentiments are generally low, where national belonging rests 
on civic criteria and where, possibly as a consequence, 
attitudes towards immigrants are comparatively positive and 
citizenship legislation is mainly liberal.32 Political and social 
institutions, or ‘the system’ as they are commonly referred to, 
are cornerstones of Swedes’ national self-understanding, which 
may also have led to them having comparatively favourable 
views on immigration, as, for example, failed integration is 
blamed on welfare institutions rather than on immigrants 
themselves.33 But Swedish nationalism has also been centred 
on the concept of Folkhemmet (the People’s Home), through 
which the universal welfare state and national solidarity are 
seen as mutually reinforcing. 
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During the refugee crisis of 2015, public institutions 
came under strain, with many commentators speaking of a 
‘system collapse’ and a threat to the welfare state. It is easy to 
see how this may have been perceived as a threat to the nation. 
Since at least 2002, when the Liberal party proposed 
a Swedish language test as a precondition for citizenship, 
issues of Swedishness and national belonging have become 
an increasingly prominent part of public discourse and 
symbolism. For example, the Swedish National Day was   
made a public holiday in 2005 and has gone from being an   
awkward non-celebration to an increasingly popular public 
festivity. Discussions of national identity became much more 
prominent from 2015 onwards in relation to the refugee crisis. 
The issues were varied. For example, much debate erupted 
after a performance of the Swedish national anthem during 
the Eurovision Song Contest 2016, during which the singers 
had added Swedish folk songs translated into Arabic and 
Hebrew. Other controversial issues included a row around a 
Muslim politician who declined to shake a female journalist’s 
hand, multiple sexual assaults at music festivals, possibly by 
refugees and asylum seekers, and the decision by the 
management of several public swimming pools to offer 
designated female-only hours in response to requests from 
some Muslims. Many of these issues were ultimately linked to 
the supposed differences in culture and values between native 
Swedes and refugees.34 
Thus Swedish political discourse has shifted towards 
questions of national identity and how immigrants need to 
assimilate into Swedish culture and adopt Swedish values. 
Some of this discourse has also been linked to the welfare 
state. Immigration has been portrayed as a potential threat 
to the social contract allegedly underpinning the Swedish 
welfare state. A simple search at the media archive Retriever 
reveals that ‘Swedish values’ was mentioned over 1,600 times 
in Swedish media during 2016. In comparison, the highest 
number of mentions of the phrase in previous years was in 
2012, when it was used 286 times. Similarly, in 2015 and 2016 
there was a large increase in mentions of words such as ‘social 
contract’, ‘integration’, ‘Swedish culture’35 and ‘immigration’.36 
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What are the consequences of this change in the public 
debate? At first glance, Sweden appears to have moved closer 
to the discourse of its Danish neighbour, where liberalism 
is embedded within a national culture, in a potentially 
exclusionary way.37 As discussed earlier, even within the 
parameters of a civic national identity, questions of values 
and culture can be discussed and intertwined in such a way 
as to construct an exclusionary discourse. It has been 
suggested that it is not the content or the symbolic resources 
of national identity that are exclusionary or inclusionary, but 
rather the way in which political actors use such content or 
symbolic resources as boundary mechanisms.38 In discussing 
the inclusionary or exclusionary tendencies of national 
identity, the content of that identity is certainly important, 
but it may be equally important to understand how it is used 
as a mechanism for exclusion or inclusion. 
For example, comparing political debates in Norway 
and Denmark, Jensen shows how in both countries national 
identity at the individual level is seen as deterministic, ‘deeply 
rooted’ in the individual and therefore difficult to change.39 
This renders national identity as a whole exclusive, as it is 
made difficult for an immigrant to become fully Danish or 
Norwegian. However, whereas in Denmark national identity 
at the collective level is also seen as deterministic, ‘fixed, stable 
and closed for change’, in Norway national identity is seen as 
something open for democratic debate.40 As a result, the 
Norwegian understanding of national identity becomes 
potentially less exclusionary, as national identity can be 
re-imagined as the country and its demographics change. 
In a similar vein, Rostbøll argues in a discussion of the 
Danish cartoon controversy that liberal principles became 
exclusionary in that debate because they were ‘presented as 
so entangled in Danish culture that in order to understand 
and accept them, one must understand Danish history and 
assimilate into Danish culture’.41 Muslims, in this case, were 
seen at times as so culturally different that they would not 
be able to adhere to these values.42 
The example of the Danish cartoons further highlights 
the role of culture in constructing difference between natives 
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and immigrants even when supposedly universal liberal 
values are at stake. When certain shared values are seen as 
entrenched in a national culture, national identity functions 
in an exclusionary way, in particular when immigrants are 
perceived as culturally distant. This is because the supposedly 
voluntaristic aspects of national identity – values – are turned 
into deterministic aspects – cultural traits deeply entrenched 
in someone’s identity. 
Have narratives of Swedishness, too, taken such an 
exclusive turn? To answer that question, we will analyse 
political rhetoric on national identity and immigration in 
the summer of 2016. That summer was a particularly turbulent 
time, with national identity at the fore of the political debate, 
following the introduction of a set of restrictive asylum 
policies in the winter of 2015. We will also analyse a new 
survey from Sweden that includes data on understandings 
of national identity as well as attitudes towards immigration 
and refugees. By analysing both elite discourses and public 
opinion we are able to examine the level and type of 
nationalism and national identity prevalent in elite discourses, 
as represented by political parties and public attitudes. 
We undertake a mixed method design, where we 
combine a qualitative analysis of speeches by political party 
leaders with a quantitative analysis of new public opinion 
survey data. This combination of elite and non-elite narratives 
of national identity allows us to provide a rich description of 
the role national identity plays in Sweden at a time when 
migration policies have taken a restrictive turn.
Elite narratives on national identity and immigration
For the qualitative analysis of elite narratives of national 
identity, we use speeches by all the party leaders of 
parliamentary parties from the politics week in Almedalen 
on 2–9 July 2016. The politics week in Almedalen is a kind of 
‘festival of politics’ taking place every year on the island of 
Gotland. It is attended by an incredibly large number of 
lobbyists, politicians, civil servants and journalists, who all 
intermingle in a uniquely open way. The festival is open to and 
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attended by the public as well. In addition to thousands of 
seminars, each day of the week is focused on a speech by one 
of the party leaders. These speeches often set out the general 
tone of the party’s political agenda and are aimed at 
mobilising voters rather than party members. The speeches are 
therefore useful indicators of the narratives party leaders wish 
to communicate to the public; while often not focused 
specifically on policies, they signal what narratives will guide 
their policy agenda. The Almedalen speeches are also a good 
data source for comparison, as all party leaders give their 
speeches during the same event, aimed at the same audience 
and under the same parameters. 
In addition to these speeches, we also analyse speeches 
held one month earlier during the Swedish National Day on 
6 June. These speeches are similarly held at around the same 
time and under the same parameters, and they also focus on 
celebrating the nation. Only two speeches were available for 
this day, but since these were the speeches by the leaders of 
the two main parties, the Social Democrats and the Moderate 
party, they represent important parts of political narratives 
during this turbulent time. 
The speeches were coded in NVivo, a software program 
for analysing whether qualitative data demonstrated 
Swedishness in inclusive or exclusive terms. Attention was 
paid to whether Swedish values were presented as culturally 
determined and immigrants as incapable of adhering to, or a 
threat to, such values because of their cultural difference. The 
main focus was on ways in which the nation, national identity 
and the national culture were used as an exclusive boundary 
mechanism or not. Linking values and culture, for example, 
and stressing the difference between natives and immigrants 
in this regard, points towards exclusive forms of narratives 
on national identity.43 In contrast, those politicians who talk 
about universal values as important for their own sake avoid 
exclusivity.44 In the next section we describe the results of 
the qualitative speech analysis. 
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2  Analysis and results
The main aim of the qualitative analysis of the narratives of 
national identity and immigration expressed by party leaders 
was to enquire whether these narratives demonstrate inclusive 
or exclusive notions of national identity. As pointed out above, 
claiming that certain values are inherently Swedish, painting 
immigrants as incapable of adopting these values and 
portraying the nation as threatened by diversity are all ways 
to construct exclusionary narratives. Such narratives were 
found to be prevalent in some of the party leaders’ speeches, 
in particular that of Jimmie Åkesson, leader of the Sweden 
Democrats, but also those of Anna Kinberg-Batra, leader   
of the Moderate party, and Ebba Busch Thor, leader of the 
Christian Democrats. 
Nationalising values and cultural difference
Unsurprisingly, exclusionary narratives were most evident 
and explicit in the speech of the Sweden Democrats leader. 
Throughout his speech, which was almost entirely dedicated 
to alleged threats to the Swedish nation brought about by 
immigration, he constructed a strong link between Swedish 
values and Swedish culture. This link is clearly deterministic, 
in that immigrants’ cultural difference is portrayed as an 
inherent threat to Swedish values and Swedish society. 
Bringing up several problems relating to sexual assault and 
other forms of crime, he connected these issues to ‘foreign 
structures and values’ and emphasised that the remedy was 
to promote Swedish culture: ‘To strengthen Swedish culture 
and Swedish values will be crucial for how we will manage 
to reduce fragmentation and segregation in the long run.’
The constant connection of culture, values and 
behaviour, coupled with the emphasis that the remedy is more 
Swedish culture, rather than a change in values and behaviour 
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among immigrants, constructs an essentialised and, to a 
large extent, deterministic understanding of culture. Since 
our moral values and behaviour become intrinsically linked 
with our cultural background, the only way for immigrants 
not to constitute a threat is to surrender their cultural identity 
and become part of the cultural Swedish national identity.
The leaders of the Moderate party and Christian 
Democrats did not express the link between culture and 
values in such explicitly exclusive terms. Perhaps predictably, 
their speeches were much subtler in this regard. Nonetheless, 
the narrative of national identity and immigration that their 
speeches constructed made this link in an exclusive way, 
primarily by emphasising certain values as national values 
and, in the case of the Christian Democrats, making an 
explicit link between such values and Swedish culture, 
suggesting that immigrants do not share these values. 
For example, when discussing the value of gender equality, 
the leader of the Moderates said:
To marry off your own daughter against her will is sometimes 
defended through freedom of religion. However, this is a misuse 
of the word freedom. To take the future away from your daughter 
– that is not freedom.
The word honour is also misused at times. Subjugation 
of the youth is sometimes justified with claims that they belong to 
an honour culture. But it has nothing to do with honour to restrict 
the members of your own family and take away their rights to their 
life and their own life choices. On the contrary, it is dishonest and 
it goes against Swedish values. 
The final remark, that the subordination is not just morally 
wrong but un-Swedish, serves to emphasise that the problem 
with certain immigrant groups is not just their values, but 
their lack of Swedishness. Because a national or cultural 
identity is often perceived as ‘stickier’ than moral values, 
when someone’s failure to adhere to certain moral values 
also becomes their failure to embrace the national culture 
they may be perceived as not susceptible to change. A similar 
link was made by the leader of the Christian Democrats when 
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she suggested that the ‘migration crisis’ was not over yet, 
because Sweden faces ‘a gigantic challenge of integration’. 
To overcome this crisis, immigrants need to learn about 
Swedish culture, which she linked to values: 
Integration – it is about jobs of course, but also about language, 
culture and values. All parts are necessary. If one part is missing, 
exclusion will grow and we risk increasing the fragmentation 
of society. 
Learning the language and civic orientation should 
be mandatory for the newly arrived from the beginning. SFI 
[Swedish For Immigrants] should start straight away. Civic 
orientation should provide information on what rights, duties 
and responsibilities you have as a newcomer in our country. 
But also on our traditions, values and customs.
The leaders of the Moderate party and Christian Democrats 
make a far subtler link between values and culture, and the 
suggestion that immigrants are causing a demise of Swedish 
values, than does the Sweden Democrats leader. The Christian 
Democrats leader coupled the nationalisation of values with 
expressions of universalism. Yet the suggestion that the way to 
remedy a lack of certain values is to strengthen Swedish 
culture contributes to an essentialist understanding of cultural 
difference that portrays immigrants as difficult to integrate 
because of their cultural heritage. 
This nationalisation of values, making values part of a 
Swedish culture and national identity in relation to perceived 
problems brought about by immigration, constructs an 
increasingly exclusive narrative of national identity. In the 
speeches this was often coupled with the suggestion that the 
nation is threatened to some extent by immigration. This was 
expressed most explicitly by the Sweden Democrats leader. In 
fact, the threat of immigration to Sweden was the main theme 
of his speech. He said that immigration, in particular asylum 
immigration, has affected the country negatively and listed 
several issues and problems that he claimed are caused by 
immigration. At the end of the speech, he spoke directly about 
the damage immigration has caused the nation and referred 
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to the ‘People’s Home’, a symbol of the Swedish nation, 
as being ‘torn apart’. 
Though far less strongly or explicitly, the leaders of 
the Moderate party and Christian Democrats nonetheless 
pointed to problems that immigration has caused or may 
cause for ‘Swedish values’ and the nation as a whole. At 
times, the party leaders further specified the values 
concerned, such as gender equality and a work ethic. For 
example, in her speech on National Day, the Moderate party 
leader talked about the importance of common Swedish 
values and suggested that such values may be challenged by 
different cultures:
Everyone has the right to believe what they want here and to 
worship any god they prefer. We also cherish democracy, equality 
and the respect for each other. In a changing society there will be 
some cultural clashes, but we will never compromise on our 
shared values. 
In the same speech, the Moderate party leader also spoke 
about a range of universal values as national values, and then 
pointed out that these may be threatened:
We know that a strong Sweden requires both stable state finances 
and stable values. It is important to have clear understandings of 
right and wrong and what unites a country and a society, not least 
when these understandings are challenged, from within or from 
the outside.
The leader of the Christian Democrats spoke throughout 
her speech about a ‘crisis of values’: 
We have much to be proud of, but there is also much that needs to 
be improved or changed. Sweden is in the midst of a crisis of values. 
Values that made our home strong, like trust, freedom and equality 
of all humans, are threatened.
Since values were linked to Swedish culture, and the need for 
immigrants to learn about Swedish culture and values was 
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emphasised, this crisis came across as being caused 
by immigration. 
This ‘nationalisation of values’ implies a form of 
cultural relativism, where the problem is not simply that 
some individuals fail to comply with universal (liberal) 
values but rather that they fail to comply with a set of national 
values. This was clearly the case when the Moderate party 
leader spoke about gender equality. Moreover, the 
nationalisation of values and the emphasis on immigrants 
as culturally different also implies that the failure of some to 
comply with universal (liberal) values is mainly due to their 
cultural difference, which contributes to an essentialist, 
deterministic understanding of cultural difference. Such 
rhetoric produces an exclusionary narrative of national 
identity, as it is difficult to overcome one’s essential and 
predetermined cultural identity. 
Lastly, the three party leaders of Sweden Democrats, 
the Moderate party and Christian Democrats were the only 
ones to emphasise the historical and ancestral nature of 
national identity. This is a common feature of nationalism, 
where the nation is seen as a family-like union extending back 
into history and forward to future generations. This renders 
the nation a unique kind of political community, as it 
encompasses a national community that includes not only 
current citizens, but also their ancestors. While this does not 
necessarily signal ethnic nationalism, coupled with a cultural 
notion of the nation it certainly brings the national 
community closer to having a more exclusive form of national 
identity. It contributes to a narrative of there being a linear 
development from ancestors to current citizens, who carry 
within them a culture grounded in its ancestral roots, which 
is potentially disturbed by immigration. 
Again, this was emphasised most strongly and explicitly 
by the Sweden Democrats leader, who even put forward the 
illiberal notion that the nation is morally greater than its 
individual members:
Our vision is built upon respect for past generations, for those that 
built this country. 
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Our vision is built on the insight that our country, our nation, 
is greater than any individual – greater than what we are today. 
Our nation, it is made up of we who are living now – but also 
– and in equal measure – of those who lived and worked here before 
us and those who will live and work after us. 
We have a responsibility to take care of what we have inherited, 
to preserve and improve it, to hand it over in good condition to 
future generations.
The Christian Democrats leader suggested that the values 
of Swedish society have been honed through generations, and 
in saying that ‘we’ have achieved these values she tied current 
generations to the idea of an ancestral nation:
We who live here shape our existence based on the foundations 
that we have inherited both from our parents and from those who 
lived here before us. Freedoms and rights that others can only 
dream about, we take for granted in our country. This is 
something we have achieved through hard and persistent work 
for a better society.
The Moderate party leader also suggested the achievements 
of the Swedish people and Sweden’s national values ought to 
be the remedy for contemporary challenges:
When Sweden is challenged, new questions face us. Then we need 
to remind ourselves of what has made us – and what will continue 
to make Sweden strong. Old Swedish values for new times. 
Of course, these were not the only party leaders to speak 
about the problems facing Sweden, but our sample includes 
only those speeches and statements that dealt directly with 
national identity, for example threats to nationalised values 
or a national culture. The leader of the Centre party talked 
extensively about issues of segregation and the lack of equality 
of opportunity in relation to immigration, but this was not 
framed in a way that framed the problems or threats as 
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directed towards Swedishness in any form. She mainly 
emphasised unemployment as a source of problems relating  
to a lack of social cohesion. Like the leader of the Moderate 
party, the leader of the Centre party also spoke about gender 
inequality and the problem of female genital mutilation, yet 
she only condemned it from the perspective of universal   
moral values:
There are clear, universal values. That persists over time, space and 
national borders. And there are values that should not be accepted 
in society. It is about what is right. And what is wrong. 
The leader of Christian Democrats made a similar point:
We should stand up for the right to be a Christian in Damascus, 
a woman in Husby,45 Jewish in Malmö and homosexual in 
Orlando. The human rights and freedoms have to apply to 
everyone. Always.
Most of the party leaders, apart from the leader of the 
Moderate party, to some extent emphasised the importance 
of universal values in themselves. For example, the leader of 
the Liberal party pointed out that liberal values in Europe 
may be threatened by xenophobic parties. Some of the party 
leaders made universal values a source of national pride. 
The prime minister to some extent nationalised the value of 
equality by emphasising that social and economic equality is 
the foundation of the ‘Swedish model’ and ‘the country that 
we love’, but he made no references to Swedish culture or any 
suggestions that immigration would damage support for 
these values. Similarly, the leader of the Green party 
emphasised Sweden’s international reputation as a champion 
of human rights. However, national pride is not necessarily 
exclusive towards immigrants. Whether or not it is depends 
on the content of national identity.46 There is a difference 
between nationalising values and expressing national pride 
because of the way one’s country safeguards or promotes 
universal values to which one has a prior commitment.47 
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3  Public opinion on 
national identity and 
immigration in Sweden
In this section we will focus specifically on political parties 
and ask if the type and consequences of national identity   
vary across voters of different political parties. 
The so-called right-wing populists have become 
increasingly nationalistic. Eger and Valdez demonstrate 
that those European parties have in recent years become 
more conservative, authoritarian and nationalistic.48 
More importantly, they also show that those who oppose 
immigration and favour welfare chauvinism are more likely 
to vote for the right-wing populist parties, which is in line with 
other research showing that people who vote for those parties 
are more averse to immigration and immigrants.49 There is 
a clear correspondence between party affiliation and voter 
preference. Given the increased emphasis on nationalist ideas 
we would expect that the supporters of right-wing populist 
parties, the Sweden Democrats in this case, would emphasise 
ethnic identity more strongly than other voters. This is because 
nationalism, or the idea of ‘one nation one people’, always 
contains an ethnic component. 
Not only do we expect Sweden Democrat voters to 
display a stronger ethnic identity than other voters in Sweden, 
we would also expect such an identity to have a different 
meaning and significance for them than it has for supporters 
of other parties. Political frameworks may influence how 
people think about a specific issue as well as adding salience 
and legitimacy to the issues at stake.50 So, if the Sweden 
Democrats combine their nationalist discourse with   
anti-immigrant rhetoric, as shown above, they provide a 
framework, an exclusive conceptualisation of the nation, 
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which leads voters to connect Swedishness with   
anti-immigration sentiments. Moreover, in strongly   
co-articulating national identity and immigration, the party 
has likely increased the salience of those issues, which may 
further strengthen the relationship between conceptions of the 
nation and anti-immigrant attitudes. Thus, we expect national 
identity and anti-immigrant attitudes to be more strongly 
correlated among Sweden Democrats voters than other voters. 
We hypothesise that ethnic identity and even civic identity 
are more exclusive for Sweden Democrats voters. 
Variables
In this section we first examine the difference in national 
identity between Sweden Democrats voters and voters for 
other political parties, then whether there is a difference in 
the relationship between national identity and anti-immigrant 
attitudes between Sweden Democrats voters and other voters. 
National identity is measured by respondents’ answers 
to the following two questions: 
Some people say that the following things are important for 
being truly Swedish. Others say they are not important. How 
important or unimportant do you think each of the following is?  
1 To have Swedish ancestry
2 To respect the political institutions of Sweden
The response scale varies from ‘very important’ to ‘not 
important at all’ on a four-point scale. Both items have been 
recoded to vary between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates a stronger 
national identity. The items used here are adopted from the 
International Social Survey Programme, where they are 
included in a longer scale (more items), but it has been shown 
that these two items capture the two dimensions in focus.51
Anti-immigrant attitudes are measured by an additive 
index of two variables: 
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On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means very bad and 10 means 
very good, would you say that people coming to live here from other 
countries has been good or bad for Sweden’s economy and Sweden’s 
cultural life?
Both items are measured on a 0–10 scale. The index was 
rescaled to vary between 0 and 10, where 10 indicates more 
negative attitudes towards immigrants. Both items come from 
the European Social Survey and are common measures of 
anti-immigrant sentiment.52 
A party preference is the party the respondents voted 
for in the last national election (2014). The parties included 
the four right-wing parties: the Moderates, the Liberals, the 
Centre Party and the Christian Democrats; the three left-wing 
parties: Social Democrats, the Left party and the Green party; 
plus the Sweden Democrats. Non-voters were excluded from 
the analyses. 
Results
Table 1 demonstrates that Sweden Democrats voters clearly 
attach more value than other voters to the ethnic dimension 
of national identity, scoring more than twice as highly as other 
voters on the 0–1 scale. Given the emphasis on the nation 
and the people among European right-wing populist parties 
this is perhaps unsurprising. All voters, regardless of party 
preferences, display a very strong sense of civic national 
identity. There are other differences across parties, with the 
voters for the Liberal and the Left parties displaying lower 
levels of ethnic identity, but those deviations are substantially 
lower than for Sweden Democrats voters. 
As pointed out above, ethnic and civic identities are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, given the very high 
prevalence of civic identity, it seems to be very rare in practice 
to have an ethnic national identity without a civic one. So 
instead of looking at the two types of identity separately we 
can combine them. We do so by classifying all people who 
agree with both items as having a multiple identity. In our 
sample, the group without a multiple identity consists almost 
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exclusively of people with a civic identity only, as there are 
no people who attach importance to the ethnic but not to the 
civic dimension of nationalism (table 2). 
Table 1   Average national identity of Swedish people,  
by party preference
Moderate 
party
Centre party Liberal party Christian 
Democrats
Ethnic identity 0.25 0.24 0.17 0.25
Civic identity 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.90
Green party Social 
Democrats
Left party Sweden 
Democrats
Ethnic identity 0.21 0.23 0.16 0.47
Civic identity 0.91 0.94 0.88 0.97
n=809
Table 2   The proportion of Swedish people with a multiple 
identity, by party preference
Moderate 
party
Centre party Liberal party Christian 
Democrats
Multiple identity 17% 17.5% 8.9% 18.5%
Green party Social 
Democrats
Left party Sweden 
Democrats
Multiple identity 12.1% 16.4% 8.3% 39.3%
n=809
As in the previous analyses, we see some differences 
across parties in that Liberal and Left voters have the lowest 
proportion of people with a multiple identity. However, 
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it is the Sweden Democrats voters who really stand out. 
We have seen that Sweden Democrats voters have a stronger 
ethnic identity and also that a multiple identity is more 
common among those voters. This leads to the conclusion 
that Sweden Democrats voters have a more exclusive sense 
of national identity than other voters. The latter is expected 
given the traditional higher emphasis on nationalism among 
right-wing populist parties in Europe and the increased 
prevalence of such articulation. 
To ensure that the correlations between party 
preference and national identity are not spurious and 
in practice dependent on variations in group dispositions, 
we also control for other variables (table 3).
Table 3   Ordinary Least Square Regression on characteristics of 
respondents, ethnic identity dependent variable (0–1)
Men .06**
Age −.001
Income −.005
Education elementary school −.003
High school (university ref category) .04
Region 
  Stockholm .03
  North Sweden .03
  North mid-Sweden −.004
  South mid-Sweden (South Sweden ref category) .03
Party preference
  Right −.22**
  Left −.25**
  Other (Sweden Democrats ref category) −.20**
*p<.05 **p<.01; n=964
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Table 3 confirms the findings in tables 1 and 2. It demonstrates 
that the effect of voting for the Sweden Democrats on having 
an ethnic identity is significantly larger than the effect of 
voting for any other party. We also see that neither education 
nor income or age significantly influence the chances of 
having an ethnic conception of national identity. Men are 
on average somewhat more likely than women to support 
ethnic nationalism. 
We also wanted to explore the extent to which those 
identities influence anti-immigrant attitudes. Does this 
influence vary according to party preference? We have 
collapsed the parties into three groups: right-wing parties 
(Moderates, the Centre party, Liberals, Christian Democrats); 
left-wing parties (Social Democrats, the Left party, Greens); 
and Sweden Democrats.
Table 4   Correlations between national identity and   
anti-immigrant attitudes in Sweden, by party preference
Right-wing 
parties
Left-wing 
parties
Sweden 
Democrats
Other 
(parties or 
non-voters)
Ethnic identity .32** .49** .34** .50**
Civic identity .04 −.01 .04 .13
Multiple identity .30** .33** .32** .35**
Civic identity only −.30** −.33** −.30** −.29**
** p<.01; n=1,007
Table 4 shows that having an ethnic or multiple national 
identity is clearly positively related to anti-immigrant 
attitudes, regardless of party preference. A civic   
national identity is on the other hand not correlated with   
anti-immigrant attitudes, because ethnic identity is not nested 
into it, in a case where civic and ethnic identity does not 
coincide. Looking at the last row, where we have excluded 
ethnic identity from the civic version, we see there is a fairly 
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strong negative correlation between civic identity and  
anti-immigrant attitudes, but still no difference by party 
preference. This implies that having a more exclusive identity, 
ethnic or a combination of ethnic and civic, has the same 
meaning across parties. So, even though Sweden Democrats 
voters display substantially higher levels of exclusive   
identities than voters from other parties, those identities  
do not have different consequences when predicting   
anti-immigrant attitudes. 
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   Summary 
and discussion
During 2015 and 2016, the political discourse on refugee 
migration and refugee policy changed dramatically in 
Sweden. In September 2015, thousands of people gathered   
in Stockholm and elsewhere under the banner ‘Refugees 
Welcome’. Prime Minister Stefan Löfven spoke in support 
of the right to asylum: ‘In my Europe, we don’t build walls. 
We offer our help when need is great.’
In October 2016, only a year later, his government 
decided to continue the new and temporary border controls 
to stem the inflow of asylum seekers. In an interview, he 
explained his reason for keeping them:
There may actually be a new massive refugee flow from Iraq. We 
need to be prepared for that. And the government has decided that 
we are not going back to the situation that we had last autumn.
This U-turn in refugee policy and rhetoric on refugee 
admission was accompanied by an increased focus on 
questions of national identity and civic integration. ‘Swedish 
values’ became one of the key terms in the immigration 
debate, in a country where nationalism used to be a political 
taboo. Our study set out to investigate the role of identity 
in constructing exclusionary rhetoric at the elite and 
non-elite level. 
Through analysing speeches by party leaders during the 
summer of 2016, we can find exclusionary nationalist rhetoric. 
For instance, the leader of the far-right Sweden Democrats 
made a speech tying values to Swedish national culture and 
heritage, and portraying immigration as a threat to the nation. 
While less articulated and much less explicit, we also found 
exclusionary rhetoric in the speeches of the leaders of the 
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Moderate party and the Christian Democrats. We find the 
language of civic integration and civic nationalism, with its 
emphasis on universal values, is in fact tied to particular 
cultural identities and traditions. Civic nationalism, often seen 
as more inclusionary, often masked a thicker cultural identity. 
Consistent with previous research, our quantitative study 
shows that such identities are clearly associated with more 
exclusionary attitudes towards immigration. Those voting 
for the Sweden Democrats were much more likely to have 
a thicker, exclusionary conception of national identity than 
voters for other parties. Interestingly, however, the effect of 
national identity on attitudes towards immigration was not 
stronger for Sweden Democrats voters. This implies that 
intensified political rhetoric on national identity and 
belonging may not make those with a thicker national 
identity even more negative towards immigration. 
The study also finds that a purely civic identity, void 
of cultural or ethnic features, is associated with more positive 
attitudes to immigration. These findings suggest that talking 
about national identity per se may not increase hostility. 
Instead, it matters hugely how we talk about national identity 
and who belongs to the nation. This may nonetheless be 
a somewhat daunting conclusion for those mainstream 
politicians who prefer to shun questions of identity altogether. 
Discussion of how to create a harmonious society amid 
deep pluralism, in part driven by immigration, was once 
dominated by advocates and critics of multiculturalism. 
Multiculturalists argued that recognition of cultural difference 
is necessary in order to guarantee equality. However, 
multiculturalism has fallen from grace in practical politics. 
It has been replaced by increasing emphasis on civic 
integrationism, contrasted with an ethnic nationalist, 
assimilationist approach. 
The civic integrationist approach, adopted by most 
countries in Europe, is inclusive on the surface. It only 
demands of immigrants that they accept political institutions, 
the constitution and some shared liberal and universal values. 
But in practice civic integrationism often ties values to an 
exclusionary group identity. The latter is exemplified in the 
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rhetoric of the Christian Democrats and the Moderates in the 
Almedalen speeches, which emphasised liberal ideas, yet also 
demanded a thick cultural understanding of who ‘we’ are. 
While multiculturalism may have failed to promote 
solidarity and inclusion, the current alternatives, too, have 
weaknesses. Civic integrationism is too often a thick form 
of identity in a liberal guise, which may ultimately strengthen 
ethnic nationalisms. This is disconcerting, as our analysis has 
shown ethnic conceptions of Swedishness go hand in hand 
with anti-immigrant sentiment. 
The emphasis in Europe on thick forms of identity is 
an awkward fit with a liberal understanding of who ‘we’   
are. What an alternative liberal understanding ought to 
consist of is an open question, however, and one that liberal 
politicians cannot afford to ignore, as nationalist accounts 
based on narrowly bounded and defined political   
communities continue to gain traction. 
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Introduction
This project has identified a wide range of fears and 
insecurities plaguing European member states and the 
continent as a whole – some of which are rooted in specific, 
practical circumstances and others which more reflect 
a particular mood, whether a sense of personal precariousness 
or national malaise. To restore the solidarity, optimism and 
support for liberalism essential to underpinning peace, 
security and openness in Europe, it is clear that citizens’ fears, 
whether based in economic ‘realities’ or social and cultural 
‘feelings’, must be taken seriously by political representatives 
at all levels – but responding to them, and rebuilding trust, 
will necessitate effective public policy initiatives and strong 
political leadership. 
Below we set out some of the core principles of 
leadership, governance and public policy-making that could 
support such renewal at EU and national levels, with 
the support of civil society and other non-governmental 
institutions (NGOs).
7 Responding to the politics of fear
1   Promote safety 
and security
Citizens across Europe are pessimistic and anxious about the 
future, and a significant minority of people feel ‘left behind’ 
by the current system. National and EU-level governments 
need to promote policies and political discourses that seek 
to allay fears, address concrete concerns and more proactively 
foster social cohesion. This requires moral and principled 
leadership on the part of political leaders, and targeted policy 
interventions to address the economic, social and cultural 
factors driving insecurity and dislocation. 
Our cross-national polling confirmed there is a 
widespread sense of pessimism, precariousness and anxiety 
across our case study countries. Some of these concerns relate 
to the economy and national security, which have continued 
to simmer or gain force since the financial crisis and the recent 
escalation of terror incidents, but others pertain more to 
feelings of social and cultural loss. It is clear that these two 
dimensions are becoming increasingly intertwined, together 
fuelling personal anxieties and a feeling that political leaders 
and institutions are no longer able to offer control and security 
to citizens.
Within each nation, our findings show that while 
feelings of insecurity and instability may be widespread, they 
are felt more strongly by certain groups – those with more 
conservative social values, and with lower income and 
education levels. Our research has therefore provided 
empirical evidence to support the concept of the 
‘left behinds’, both economically and culturally defined. 
It seems that across most of our case study countries there 
is a significant minority of the population (10–20 per cent) 
who are deeply pessimistic about the future and feel out 
of step with contemporary societal values.
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In responding to the current febrile atmosphere political 
leaders should consider the approaches discussed below.
Provide genuine moral leadership, to act 
as a stabilising and guiding hand in response 
to public anxiety and fear
The Realpolitik motivations for referendums in the UK 
and Italy have spectacularly backfired on their proponents, 
and only served to heighten civic anxiety and division. 
Furthermore, governments’ ‘adoptive’ strategy in responding 
to populist rhetoric has led mainstream parties, particularly 
in the UK and France, to foster a negative and divisive 
political discourse around issues such as immigration and EU 
integration.1 This tendency was most starkly reflected in our 
French polling, which found that twice as many people 
expected their vote to be driven by negative motivations 
(to prevent a candidate they disapprove of winning) than 
positive ones (choosing the best candidate) in the upcoming 
national elections. 
Angela Merkel’s chancellorship presents an alternative 
approach, marked by a steadfast commitment to her refugee 
policy and an assertion that ‘fear cannot be a counsel for 
political action’.2 While Merkel’s approval ratings have 
fluctuated, they still remain far ahead of her European 
counterparts.3 Clearly, the 2016 Christmas terror attack in 
Berlin represents a significant challenge to Merkel’s policies 
and approach, but again she has remained unwavering in her 
calls for national unity, based around values of openness, 
freedom and humanity.4 
While politicians must recognise that the recent populist 
uprisings reflect genuine concerns about the direction of travel 
in their country and the broader world that must be 
addressed, this should not come at the expense of principled, 
stable leadership that seeks to build long-term social and 
economic growth and enrichment. Politicians may feel they 
are representing the views of their people by bowing to 
populist rhetoric in the short term, but the fact remains that 
citizens also fundamentally expect higher moral leadership 
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from their politicians than from almost any other profession.5 
Political leaders should therefore seek to promote more 
positive and hopeful visions of the future, which can act as 
a cohesive force to build national unity. 
Deliver targeted policy interventions
These policy interventions should address the concerns of ‘left 
behind’ or vulnerable groups, and more proactively promote 
social and community cohesion. The policy response to the 
politics of fear must include initiatives that attempt to tackle 
economic insecurity and inequality directly – through 
inclusive growth strategies, education and skills investment, 
and regulatory interventions to reduce the precariousness of 
low-skilled work. However, there is also a need for a more 
proactive approach to address some of the cultural drivers of 
the politics of fear – especially, as reflected in our polling, the 
perception that immigration has not been matched by social 
integration, and that cultural pluralism is threatening long-
established, deep-rooted aspects of national identity. 
For example, the recent Casey Review in the UK has 
shone light on the UK government’s piecemeal approach to 
promoting social cohesion, and has called for greater 
government investment in English language support, social 
mixing initiatives, and the emancipation of women in 
conservative religious communities.6 Without addressing areas 
of clear failure in integration policy, the positive arguments for 
immigration, whether based on moral values or interests, 
will remain subordinate to feelings of cultural infringement 
among large minorities of citizens.
Examples of more proactive approaches to promoting 
cohesion in our case study countries often come from civil 
society initiatives. This includes Sweden’s ÖppnaDörren, 
which aims to help and encourage newcomers and more 
established Swedes to build connections and friendships, 
through dinners, monthly meetings and opportunities to build 
professional networks. Another approach, pioneered in the 
German city of Mannheim, is community dialogue – a forum 
for different sections of a diverse community to come together 
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in facilitated discussion to establish common concerns and 
priorities for the city. 
National and local governments can play a role in 
supporting and scaling effective civil society programmes, 
as well as facilitating better cross-sector working. This is 
the approach taken in the Polish city of Bialystok, which in 
response to a spike in hate crime launched a multi-agency 
initiative to tackle racism and xenophobia in the city, 
including special training for municipal police officers, 
and developed an online platform run by civil society groups 
to report racist or xenophobic graffiti. 
Support a more focused EU
There should be support for a more focused EU, which can 
achieve tangible successes in areas crucial to underpinning 
the sense of economic and physical security that encourages 
citizens to favour openness over nationalism. There was 
widespread consensus in our consultations with national and 
civil society practitioners that the EU should concentrate on 
a stronger, more core remit of responsibilities – enabling it to 
deliver more comprehensively on a reduced number of areas, 
and avoiding the ‘over-reach’ that contributes to a sense of 
disenfranchisement among citizens. Ultimately, the more the 
EU can be seen to achieve successes in ‘big ticket’ policy areas 
outside social and cultural frameworks – which our research 
shows is viewed as the preserve of national governments by 
most of the public – the more it will help foster the sense of 
security essential to promoting togetherness over division.
These responsibilities will include levers that emphasise 
cooperation and solidarity – but to productive and tangible 
ends, such as on security, counter-terror and immigration 
policy. The most recent Eurobarometer (86) lends support to 
this view, finding substantial majorities in favour of current 
EU policy priorities around freedom of movement, common 
defence and security policy, and common energy policy.7 
EU leaders can also play a role in promoting safety and 
security by re-orientating policy to position the EU not simply 
as an architect of globalisation, but as a protector against the 
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global economy’s destabilising effects at local levels. 
Importantly, the EU has the opportunity to promote just, 
as well as free, trade. Major trade deals such as the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
have been perceived to favour corporate interests at the 
expense of public scrutiny and protection, leading the EU’s 
Commissioner for Trade, Cecilia Malmström, to declare that 
the EU must ‘do more to engage people at national level and 
to find a new European consensus on trade’.8 This involves 
securing trade deals that explicitly protect workers’ rights and 
enable national governments to hold big business to account. 
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2  Reconnect ‘political 
elites’ and citizens
Political leaders need to address a crisis in political trust 
through measures that reinforce and rejuvenate representative 
democracy and political accountability. The recent increase in 
the use of referendums across Europe demonstrates a failure 
of effective representation, with many serving only to inflame, 
rather than settle, divisive issues.9 There is therefore a pressing 
need for new mechanisms which enable politicians to 
understand the concerns of citizens more constructively, 
and provide clear lines of accountability to political 
decision-making. 
Our findings point to a crisis in political trust. For some 
countries, trust in national governments is higher than trust 
in the EU (particularly the UK), while for others the reverse is 
true (particularly Poland and Spain) – however, trust is 
chronically low throughout. The German case study, in 
particular, revealed a significant disconnect between public 
opinion – rooted in concrete concerns about the EU’s 
influence on national contexts – and the views of many 
German politicians – diagnosing the problem as a diffuse and 
nebulous sense of fear. There is therefore an urgent need to 
address this disconnect between politicians and citizens, and 
the low trust environment that is both its cause and symptom.
Participatory or deliberative forms of democracy can 
be seen as a possible silver bullet for tackling a lack of faith 
in the political system. And there are notable examples of 
well-structured deliberative approaches that have been 
successful at engaging citizens and generating informed 
debate and public contribution (eg, the Irish Convention on 
the Constitution and Iceland’s Constitutional Council).10 
However, attempts at deliberation at the EU level have 
largely been ineffective – with only three campaigns under 
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the EU’s flagship European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) 
managing to fulfil requirements to be heard by the 
Commission (1 million signatures, from seven countries, 
relating to an issue within the EU’s competencies).11 
At the national level, calls for greater democratic 
participation have largely been met through a rise in the 
number of referendums, which have had destabilising 
effects on national democracies and have contributed to 
what Belgian author David Van Reybrouck calls ‘democratic 
fatigue syndrome’, with more intensive electoral politics 
actually serving to undermine trust and engagement.12
In restoring trust, while direct and participatory 
approaches can provide an important supplement to existing 
democratic processes, there is a need to get the fundamentals 
– of democratic accountability and representation – right 
first. This impetus can be supported in the following ways.
Reduce the remoteness of ‘political elites’
In order to make political elites less remote it is necessary 
to create more effective mechanisms for dialogue between 
politicians and citizens, and initiatives to make parliaments 
more reflective of the wider population. There is a pressing 
need to reduce the considerable (and seemingly rising) social 
and geographic gap between politicians and citizens. Part of 
the answer must involve bringing politics down to a local 
level. This could be done through developing forums and 
instruments to enable greater dialogue between national 
politicians and their local communities. There is a clear role 
for civil society organisations to act as a bridge between local 
communities and local, national and supranational politics. 
Maison d’Europe is an example of an initiative in France that 
works to connect local communities to EU-level politics 
through conferences, which provide a forum to connect people 
to EU institutions and politicians. The membership arms of 
political parties can also be influential in embedding politics, 
and even policy development, at a local level.
Making parliaments more reflective of the wider 
population in gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic 
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background is also central to reducing the remoteness of 
politics from people’s lives. On gender, for example, despite 
some gains in recent elections women are still in a minority   
in lower or single parliamentary houses in all our case study 
countries, ranging from 43.6 per cent in Sweden to just 26.2 
per cent in France.13 More effort needs to be made on both the 
demand side (recruiting politicians from diverse backgrounds) 
and supply side (providing leadership opportunities for 
under-represented groups). 
Civil society organisations can play a role here also. 
In the UK, for example, a programme called Reclaim 
(based in Manchester) aims to encourage community and 
political leaders from working-class backgrounds by 
supporting young people from deprived communities 
to deliver a social change project over two years in 
their community.14 
Support democratic and policy-making processes 
that build rather than undermine trust
Referendums should be used sparingly and implemented 
better when needed; the policy-making process should be 
more transparent and open to external input. They are an 
appropriate democratic instrument in specific circumstances 
– particularly, where there has been a significant shift in 
public opinion, which requires the public to ratify a related 
change in policy direction collectively (eg, the 2015 Irish 
referendum on same-sex marriage, which passed with 62 per 
cent of the vote). However, recently referendums have been 
more often used as a political tool to resolve internal political 
conflicts (within the Conservative party in the UK) or 
external political conflicts (between the Hungarian 
government and the EU over refugees). 
This motivation undermines representative democracy, 
with governments abdicating decision-making to settle their 
own political disputes. If a referendum is required, there needs 
to be a fundamental reassessment of how they are structured 
and delivered – to ensure that people are better informed and 
engaged, and campaigns are seen to be factually sound. 
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There is scope for resolving specific political issues 
through well-thought-through deliberative mechanisms 
as an alternative to referendums, ranging from light-touch 
approaches that involve large numbers of people, to more 
intensive processes, including sortition-based citizens’ councils. 
Digital technology has the potential to widen the reach of these 
initiatives dramatically. For example, since 2014 Paris has been 
experimenting with a crowd-sourcing approach to 
participatory budgeting, through which residents are provided 
with online and face-to-face forums to submit, and vote on, 
ideas for how to spend a budget of €426 million between 2014 
and 2020 (5 per cent of the city’s investment budget).15 In the 
2016 spending round nearly 160,000 Parisians voted on how 
to allocate that year’s budget of €100 million, an increase in 
participation of 40 per cent on the previous year.16 The Paris 
example demonstrates both the potential and the limitations 
of deliberative approaches – while it has been able to engage 
large numbers of people, those involved are still only a fraction 
of the 2.2 million population of Paris. Although deliberative 
initiatives can be deployed effectively to build trust and 
engagement on specific issues, or to foster more structured 
debate around the traditional electoral process, they still 
lack the representative legitimacy of electoral democracy. 
Furthermore, policy-making itself needs to become 
a tool for engendering trust rather that an opaque or 
technocratic process conducted in conversations between 
politicians and civil servants behind closed doors. For 
example, the UK government has committed to making 
‘open policy-making’ the norm under its Civil Service Reform 
Plan – though the results so far have been limited to small 
innovations applied to narrow areas of policy.17 
True open policy-making requires far more transparency 
over the policy design process – setting out overall aims and 
the options for change, and encouraging a truly consultative 
process that gathers expertise and input more widely. This 
should apply across all levels of government – from local 
community and neighbourhood plans, to national policy 
conversations, to greater transparency and openness within 
the EU legislature.
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Boost the accountability of EU institutions 
and policy-makers at EU level 
The accountability of EU institutions and policy-makers can 
be improved by making information on the legislative and 
decision-making process more readily available, making more 
active efforts to disseminate this information, supporting 
public engagement, and ensuring that the nuances of national 
debates are better represented at the supranational level.   
As a result of the actual and perceived distance between 
EU legislators and citizens, transparency is often seen as 
a panacea to problems of low public trust and legitimacy.18 
A particular area of concern in this regard is the consolidation 
of decision-making power within the Council of Ministers, 
which prioritises behind-closed-doors negotiations between 
representatives of national governments. The lack of 
transparency at the Council level threatens the EU’s 
accountability – with limited indication of decision-making 
responsibilities, and its representativeness failing to reflect 
the diversity of voices and positions within national 
political discourses. 
Increasing the transparency of Council negotiations 
is therefore a much-needed step to supporting broader 
improvements in accountability across EU institutions. 
The European ombudsman has recently made 
recommendations for greater transparency in EU trialogue 
negotiations – where representatives of the Council and 
Parliament (with assistance from the Commission) meet 
to discuss legislative changes – which include proposals 
to publish meeting dates, summary agendas, positions 
statements and the names of decision-makers.19 These 
recommendations could be applied more broadly to Council 
negotiations and would provide a means of significantly 
increasing publicly available information on decision-making 
within this forum. 
However, this form of transparency – increasing the 
amount of publicly available information, which is the 
dominant understanding of transparency at the EU level 
– only goes so far in securing meaningful accountability. 
In a study of transparency within the Council since 1999, 
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academics Jørgen Bølstad and James Cross argue that while 
the amount of public information has increased:
This does not necessarily translate into a broader public engagement 
with EU politics and increased understanding of how the EU makes 
decisions. For non-experts, the decision-making process remains 
byzantine, and the provision of access to legislative records has 
done little to ameliorate this fact.20
Transparency therefore needs to be conceptualised in less of 
a corporate and more of a civic manner – beginning with the 
public provision of information, but followed by far more 
proactive attempts to disseminate this information in a way 
that draws clear lines of accountability and actively engages 
the public.
As well as increasing accountability, to address EU 
shortcomings in legitimacy and trust it is also necessary to 
make stronger efforts to boost the representativeness of EU 
institutions. Increasing transparency at the Council level 
would have no significant impact on this as it fails to deal 
with a more fundamental issue – put forward by 
constitutional academic Vernon Bogdanor – that European 
elections ‘do not determine or even substantially influence 
the development of the Union… they do not determine the 
political colour of the Union, how it is to be governed, for 
they do not affect the composition of the Commission, nor, 
of course, of the Council of Ministers’.21 
Part of the answer lies in ensuring the full 
implementation of the so-called ‘Interinstitutional 
agreement on better law-making’ introduced in 2016, which 
sets out the principle of ‘equal footing’ of Parliament and 
the Council.22 Beyond this citizens need to be given more 
confidence that their vote genuinely influences the EU’s 
policy-making agenda, through strengthening the powers 
and visibility of the European Parliament (and its MEPs) in 
developing policy and delivering outcomes at the EU level.
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3  Make the case for 
openness and liberalism
With illiberal, nationalist political discourse ascendant, 
there is an urgent need to put forward a more persuasive 
case for liberalism – one that promotes liberal values of 
openness, international cooperation, pluralism and respect 
for fundamental human rights and freedoms, but in a way 
that is more meaningful for ordinary people. 
Pro-liberal politicians and institutions must become  
far more proactive and adept at building coalitions around 
collective interests (which cut across traditional political 
divides), engaging in – and helping to shape – national 
debates around identity and immigration, and ensuring that 
the benefits of international openness are experienced more 
widely across society.
Our findings indicate that while Europe is not 
experiencing an absolute rejection of liberal values –  
with majorities in most countries holding liberal attitudes   
towards issues such as same-sex relationships and female 
participation in the labour market – there has been a slide 
towards more authoritarian and socially conservative views, 
particularly around ethnicity and immigration. In France, 
Germany and Poland, in particular, a higher proportion  
of people feel that greater ethnic and religious diversity  
has had a negative effect on their country rather than  
been a positive influence. And even traditionally liberal  
Spain and Sweden have seen a hardening of opinion  
on immigration. There is a sense, then, that anti-liberal  
rhetoric is cutting through to public opinion far more 
effectively and reopening debates previously  
thought settled. 
So, why have liberal arguments failed to effectively  
speak to people? 
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First, and particularly, at the EU level, there has been 
an over-emphasis on explaining the functions and structures 
of the political process and institutions (so-called ‘input 
legitimacy’) at the expense of genuine citizen engagement. 
This has been ineffective at two levels – in genuinely 
informing people about the EU (public awareness about EU 
institutions and competencies remains low) and in promoting 
any kind of pro-EU, pro-cooperation consensus. The 2015 
Eurobarometer (83), for example, found that there was no 
correlation between people’s level of knowledge about the 
EU and pro-EU sentiment.23 
Second, where liberals at national and EU levels have 
focused more on promoting values, these have too often been 
discussed in an abstract form, or in ways that presuppose their 
universality and ubiquity. Both the content and source of these 
arguments are important. As American social psychologist 
Jonathan Haidt has argued, the ‘new cosmopolitan elite… 
acts and talks in ways that insult, alienate, and energize many 
of their fellow citizens, particularly those who have a 
psychological predisposition to authoritarianism’.24 
There is therefore a need to reframe and re-energise the 
case for liberalism and openness, and there are a number 
of clear steps that can be taken to achieve this, which are 
discussed below.
Develop pro-liberal arguments around 
collective interests
It is necessary to develop pro-liberal arguments around 
collective interests – issues that matter to ordinary people and 
that cut across traditional party political lines – and 
demonstrate the concrete benefits of these positions. 
By focusing on interests, liberal arguments can move beyond 
the abstract and the technocratic, and begin to make a 
compelling case for the concrete benefits of international 
openness, pluralism and diversity to ordinary people’s lives 
(‘output legitimacy’). Crucially, they can reach out to people 
who may not be self-identifying ‘liberals’, but who ultimately 
share common concerns and hopes for their families, 
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communities and country’s place in the world. This requires 
liberals to be proactive in reaching across traditional political 
divides, to create coalitions over shared interests – even if the 
motivation behind the interest or its policy manifestation  
may be complementary rather than matched. 
Areas for possible coalition-building include 
immigration policy, where social liberals could feasibly reach 
out to business and free marketers to resist more nationalistic, 
protectionist reforms to immigration policy. Liberals could 
even attempt to capitalise on new political space created by 
populist insurgents where their interests or aims align. 
This is particularly the case with the social interventionist, 
big government elements of current populist discourse 
– so evident in both Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen’s 
anti-free-trade protectionism – which liberals should engage 
with to develop a broad consensus in support of improved 
social protection and more humane welfare policy. 
Practise values of openness and pluralism
Pro-liberal politicians and institutions should put values of 
openness and pluralism into practice by supporting initiatives 
that enable positive, and ultimately consensus-building, 
debates on issues such as identity, nationalism and 
immigration. There has often been a temptation for liberals to 
actively dismiss or more passively avoid debates on potentially 
divisive issues linked to national identity, but this approach 
risks leaving the argument to be framed, uncontested, by the 
populist right. The narrowness of the Remain campaign’s 
message during the UK Referendum, framed predominantly 
in economic terms, points to the potential consequences of 
failing to shape the wider debate.25 There are warning signs 
that similar mistakes are being made in countries where there 
has not yet been a populist upsurge – particularly Spain, 
where our polling found that 40 per cent of people would vote 
for a party pledging to reduce immigration. This, more than 
any other issue, has also been ‘under-discussed’ in many 
Western nations, which can eventually fuel the rise of parties 
willing to challenge normative viewpoints.
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Liberals therefore need to take an active role in shaping 
the boundaries and content of these discussions – which will 
require a careful balance to be struck between contesting 
discriminatory rhetoric and ensuring that a defence of identity 
politics does not stifle free and open debate. 
Framing the public conversation is a crucial aspect of 
political leadership, and must be conducted in good faith and 
with legitimacy. In 2010, the French government under 
President Nicholas Sarkozy launched a national debate on 
French identity, involving over one hundred local town hall 
meetings across France. However, they were seen as a political 
tool to bolster support from the right in the run-up to regional 
elections. Rather than building consensus, the framing of the 
debates fanned the flames of nationalism and xenophobia 
– by emphasising divisive issues like the burqa. Despite initial 
public support for the initiative, by their conclusion, only 
33 per cent of those polled considered them to be constructive 
and 61 per cent said the process had in no way defined what 
being French means.26 
An alternative approach would be to frame debates 
more actively around points of commonality than points 
of difference, as argued by Karen Stenner, author 
of The Authoritarian Dynamic:
It would seem that we can best limit intolerance of difference 
by parading, talking about, and applauding our sameness… 
Ultimately, nothing inspires greater tolerance from the intolerant 
than an abundance of common and unifying beliefs, practices, 
rituals, institutions, and processes.27
There is also a need for greater inclusivity in debates around 
European values, providing space for more socially 
conservative voices: not watering down liberal positions, 
but preventing the exclusion of those who may be susceptible 
to right-wing populist rhetoric.
A potentially instructive example can be found in the 
Commission’s rejection of the ‘One of Us’ campaign in 2014 
– one of the few initiatives of the ECI actually to gain the 
required number of signatures. This initiative, which garnered 
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1.8 million signatures, predominantly from Italy and Germany 
(and backed by the Catholic Church), called on the EU to 
‘ban and end the financing of activities which presuppose 
the destruction of human embryos’. While few liberals would 
question the Commission’s ultimate decision in this case, there 
was clearly a need to provide an outlet to continue the debate 
and better engage with those who felt strongly on this issue to 
explain in concrete (rather than abstract liberal) terms why the 
Commission rejected the initiative. The flat dismissal may 
simply have left those backing the campaign with the sense 
that the EU is not for them. 
Ensure that the benefits of openness and diversity 
are experienced more widely
The benefits of openness and diversity must be experienced 
more widely, particularly through supporting greater   
intra- and international mobility and engagement for 
socioeconomic groups unlikely to participate in existing 
initiatives. Our findings, particularly from the UK case study 
– which found that the size of people’s social networks 
significantly influences their attitudes towards liberalism, 
international cooperation and cultural diversity – point to the 
need to ensure that people from groups with low 
socioeconomic status, education levels and mobility and/or 
from rural areas are given the same opportunities to travel and 
mix with people from different backgrounds as has become 
the norm among more affluent, cosmopolitan groups. 
At the EU level, while policies like the Erasmus 
programme and data roaming are popular initiatives, they 
often only serve a narrow tranche of the European population: 
those who are already mobile and internationalist in outlook. 
More needs to be done, then, to support mixing between 
communities that are not currently served by these kinds 
of policies. The current Erasmus programme (Erasmus+) 
was originally titled Erasmus for All, with the intention of 
opening up the programme to volunteering, vocational and 
work-related placements, as well as higher education and 
graduate schemes. The EU should invest more heavily in 
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widening this programme to be more inclusive to those 
outside the university system, and reach out to schools, 
vocational learning institutions and community organisations 
to help them to provide resources and support to facilitate 
the application process. 
The UK case study’s finding on social networks also 
demonstrates that mobility schemes within nations could be 
significant to fostering more liberal attitudes and potentially 
overcoming divisions wrought by hard-wired social 
perspectives and economic experiences. Currently, 
many governments only focus on integration policy from 
a racial perspective, but improving socioeconomic and 
rural–metropolitan integration will be just as important 
to building more cohesive societies. 
Civil society organisations have a potential role to play 
here in facilitating mixing at a national and community level. 
For example, the Carnegie UK Trust has recently launched its 
Twin Towns programme, which will provide financial support 
and expertise to enable ten small- and medium-sized towns 
to trial bilateral ‘twinning’ arrangements over an 18-month 
period.28 So too could education systems and local councils 
place a stronger emphasis on building partnerships between 
schools of differing circumstances – whether within 
communities or in different towns and cities – to expose 
children to a greater diversity of experience. 
For adults, there is scope to consider schemes that 
encourage mixing for non-graduate working-age citizens 
– whether through paid voluntary international work 
placement schemes for individuals and their families 
in non-professional sectors, or by linking tax relief to 
community and civic participation. Government-administered 
community grants could also be structured to encourage 
support for projects that bring diverse groups together 
to share common experiences.
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4  Counter post-truth 
narratives in politics 
and the media
Systematic manipulation of facts for political ends and 
the growing acceptance of conspiracy theories are emergent 
trends of particular concern, in part accelerated by new forms 
of social and alternative media. 
According to Oxford Dictionaries, ‘post-truth’ was the 
word of 2016, fuelled by political campaigns in the USA and 
the UK that have had a notably loose relationship with the 
‘facts’. Aided by social and alternative media, political 
misinformation has become a systematic tool used to bolster 
populist campaigns. 
The Polish case study presents the starkest evidence of 
this, describing how the Law and Justice party successfully 
campaigned on a narrative of ‘Poland in ruin’, despite rising 
living standards and falling inequality over the last decade. 
Our polling also found that Islamic terrorism had risen to the 
top of Poles’ concerns for their country, although there have 
been no reported terrorist attacks in Poland and the country 
has only a small Muslim population – a clear indication of the 
impact of Islamophobic campaigning from the populist right. 
Where there is a sense that information or activities are 
being obfuscated, or that politicians are not acting in citizens’ 
interests, people will necessarily reduce their trust in formal 
institutions; the danger now is that we have entered an 
information age, which privileges informal movements and 
provides the opportunity to construct echo chambers around 
preferred viewpoints.
Countering these false narratives and conspiracy 
theories will require decisive action from political 
representatives – addressing the issues that encourage 
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susceptibility to their messages and rebuilding trust in their 
expertise, and the systems that support stable, 
democratic government. 
Citizens must also be supported to differentiate between 
credible and non-credible news sources, by promoting media 
literacy and digital citizenship – whether through national 
education systems or more informal methods. 
Pilot schemes designed and trialled by Demos have 
demonstrated promising achievements in preventing the 
online radicalisation of school students, equipping young 
people with the critical-thinking skills and media awareness 
to be able to evaluate the arguments and content presented   
by extremists. These pilots found statistically significant 
impacts on young people’s confidence in differentiating 
between truth and lies on social media,29 and could   
readily be applied to wider digital media literacy training to   
improve the public’s skills in critically assessing of day-to-day   
political information.
Government-led initiatives in challenging post-truth 
politics will necessarily also need to be complemented by 
those facilitated by civil society and grassroots organisations, 
whose position outside the establishment may help afford 
them greater legitimacy in the short term. We must be clear 
that not all civil society organisations represent a benevolent 
force when it comes to combating populist misinformation 
– with the populist movement in Poland, for instance, backed 
by a range of far-right or anti-liberal civic groups. Moreover, 
civil society organisations, particularly international NGOs, 
can be regarded as being part of ‘the establishment’ or serving 
‘foreign interests’, and hence can lack widespread agency. 
However, certain civil society voices, enjoying high levels of 
trust among the public, may have greater scope in contesting 
false narratives than mainstream political institutions. 
A number of civil society organisations have   
emerged in recent years with a mission to promote greater 
‘truthfulness’ in public discourse. According to a report for 
the Reuters Institute at the University of Oxford, some 
60 per cent of fact-checking outlets in Europe are ‘operating 
either as independent ventures or as projects of a civil society 
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organisation’30 – including FullFact in the UK and   
Demagog in Poland. As well as targeting and challenging 
misinformation a number of civil society initiatives have 
been established that foster more evidence-based public 
debates. Mediendienst-Integration, based in Germany, is one 
such organisation, aiming to support accurate reporting 
of immigration-related news in the mainstream media. 
By providing information, resources and expert contributors 
for journalists, the organisation seeks to shift coverage 
‘from portraying “perceived truths” to [reporting] on 
empirical facts’.31
While these organisations can play an important role 
in shaping media and political narratives, they too can suffer 
from a lack of democratic accountability and popular 
legitimacy. Other initiatives are therefore attempting to take 
a more grassroots approach by building civil society’s 
resilience to ‘post-truth’ narratives and politics. One such 
organisation is the Committee for the Defence of Democracy 
(KOD), which has been able to mobilise 1.5 million Poles  
(5 per cent of the population) in protests against the 
manipulation of state institutions by the Polish government.32 
As well as building a civic resistance to the current Polish 
government, KOD takes an overtly pro-European, pro-liberal 
stance, and is working to build a civic movement around these 
values and principles. 
The EU has a potentially powerful role to play in 
supporting the incubation and scaling of these bottom-up 
organisations. As well as providing funding for these groups, 
the EU can provide capacity-building, coordination and 
networking support to ensure their longer-term sustainability. 
EU support clearly carries some risks in relation to grassroots 
authenticity and legitimacy. Ensuring transparency in funding 
and support criteria and allocation is therefore vital to refute 
claims of clandestine interference by the EU. 
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Conclusions
This project has presented a snapshot of the ‘mood on the 
ground’ in six member states of Europe, during a period of 
increasing social and cultural crisis and political upheaval. 
Through a wide range of qualitative and quantitative 
methods – including surveys, interviews, focus groups and 
workshops – it has drilled beneath the surface of Europe’s 
‘hidden crisis’, as it has become increasingly laid bare for all 
to see. It has allowed us to explore the nuances of how fear 
manifests in particular national contexts, and how cultural 
identities, histories and economic conditions intersect to foster 
conditions that support the rise of authoritarian, nationalist, 
populist or illiberal forces. Importantly, it has also captured 
the hard-wired social attitudes and mindsets that are being 
increasingly activated by populist parties and campaigns, to 
react against a period of unprecedented global connectivity 
and digital transformation. 
The picture painted by the research is certainly cause 
for concern for those who would like to see Europe, and 
a post-Brexit UK, remain both cohesive within and open to 
the world. Nonetheless, as we have outlined above, there are 
clear pathways forward for those leaders with ambitions to 
restore and enhance the stability and success of the EU, and 
to promote stable, liberal democracies. Each principle will 
strengthen the next, and they must be undertaken with a spirit 
of urgency, inclusivity and vigour. 
Attention should focus on how elites can restore trust 
in the fundamental institutions of our democracies, better 
articulate the myriad, shared benefits and strength of open 
societies, and encourage more diverse, challenging and free 
public debate on issues important to people’s social and 
cultural identity. Fundamentally, however, political parties 
and institutions must consider what practical role they   
can play in helping more citizens to feel safe in their lives 
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– whether through public policy levers or simply through 
more inclusive, emotionally attuned and morally 
responsible leadership.
There is no doubt that we are living through a transition 
that feels cataclysmic in nature – disruptive, challenging and 
potentially dangerous. But the question as to whether this is 
the beginning or the end of something has not yet been 
decided. It is important that European governments, and the 
EU itself, do not succumb to reactive policy-making and 
short-term thinking to try to ‘stem the tide’ of populism, 
nationalism and authoritarianism. Liberals may feel in a 
position of disadvantage, but as this research shows, there 
is still a fundamental, majority baseline of support for many 
liberal ideas and policies, which can surely be reactivated 
in the future. The road ahead will be hard, but with humility, 
conviction, creative energy, collaboration and perseverance, 
new shoots will grow.
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